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While a lot of ink has been spilled and numerous papers devoted to 
the variegated causes of the Niger Delta conflict, what has been 
conspicuously moot in the literature is their integration into a 
sufficient explanatory system to facilitate the intelligibility of empirical 
data and support effective policy intervention. Also, while writers 
have investigated the internal dimensions of the conflict, little 
systematic attention has been paid to its international dimensions. 
The study proposes to fill these gaps in existing literature through a 
two-level analysis of the Niger Delta Conflict: (1) internal (2) 
international. The internal level is anchored on a four-dimensional 
explanation which argues that political and economic factors are the 
root causes of the Niger Delta conflict, with environmental and 
social-security factors as the proximate causes. At the international 
level, the study probes the role of the international community in the 
moderation of the Niger Delta conflict and concludes with an 
appraisal of the extent to which the internationalisation of the conflict 
engendered both attitudinal and policy shifts on the parts of key 
players. Problematising the usefulness of majoritarian democracy for 
resource starved plural societies, the study canvasses, inter alia, the 
implementation of consociational mechanisms in the Nigerian 
political process as a more effective way of mitigating the seething 
cauldron of conflicts in the Niger Delta, and promoting inter-ethnic 


























Throughout the country... ethnic minorities are in ferment. They 
are striving to shake off age-long usurpations, to cast off the 
yoke of distant suzerains and to take their own destinies in their 
own hands. This ferment, which this nation can ignore only at 
its own peril, is what has been subsumed under the national 
question. It is real, and it is urgent. To pretend that it does not 
exist is to be deluded. 
 
―Zangon-Kataf: A tainted verdict,‖ editorial in  
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Background to the Study 
1.1 General Introduction: Setting the Scene 
After over five decades of political independence, many African states are engulfed by, 
or teeter on the brink of, open violence due to problems that are largely a colonial 
bequest.  Composed of motley political entities with variegated degrees of autonomy, 
late precolonial Africa was an opaque and highly complex system of fluid polities and 
societies that were at once distinct and related.  The advent of the colonial enterprise 
saw the establishment of ossified territorial and regional boundaries that cut across 
existing political, social, ethnic and religious borders.  The West paid scant attention to 
issues of ethnic, cultural, social, economic, or political propinquity as they arbitrarily 
pencilled on to inexact maps the artificial boundaries of their claimed African colonial 
territories.  It mattered little (if at all) to the metropolitan centers that the yoked entities 
were often made up of societies and cultures that harboured abiding historical rivalries 
or animosities towards each other.  Predictably, postcolonial Africa has been enmeshed 
in a seething cauldron of ethno-religious turmoil that threatens to engulf her.  This is 
despite the 1963 determination of the founding members of the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) not to meddle with the incendiary colonial borders; due to fear that this 
might spark new conflicts, in lieu of ending old ones (otherwise known as the principle of 
uti possidetis). 
In the late 1970s, African leaders and development pundits were forced by the region‘s 
persistent social, economic, and political gridlocks to reflect critically on the nature and 
causes of the bedlam.  The resulting scholarship, which was primarily directed at 
capturing the dynamics of the impasse of nation building, focused analytical attention on 
the excesses of the state and issues pivoting on ethnicity and class.  Many of those 
preliminary analyses addressed questions that fell within the purview of state failures 
and intrastate cleavages from very parochial and deterministic perspectives, especially 
class or ethnicity (see, for example, Cartwright, 1983; Connor 1973, 1994; Diamond 
1982, 1983; Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985; Graf, 1985; Joseph, 1983; Rothchild and 
Olorunshola, 1983; Sklar, 1979).  In doing so, other useful explanatory angles such as 
internal and external influences (including corruption, incompetence, poor leadership, 
falling cash crop prices, and negative terms of trade) were de-emphasized (Uzodike, 
2004: 289; Agbiboa, 2010: 474).   
A key source of domestic tensions in Africa can also be traced to the production and 
exchange patterns that were entrenched under colonial rule.  By linking economic 
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activities, transport networks, and physical infrastructure to the socio-economic needs of 
the metropolitan centers in lieu of the development imperatives of the local economies, 
colonialism created enduring distortions in the political economies of African states 
(Uzodike, 2004: 289; Agbiboa, 2010: 474-509).  The distortions were further 
exacerbated by other colonial polices, including:  
the skewing of terms of trade in favour of the metropolitan centers, the focus on 
primary commodities and extractive industries, the competitive and negative 
positioning of subcultures under ‗divide and rule‘ strategies, and deliberate 
alienation of native populations from land as well as meaningful educational and 
skills-development projects through a policy of importing a median layer of 
skilled labour (Uzodike, 2004: 289).   
In the absence of financial resources, transcendent vision, and adequate managerial 
skills, post-colonial governments retained the inherited production and exchange 
patterns and some of the biases of its colonial progenitor (Uzodike, 1999: 69-74).  
Indeed, ―as political competition was not rooted in viable national economic systems, in 
many instances the prevailing structure of incentives favoured capturing the institutional 
remnants of the colonial economy for factional advantage‖ (Annan, 1998: 4).  The net 
effect for the post-colonial African government has been that the process of state 
building and the inculcation of the ideals of nationalism have proved a Herculean task in 
the face of rabid cultural diversity such as ethnic, religious, and regional differences.  In 
particular, the intoxicating brew of diversity, pervasive resource scarcity and diversion, 
as well as the attendant problems of unequal distribution of whatever is available, has 
coalesced to produce and incubate tensions in many African societies.  There is a 
tendency for such tensions to develop into open conflicts in countries when leaders fail 
to manage the problems passably and promptly before dagger-drawn opposition lines 
are established.   
In contemporary times, the struggle for scarce resources has become the real stuff of 
African politics (Reno, 2003: 45).1  This is evident in the fact that most conflict and wars 
tend to take place around resource-rich regions (Ikelegbe, 2005: 210).  To corroborate 
this point, Keen (2003: 67) observes that the violent struggles in Sierra Leone occurred 
largely in the diamond rich areas.  The same can be said of Liberia and DRC were the 
emergence of personal militias and armed networks is ―underpinned by the struggle for 
control of external commerce and social and trade networks‖ (Ikelegbe, 2005: 210; Ellis, 
1998: 161).  In Nigeria, the oil-rich Niger Delta remains the site of conflict and spiralling 
violence.  Elsewhere, I argued that the struggle for resources are directly linked to bad 
                                                          
1
 Ikelegbe (2005: 209) notes that ―[t]his is what has led to the characterization of several wars, such as 




leadership, overcentralization of governance structures, corruption and lack of 
accountability, dearth of checks and balances, disregard for the rule of law, disrespect 
for standard human rights norms, or the affixation of leadership by circumventing 
democratic processes (Agbiboa, 2011: 83; Ikelegbe, 2005: 209).    
It is often said that individuals and groups who wield political power are well positioned 
to secure economic assets and the paraphernalia of development such as paved roads, 
potable water, good health facilities, adequate educational institutions, and job 
opportunities (Uzodike, 1999: 70).  However, access in Africa has been crucial, and 
even decisive, frequently not only because of the enormity of resource starvation but 
also because the monopoly of political power often led (or was perceived as leading) to 
nepotism, endemic corruption and gross abuse of power.  Not surprising, public 
participation in politics has tended to be hemmed in by discordant struggles among rival 
groups over power and resources (Sklar, 1986: 115).   Fearing increased 
marginalisation, subordinated groups tend to rally around shared lines of affinity in an 
attempt to agitate vigorously for redress.  As former U. N. Secretary-General, Kofi Anan 
(1998: 4) pointedly notes, ―in extreme cases, rival communities may perceive that their 
security, perhaps their very survival, can be ensured only through control of state 
power.‖   
When the tensions are well managed, violent conflicts can be forestalled.  However, 
with inept leadership, the tensions may not only snowball and culminate in economic 
decline but also is foredoomed to state failure.  The experiences of countries like 
Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Congo-Zaire during the 1980s and 1990s all serve 
as salutary reminders.   
1.2 Nigeria’s Wealth: Serving the Few, Starving the Many 
How else do you wake the sleeping elephant?  Poke it with a needle?  It will not 
feel it.  A million needles will not rouse it from the sleep of three decades.  Ever 
since Nigeria was born, it has been sleeping grandly.  So much so that, as I say, 
flies, ants, maggots and all such agents of corruption have presumed it to be 
either dead or dying.  To wake the big, bad beast from its stupor, a sledge 
hammer is needed (Saro-Wiwa, 1990: 166). 
Nigeria is Africa‘s most populous country and the jewel in the African oil crown.  The 
country is also described as a Gulliver2; and its leaders have been compared to the 
                                                          
2
 ―The British author and clergyman, Jonathan Swift, wrote his classic Gulliver’s Travels in 1726, as a 
satire of human frailty as well as his own era, in which Whig politicians were persecuting their Tory 
opponents.  As part of Gulliver‘s travels, he encounters tiny creatures in the land of Lilliput who end up 
behaving in a treacherous and cruel manner, tying up Gulliver, who appears to be a giant in comparison 
to them‖ (Swift, 1986, quoted in Adebajo, 2008: 1-2). 
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Lilliputians3 whose shenanigans have badly dented a country‘s huge potential for 
growth and development (Adebajo, 2008: 2).  As Ali Mazrui (2006: 154) articulates, ―the 
giant of Africa was in danger of becoming the midget of the world.  Africa‘s Gulliver 
faced the threat of becoming the Lilliput of the globe.‖  Other scholars have variously 
described Nigeria as a ―crippled giant‖ (Osaghae, 1998: 1); a ―sleeping elephant‖ (Saro-
Wiwa, 1990: 166); a ―giant with clay feet‖ (Adebajo, 2008: 2); ―a colossal collection of 
impoverished masses [and] a crumbling Tower of Babel built on the rickety foundations 
of oil rents collected and squandered by its leaders‖ (Adebajo, 2008: 2).  Despite its 
position as the world‘s eighth largest producer of crude oil in the world and fifth largest 
supplier of oil to the United States (Ebeku, 2007: 3), Nigeria still swims largely in the 
ocean of poverty.  Adebajo (2008: 2) bemoans the fact that ―Nigeria‘s corrupt leaders 
have failed spectacularly to diversify its economy to reduce its huge dependence on 
crude oil, which still accounts for over 95 per cent of foreign exchange earnings.‖ 
In the years between 1965 and 2004, annual per capita GDP in Nigeria dropped from 
$250 to $212 and between 1970 and 2000, the percentage of total population eking out 
a living on less than $1 a day in the country climbed, rather astonishingly, from 36 per 
cent to a staggering 70 per cent, from a relatively low of 19 million to a high of 90 million 
(Higgins, 2009; Agbiboa, 2011a) (see chart 1A and 1B below).  Available figures show 
that over ―70 per cent of the Nigerian population survives on less than $1 a day; life 
expectancy is also at a dismal 47 years, and the country ranked 159 out of 177 states 
on the United Nations Human Development Index in 2006,‖ below Haiti and Congo 
(Adebajo, 2008: 2; The Economist, 2007: 46). 
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Source: Salai-Martin and Subramanian (2003).  ―Addressing the Natural Resource 
Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria,‖ IMF Working Paper WP/03/159. 
According to Adebajo (2008: 2), ―Nigeria‘s leaders have clearly lacked a sense of 
noblesse oblige (obligation of ranks).‖  In lieu of been called leaders, they are better 
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described as ―leeches‖ that have sucked the country anaemic (Agbiboa, 2011a: 83).4  
Between 1960 and 1999 alone, ―Nigerian leaders siphoned over $440 billion.  This is six 
times the Marshal Plan, the sum total needed to rebuild devastated Europe in the 
aftermath of the Second World War‖ (Ribadu, quoted in Agency News Blog, 21 May, 
2009).5  The sum of the stolen money also amounts to roughly ―two-thirds of all the 
economic aid given to Africa during this period‖ (The Economist, 2007: 46, quoted in 
Adebajo, 2008: 2).  To mention a few names, the regime of General Ibrahim Badamosi 
Babangida, which lasted from 1985 to 1993, failed conspicuously to account for ―$12.4 
billion of missing oil revenues that were part of a windfall from the Gulf war of 1991‖ 
(Apter, 2005: 247, quoted in Adebajo, 2008: 2).  Babangida‘s military successor, 
General Sani Abacha, who ruled Nigeria from 1993 to 1998, was also guilty of 
corruption and frenetic looting.  His family had to return $700 million (out of a reported 
$3 billion—more than a million dollars for every day in office, including weekends) in 
looted money after his death in June 1998 (Guest, 2004: 121; Adebajo, 2008: 2).   
Between the early 1970s and 1998, Nigeria received some $280 billion in oil receipts 
(Agbiboa, 2011: 83).  ―Our problem is not money,‖ an overconfident Head of State, 
General Yakubu Gowon, once boasted, ―but how to spend it‖ (quoted in Raji, 1998: 
133).  However, Nigerian leaders have squandered the whole lot through corrupt 
dealings and perfunctory investment.  In fact, ―since they borrowed billions against 
future oil revenues and squandered that money too, it is fair to say that Nigerians blew 
more than the country‘s entire windfall‖ (Guest, 2004: 124).  Thus, ―by 1998, Nigerians 
were poorer than when the oil boom period began in 1974, and the country was saddled 
with debts of some $30 billion‖ (Guest, 2004: 124).   Income per head stood at $345, 
less than a third its level at the peak of its boom in 1980 (The Economist, January 13 
2000).  In 2011, many Nigerians still bewail the wasted opportunities of the halcyon 
years of oil boom, ―blaming unscrupulous leaders and self-serving ministers who were 
unprepared for the enormous windfalls of oil rents and revenues and became 
intoxicated by the power of the petro-dollar‖ (Raji, 1998: 132).    
Following Nigeria‘s return to democratic governance in 1999, many Nigerians expected 
the country‘s perennial problem of corruption to plummet.  However, such expectations 
have been largely dashed.  Adebajo (2008: 12) contends that despite allegedly 
spending more than $2 billion in reconstructing roads and over one trillion naira on the 
power sector, the civilian regime of erstwhile military leader, Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-
2007), failed to revive the country‘s dilapidated infrastructure and electricity sector, and 
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 For a more detailed description of the corruption of Nigerian leaders, see the author‘s recent publication 
(2011): ―Leaders or Leeches? Corruption and the Cycle of Dysfunction in Nigeria,‖ Loyola Journal of 
Social Science, XXV(1): 83-102. 
5
 See, http://loveworldnewsagencyblog.wordpress.com/category/african-news/page/2/  
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―the country‘s oil refineries were producing less when he left office in 2007 than when 
he was first elected in 1999.‖  In what seems senseless squandering of hopes, the 
Obasanjo regime also announced that it had lost $4 billion in potential oil revenues in 
2006 to incessant attacks on oil pipelines by armed militants in Nigeria‘s volatile delta 
region (Odunfa, 2007: 24).  As Agbaje et al. (2007: 79) aptly note:  
Nigeria is a resource-rich country of poor people in which pathological substance 
often triumphs over sanitized form; institutional recession masquerades as 
institution building; endless new constitutions parade as substitutes for 
constitutionalism; and… performance is often in direct contrast to fervent 
declarations of intent and achievements.   
The extent of Nigeria‘s failure is brought into bold relief when we juxtapose the country 
with Indonesia.   At independence, both countries were nations of subsistence farmers.  
Both struck oil and were deluged with petrodollars.  But this is how far we can go in 
drawing the parallels.  While Indonesia is not exactly a model of good governance, the 
country‘s average income rose nonetheless, from under $200 in 1974 to $680 in 2001, 
despite the Asian financial crash of 1997 (Guest, 2004: 124).  The government of 
Indonesia made good use of its oil wealth and fuelled its industrialization policy that saw 
manufacturing export rise by 40 per cent, vis-à-vis less than one per cent in Nigeria 
(Guest, 2004: 124).  According to Okonkwo (quoted in Tell Magazine November 2, 
2009):  
Indonesia had average gross domestic product, GDP, growth rate of 5.9 per cent 
between 1965 and 2004 whereas Nigeria recorded 3.5 per cent GDP growth. In 
Indonesia, Manufacturing value added increase from 8 per cent in 1965 to 25 per 
cent by 2000, but declined from 5 to 4 per cent in Nigeria.  Similarly, the share of 
manufactured exports increased from 4 per cent to 57 per cent in Indonesia, but 
declined from 2 per cent to 1 per cent in Nigeria. 
In 2002, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported that Nigerians 
are more than twice as likely as Indonesians to be illiterate or to die before the age of 
forty (UNDP, 2002: 151).  Indonesia aside, another great lesson in development is 
Dubai.  Dubai is currently ahead of most of its fellow oil rich nations in the world.  With a 
population of 1, 422,000 and GDP of $46 billion in 2006, Dubai has built a solid and fast 
growing economy on the back of its oil resources.  Significantly today, revenues from oil 
and gas approximate to less than six per cent of its entire annual earnings (Adeyemo, 
2008).6 Income distribution in Nigeria has also deteriorated markedly.  Chart 2 (below) 
plots the distribution of income for four years, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000.  A careful 
study of the chart shows that over time the two tails of the distribution have become 
fatter which suggests that people are increasingly been pushed towards poverty (the left 
                                                          
6
 See, http://www.tellng.com/news/articles/080210-5/news/50%20years_moneyprobs.html.   
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hand side of the distribution) and towards extreme wealth (the right hand side).  
Whereas in 1970 the top 2 per cent and the bottom 17 per cent of the population earned 
the same total amount of income, in 2000 the top 2 per cent had the same income as 
the bottom 55 per cent.7  Nowhere is the tragedy of development in Nigeria more eye-
catching and poignant than in the Niger Delta.  
 
 
Source:  Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). ―Addressing the Natural Resource 
Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria,‖ IMF Working Paper WP/03/159. 
1.3 The Niger Delta of Nigeria: Paragon or Paradox of Development? 
By way of a prelude, the Niger Delta—the delta of the Niger River—covers an area of 
circa 70,000 square kilometres, and is usually ranked among the ten ―most important 
wetland and coastal marine [ecosystem] in the world and is home to some 31 million 
people‖ (Amnesty International, 2009: 9).  The wetland area is comprises of ―36,000 
square kilometres of marshland, creeks, tributaries and lagoons, and is [teeming with] 
fish and wildlife resources, with a high biodiversity‖ and a miscellany of flora and fauna 
(Omotola, 2006: 1).  According to Ojakorotu and Uzodike (2007: 92), the present geo-
politics of Nigeria‘s Delta region concerns nine states, namely (1) Abia, (2) Akwa Ibom, 




.   
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(3) Bayelsa, (4) Cross River, (5) Delta, (6) Edo, (7) Imo, (8) Ondo, and (9) Rivers (see 
chart 3 below).  Ethnic minority groups8 such as ―the Ijaw, Urhobo, Iteskiri, Isoko, 
Kalabari, Nokws, Ndom, Ogoni, Efik, Annang‖ and many others are, collectively, 
predominant in the region (Obi, 1999: 436).  The geographical spread and population 
projection of the Niger Delta is tabulated below (see Table 1 below). 
 
Table 1 
Estimated Population of the Niger Delta  
State 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Abia 3,230,000 3,763,000 4,383,000 5,106,000 
Akwa Ibom 3,343,000 3,895,000 4,537,000 5,285,000 
Bayelsa 1,710,000 1,992,000 2,320,000 2,703,000 
Cross River 2,736,000 3,187,000 3,712,000 4,325,000 
Delta 3,594,000 4,186,000 4,877,000 5,681,000 
Edo 3,018,000 3,516,000 4,096,000 4,871,000 
Imo 3,342,000 3,894,000 4,535,000 5,283,000 
Ondo 3.025,000 3,524,000 4,105,000 4,782,000 
Rivers 4,858,000 5,659,000 6,592,000 7,679,000 
Total 28,856,000 33,616,000 39,157,000 45,715,000 
Source: Ibeanu, 2006, p.19. 
 
Chart 3 
Map of Nigeria numerically showing the states of the Niger Delta 
region 
                                                          
8
 In a definition that adequately encapsulates the critical, numerical and relational properties of the 
concept, a United Nations source describes minorities as groups that: ―…are numerically inferior to the 
rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members possess ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics differing from the rest of the population, and who have, if only implicitly, a sense 
of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture (resources), tradition, religion or languages 




Source: Wikipedia, Available http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File.  Retrieved on 16 May 
2011. Notes: [1] Abia; [2] Akwa Ibom; [3] Bayelsa; [4] Cross River; [5] Delta; [6] Edo; [7].  
Imo; [8].  Ondo; [9].  Rivers. 
 
In Nigeria, ethnic groups are customarily divided into ―majorities‖ and ―minorities‖ 
(Mustapha, 2004: 3).  The numerically preponderant and politically dominant groups in 
Nigeria are indubitably the combined northern Hausa-Fulani, the south-western Yoruba, 
and the south-eastern Igbo.  These three predominant ethnic groups—sometimes 
dubbed the ‗big three‘—are popularly referred to by the generic term ―wazobia.‖9  
Afolayan (1978: 155) argues that these three hegemonic groups constituted 57.8 per 
cent of the national population in the 1963 census.  Going by that census, the Hausa 
ethnic group was placed at 20.9 per cent, the Yoruba at 20.3 per cent and the Igbo at 
16.6 per cent (Mustapha, 2004: 3; Jibril, 1991: 111).  All the other ethnicities constitute 
varying degrees of ―minority‖ status.  There are ―large minorities‖ like the Ijaw, Kanuri, 
Edo, Ibibio, Nupe, and the Tiv (Mustapha, 2004: 3).  Afolayan (1978: 155) notes that 
eleven of such large minorities make up 27.9 per cent of the population in the 1963 
census.  Nonetheless, ―since minority status is both a numerical and a political category, 
often underlined by administrative and economic disadvantages, the bulk of the over 
                                                          
9
 ―wa‖ in Yoruba, ―zo‖ in Hausa, and ―bia‖ in Igbo. 
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200-odd ethnic minority groups shade into different degrees of ‗minoritiness‘‖ 
(Mustapha, 2004: 4).   
Table 2 
Ethnic and Regional Composition of Nigerian Population: 1952/3. 
Ethnic group Population  Percentage 
Edo 468,501 1.5 
Fulani 3,040,736 9.76 
Hausa 5,548,542 17.81 
Ibibio 766,764 0.25 
Igbo 5,483,660 17.60 
Kanuri 1,301,924 4.18 
Nupe 359,260 1.15 
Tiv 790,450 2.54 
Yoruba 5,046,799 16.2 
All Nigeria 31,156,027 100 
North 16,835,582 54 
East 7,967,973 25.6 
West 6,352,472 20.4 
Sources: compiled from GoN, 1952a, Population Census of Northern Region of Nigeria 
1952; GoN, 1952b, Population Census of Western Region of Nigeria 1952; and GoN, 
1953, Population Census of the Eastern Region of Nigeria 1953 (reproduced in 
Mustapha, 2004: 4). 
The exact percentage of each ethnic group in Nigeria is moot; more recent censuses 
are hotly contested.  However, one can glean some indication of the size of nine ethnic 
groups in the population from the last colonial census held in 1952/3 (see Table 2 
above).   A perusal of the above figures shows that the three dominant ethnic groups 
constituted about 51.6 per cent of the national population in 1952/3.  This appreciable 
upper-hand is further enhanced by the tripartite regional administrative arrangement of 
that period.  In the Northern region, the Hausa constituted 32.6 per cent of the 
population.  However, with the inclusion of the Fulani, the figure rises to 50.6 per cent.  
The Yoruba in the Western region constituted 70.8 per cent of the population, while in 
the Eastern Region, the Igbo constituted 61 per cent of the population (GoN, 1952a: 26; 
GoN, 1952b: 18; GoN, 1953: 36, quoted in Mustapha, 2004: 4). The foregoing 
demographic distribution was bolstered by colonial perceptions that ―Nigeria falls 
naturally into three regions, the North, the West and the East‖ (Oyovbaire, 1983: 8).  
Thus, there is the numerical and political superiority of the three majority ethnic groups, 
in their respective regions, and in the nation taken as a whole.  According to Mustapha 
(2004: 4), ―the tendency of many minority groups to cluster—politically, linguistically and 
culturally—round the big three, has given Nigeria a tripolar ethnic structure which forms 
the main context for ethnic mobilization and contestation.‖  In 2011, the Nigerian 
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federation is a composite of 36 states, which are then informally subsumed into 6 zones 
(Mustapha, 2004: 4).  Table 3 (below) indicates the zones-cum-states, and the 
distribution of ethnic groups within them.  
The central place of crude oil revenues in the Nigerian economy began in the early 
1970s, and oil revenues have continually accounted for 95 per cent of Nigeria‘s foreign 
exchange earnings annually since the 1980s (Omotola, 2006; Ogundiya, 2011).  This 
fact has been reported by several scholars (Ikein, 1990; Khan, 1994; Onosode, 1998; 
Ross, 2003; Agbiboa, 2010, 2011a, 2011b) and statistics from the Central Bank of 
Nigeria corroborates various research findings (Ebeku, 2007: 2-3).  One Central Bank of 
Nigeria reported that Nigeria earned US$2.9 billion from crude oil in the month of 
January 2006 alone (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2006, quoted in Ebeku, 2007: 3).  This 
crystallizes the centrality of crude oil to the Nigerian political economy. 
Table 3 
 Location of Ethnic Groups in Nigeria 
States by Zones Dominant Ethnic Groups Number of 
Minority Ethnic 
Groups 
North West  54 
Sokoto, Kebbi+Zamfara Hausa 12 
Katsina Hausa 1 
Kano+Jigawa Hausa 9 
Kaduna Hausa 32 
North East  205 
Borno+Yobe Kanuri 29 
Adamawa+Taraba Fulani, Hausa 112 
Bauchi+Gombe Hausa 64 
North Central  123 
Old Kwara (+parts of Kogi Yoruba, Ebira, Igala 20 
Old Niger Hausa, Gwari 19 
Old Benue (+parts of Kogi Tiv, Idoma, Igala 12 
Plateau + Nassarawa Birom, Angas, Yergam 72 
South West  4 
Oyo + Osun Yoruba - 
Ekiti + Ondo Yoruba 2 
Ogun Yoruba - 
Lagos Yoruba 2 
South East  1 
Anambra, Enugu+Ebonyi Igbo 1 
Imo + Abia Igbo - 
South South  59 




Rivers + Bayelsa Ijaw, Ogoni, Andoni, Igbo 10 
Akwa Ibom Ibibio 7 
Cross River Efik 29 
Source: Otite, 1990, p.57, reproduced in Mustapha, 2004, p.4. 
From oil alone, Nigeria generated US$300 billion between 1970 and 2002, amounting to 
96 per cent of the country‘s foreign earnings (Okonjo-Iweala et al.  2003: 1).  However, 
due to years of ―authoritarianism, chronic opportunism and endemic corruption‖ 
(Omotola, 2006: 8), the potential benefits of oil have failed to trickle down meaningfully 
to the people.10 Informed by a World Bank report, Afiekhena (2005: 15) estimates that 
―about 80 per cent of Nigeria‘s oil and natural gas revenues accrue to one per cent of 
the country‘s population.  The other 99 per cent of the population receive the remaining 
20 per cent of the oil and gas revenues, leaving Nigeria with the lowest per capita oil 
export earning put at $212 (N28, 408) per person in 2004‖ (quoted in Obi, 2009: 124).11  
To make matters worse, the bulk of the wealth that accrues to the one per cent of the 
Nigerians (the ruling cabal) are stashed in foreign banks abroad.  As Afiekhena (2005: 
15) again notes, this time drawing on a UNIDO report: ―Nigeria had an estimated $107 
billion of its private wealth held abroad‖ (quoted in Obi, 2009: 124).  This suggests that  
―not only are most Nigerians and the Niger Delta people excluded from the benefits of 
the oil wealth, most of the wealth has not been invested within the country, contributing 
to most Nigerians living below the poverty line‖ (Obi, 2009: 124).  After the discovery of 
oil in Mongolia, a local leader declared:  ―We do not want to become another Nigeria‖ 
(quoted in Watts, 2008: 43). 
Most importantly,  the ―Niger Delta habours Nigeria‘s crude oil reserves to the tune of 33 
billion barrels, while the natural gas reserves are 160 trillion cubic feet‖ (Omotola, 2009: 
36).  Perhaps, this is why one Ijaw declared:  ―The delta is at the base of Nigeria and it‘s 
like putting a keg of gunpowder under Nigeria.  If the delta explodes, Nigeria goes with 
it‖ (quoted in Maier, 2000: 113).  The paradoxical reality, however, is that the Niger 
Delta region – the Goose that lays the golden egg – suffers from chronic 
underdevelopment and its indigenes remain one of the poorest peoples of Nigeria 
(Amnesty International, 2009: 9; UNDP, 2006: 15).  According to Watts (2008: 44), ―by 
any measure of social achievement the oil states [in Nigeria] are a calamity,‖ 
characterised by ―nestled shacks, broken-down canoes, and children who will be lucky 
to reach adulthood.‖  In 2011, ―what marks out the [Niger Delta] region is its chronic 
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 This is in manifest contrast to a country like Indonesia that has capitalized on its oil fortune and fuelled 
its industrialization policy that saw manufacturing export rise to 40 percent compared to less than 1 
percent in Nigeria (Usman, 2007). 
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underdevelopment, the jolting sense of neglect that engulfs the place and the general 
misery and violence that govern the lives of most of its inhabitants‖ (Osha, 2006: 17).  
As the 2005 Amnesty International report confirms:  
In spite of windfall gains for the Nigerian government as global oil prices have 
more than doubled in the past two years, the inhabitants of the Niger Delta 
remain among the most deprived oil communities in the world – 70 per cent live 
on less than US$1 a day, the standard economic measure of absolute poverty 
(quoted in Ebeku, 2007: 4)  
Commenting on the state of uneasy stasis in the region, the report noted that 
Niger Delta communities see little of Nigeria‘s oil revenues.  Vast stretches of the 
region have erratic electricity supplies, poor water quality, a few functioning 
schools, health care centers, post offices… The only visible government 
presence in many parts [of the region] is a heavily-armed security apparatus.  
The government provides very little infrastructure, public works or conditions 
conducive to employment (quoted in Ebeku, 2007: 4). 
In 2006, a UNDP Niger Delta Human Development Report similarly commented on the 
fact that ―the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling 
social infrastructure and services, high unemployment [rate], social deprivation, abject 
poverty, filth and squalor…‖ (UNDP, 2006: 15).  The report added that ―the prevailing 
situation not only explains the increasing waves of restiveness in the region, it also 
presages a grim future for the region and the country‖ (UNDP, 2006: 16).  Interestingly, 
the tragedy of development in the Niger Delta appears to be consistent with earlier 
findings of several researchers in the field—thus, suggesting that the ‗curse‘ of 
development in the region is both consistent and time-honoured.12  For present 
purposes, however, suffice it to adduce two illustrative case-studies.   
In the first case-study, conducted in the mid-1990s by the World Council of Churches 
(WCC), Geneva, the following was pointedly noted:  
It is clear that the oil boom financed numerous capital-intensive projects, the 
expansion of the network of roads, and of course the development of the new 
capital city: Abuja.  Most of this development took place in the non-oil producing 
areas.  The oil-producing areas were, and still are, some of the least developed 
in the country.  There is no electricity, running [potable] water, telephones, no 
good roads, poor health care facilities, etc. in Ogoniland, and other minority 
groups in the Niger Delta live in similar or even worse conditions. The revenues 
from oil brought incredible modernization and development to some regions of 
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 The fact that underdevelopment is a long-standing problem in the Niger Delta was acknowledge by the 
participants of the stakeholders meeting held on 5 April 2006 at which COSEND was established.  See 
―Government raises fresh panel on Niger Delta‖ (The Guardian, 6 April 2006), available at: 
http://odili.net/news/source/2006/apr/6/32.html.30/07/06.   
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Nigeria, but have had little positive impact on the oil-producing areas (quoted in 
Ebeku, 2007: 5-6; Naanen, 1995: 46). 
In the second case-study, which was released in 2000, the International IDEA [Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance] commented that 
Although data are generally debatable… the Niger Delta, the treasure base of 
the nation, fares relatively poorly in three indicators of well-being [namely, 
access to safe water; access to electricity; and population per medical 
doctor]…Youth unemployment in the Niger Delta is estimated to be among the 
highest in the country… in terms of infrastructure, the Niger Delta lags behind 
enormously. Easily accessible drinking water is still a luxury in many 
communities, a condition that is worsened by the poor environmental practices of 
oil companies… Many roads are not motorable as oil companies only improve 
roads that support their activities. The East-West Road, which links the three oil-
producing states of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers, contrasts dismally with that which 
links Okene and Abuja [the new federal capital territory of Nigeria built entirely 
from oil revenues13] (International IDEA, 2000: 254, quoted in Ebeku, 2007: 6). 
Against this backdrop of scarcity and surfeit, the oil-bearing communities in the Niger 
Delta area are gravely piqued by the inequitable neglect of their region which shoulders 
the burden of oil exploitation and extraction while developing other regions, like the 
north, with the revenues derived from oil (Kubeyinje and Nezianya, 1999).  
Subsequently, in August 1990 the Chiefs and people of Ogoni14 in Nigeria met to sign 
one of the most important declarations to come out of Africa in recent times:  the Ogoni 
Bill of Rights (OBR).15  ―The OBR presented to the Government and people of Nigeria 
called for political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, control and use of Ogoni 
economic resources for Ogoni development, adequate and direct representation as of 
right for Ogoni people in all Nigerian national institutions and the right to protect the 
Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation‖ (Saro-Wiwa, prelude to the 
Ogoni Bill of Rights, 1990: 1).  In particular, the OBR bemoaned the following: 
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 Until late 1980/early 1990s, Lagos was the capital territory of Nigeria.  The new capital territory of 
Abuja, which is a show-case of a modern city, contrasts sharply with Niger Delta villages/communities 
from where the money used to build Abuja was derived (Ebeku, 2007: 6). 
14
 The Ogoni are a people of approximately 500 000, who live in Ogoni, a region in Rivers State, Nigeria.  
The region of Ogoni only has an area of 650 square kilometres, resulting in a very high population 
density.  Despite this high population density, the extraordinary fertility of the Niger Delta has historically 
allowed the Ogoni to make a good living as subsistence farmers and fishing people.  Currently, however, 
this lifestyle is being threatened.  A MOSOP statement reads: ―The once-beautiful Ogoni countryside is 
no more a source of fresh air and green vegetation.  All one sees and feels around is death‖ (―Fact sheet 
on the Ogoni Struggle,‖ see http://www.ratical.org/corporations/OgoniFactS.html.   
15
 The OBR was adopted by general acclaim of the Ogoni people on 26 August 1990 at Bori, Rivers 
State.  Note that the Niger Delta people are not a homogenous ethnic group, but consists of different 




1. That the Ogoni people, before the advent of British colonialism, were not 
conquered or colonized by any other ethnic group in present-day Nigeria.   
2. That British colonization forced us into the administrative division of Opobo from 
1908 to 1947.   
3. That we protested against this forced union until the Ogoni Native Authority was 
created in 1947 and placed under the then Rivers Province.   
4. That in 1951 we were forcibly included in the Eastern Region of Nigeria where 
we suffered utter neglect.   
5. That we protested against this neglect by voting against the party in power in the 
Region in 1957, and against the forced union by testimony before the Willink 
Commission of Inquiry into Minority Fears in 1958.   
6. That this protest led to the inclusion of our nationality in Rivers State in 1967, 
which State consists of several ethnic nationalities with differing cultures, 
languages and aspirations.   
7. That oil was struck and produced in commercial quantities on our land in 1958 at 
K.  Dere (Bomu oilfield).   
8. That oil has been mined on our land since 1958 to this day from the following 
oilfields: (i) Bomu (ii) Bodo West (iii) Tai (iv) Korokoro (v) Yorla (vi) Lubara Creek 
and (vii) Afam by Shell Petroleum Development Company (Nigeria) Limited.   
9. That in over 30 years of oil mining, the Ogoni nationality have provided the 
Nigerian nation with a total revenue estimated at over 40 billion Naira (N40 
billion) or 30 billion dollars.   
10. That in return for the above contribution, the Ogoni people have received 
NOTHING.   
11. That today, the Ogoni people have:  
a. No representation whatsoever in ALL institutions of the Federal 
Government of  Nigeria;  
b. No pipe-borne water;  
c. No electricity;  
d. No job opportunities for the citizens in Federal, State, public sector or 
private sector companies;  
e. No social or economic project of the Federal Government.   
12. That the Ogoni languages of Gokana and Khana are underdeveloped and are 
about to disappear, whereas other Nigerian languages are being forced on us.   
13. That the Ethnic policies of successive Federal and State Governments are 
gradually pushing the Ogoni people to slavery and possible extinction.   
14. That the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited does not 
employ Ogoni people at a meaningful or any level at all, in defiance of the 
Federal government‘s regulations.   
15. That the search for oil has caused severe land and food shortages in Ogoni one 
of the most densely populated areas of Africa (average: 1,500 per square mile; 
national average: 300 per square mile).   
16. That neglectful environmental pollution laws and substandard inspection 
techniques of the Federal authorities have led to the complete degradation of the 
Ogoni environment, turning our homeland into an ecological disaster.   
17. That the Ogoni people lack education, health and other social facilities.   
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18. That it is intolerable that one of the richest areas of Nigeria should wallow in 
abject poverty and destitution.   
19. That successive Federal administrations have trampled on every minority right 
enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution to the detriment of the Ogoni and have by 
administrative structuring and other noxious acts transferred Ogoni wealth 
exclusively to other parts of the Republic.   
20. That the Ogoni people wish to manage their own affairs‖ (excerpts from the OBR, 
1990: 4-8; see Appendix 1 for the complete document).   
Since the 1990s, strenuous efforts have been made by many scholars to dissect the 
causal basis of conflict and spiralling violence in the Niger Delta region.  Some of the 
explanatory variables attributed to the Niger Delta conflict includes:  the clamour for 
more oil revenue (Obi, 2001; Ross, 2003; Omeje, 2004);  the broad context of oil 
extraction and the consequent disastrous effect on the environment (Naanen, 1995; 
Okoh, 1996; Onduku, 2001; Omotola, 2009); differences in perception and 
understanding of security by both the Nigerian state and the indigenous people (Obi, 
1997; Ibeanu, 2000; Uzodike and Isike, 2009); lopsided federalism, underrepresentation 
and the politics of revenue sharing in Nigeria (Ikporukpo, 1996; Okoko and Nna, 1997; 
Ibaba, 2005; Uzodike and Allen, 2005; Uzodike et al. 2010); environmental injustices 
and human rights violation (Okonta and Oronto, 2001; Aaron, 2006); the failure of 
corporate social responsibility on the part of oil multinationals (Clark et al.  1999; Aaron, 
2008; Ikelegbe, 2008); accountability and transparency failures in governance (Peel, 
2005; Enweremadu, 2008; Agbiboa, 2010); hegemonic politics, depredation, a bloated 
status quo (Isumonah, 2005; Obi, 2009) and the laws that govern the oil industry (Ibaba, 
2005).16 
While a lot of ink has been spilled and numerous papers devoted to the variegated 
causes of the Niger Delta conflict, what has been conspicuously moot in the literature 
on the Niger Delta is the integration of these complex causal factors into a sufficient 
explanatory system to facilitate the intelligibility of empirical data and support effective 
policy intervention.  Beyond this, it is often not clear if all the factors attributed to the 
conflict are causal or mediatory.  It is also not clear which factors are trigger, pivotal, 
mobilizing or aggravating (Ibeanu, 2000).  This obfuscation in literature makes conflict 
management in the Niger Delta an onerous task.  In view of the foregoing, this study 
proposes a two-level analysis of the Niger Delta conflict:  internal and international.  At 
the internal level, the study will adopt an integrated four-dimensional approach to the 
Niger Delta conflict—one that draws profoundly on the relationships between political, 
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 It is useful to underscore that the various authors are not necessarily presenting their cases in the form 
of single causality analysis.  So, while suggesting a salient factor, they are not discounting the relevance 
of other factors. 
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economic, environmental and social-security factors often attributed to the conflict.  
Here, the basic postulate is that political and economic factors are the root causes of 
the Niger Delta conflict, with environmental and social-security factors as the proximate 
causes.  The choice of a four-dimensional approach is informed by the conflict analysis 
and response definition endorsed by the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response 
(FEWER) which argues that 
…there is no single cause of a conflict.  Nor is there any single precondition for 
sustainable peace. Different factors vary in importance and reinforce or 
neutralize each other. The analysis of the situation must therefore include 
assessing the relative importance of the different indicators and their inter-
relationship (FEWER, 2001: 7). 
Further afield, at the international level, the study seeks to undertake an analysis of the 
mediative role played by the international community in the Niger Delta conflict and 
conclude with an assessment of the extent to which the internationalisation of the 
conflict brought about a constructive change in attitudes and policies on the part of key 
players.  Particular attention will be paid to the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), 
since they were the first groups to draw the attention of the international community to 
the sufferings of the Niger Delta people.  The paper will also examine the strenuous 
efforts of Ken Saro-Wiwa—the feisty and passionate MOSOP leader-writer—who first 
exposed the plight of the Ogoni to the United Nations Minorities Council (UNMC), 
―calling for the recognition of the Ogoni people as one of the world‘s endangered 
minorities‖ (Soyinka, 1996: 2). According to Saro-Wiwa, wining the ethnic minority 
struggle in the Niger Delta is vital:  ―we either win this war to save our land,‖ he said, or 
we will be exterminated, because we have nowhere to run to.‖17 
The concluding chapter of this study is characterised by two fundamental assumptions.  
The first is that political exclusion and underrepresentation not only tends to flatten the 
vestiges of federalism and democracy in Nigeria, but also ‗oils‘ the interests of the 
majority ethnic groups, while foiling those of the minority ethnic groups.  The second is 
that unequal fiscal regimes tend to generate minority ferment in federations with 
multiethnic groups.  Problematising the usefulness of majoritarian democracy for plural 
societies, the section canvasses, inter alia, the implementation of consociative 
mechanisms in the Nigerian political process as a more useful and intellectually 
satisfying way of ensuring inter-ethnic equity and amity in the country. 
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 ―Factsheet on the Ogoni Struggle,‖ seehttp://www.ratical.org/corporations/OgoniFactS.html. 
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1.4 Research Problem  
This study seeks to understand why an initially peaceful internal resistance in the Niger 
Delta has become increasingly violent, with international consequences. 
1.5 Research Hypothesis 
The thesis of the study argues that the insensitivity of the Nigerian state to the plight of 
ethnic minority groups in the Niger Delta has been the basis of the persistent violence 
against the state and oil multinationals since the 1990s, and the subsequent 
internationalisation of the conflict. 
1.6 Research Objectives  
The study has the following five interrelated objectives:  
1. To investigate the major sources of ethnic minority problems in the Niger Delta; 
2. To discuss the strategies by which ethnic minority groups in the Niger Delta have 
sought to overcome their position as subordinate groups within Nigerian 
federalism; 
3. To examine how an internal crisis has extended to the international arena;  
4. To assess the nature, impact, strengths and inadequacies of past and present 
public policies on ethnic minority problems in the Niger Delta; and 
5. To suggest alternative strategies for the creative, ordered and amicable 
management of ethnic minority problems in the Niger Delta, and Nigeria as a 
whole.    
1.7 Research Questions 
Five questions flow from the research problem and objectives set out above: 
1. How can the conflict in the Niger Delta be appropriately situated? 
2. Why has the conflict transited from a peaceful demonstration to a violent one, 
and from an internal struggle to an international one? 
3. Why does the conflict continue to defy state and corporate responses? 
4. Has the internationalisation of the conflict been a failure or success? 
5. How can the conflict in the Niger Delta be sustainably resolved?  
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1.8 Theoretical Framework 
Various theoretical approaches have been used to explain violent conflicts, especially in 
Africa.  There is neo-patrimonialism, which finds its clearest expression in the works of 
Chabal and Daloz (1999).  The theorists investigate ―the use of disorder as an 
instrument of African political elites to undermine the state and pursue their personal 
interests, resulting in conflict, state failure and crises.‖18 The political approach is 
another theory that has been used to explain the onset of conflict in contemporary 
Africa. It spotlights poor ―governance‖ (World Bank, 1991; Fukuyama, 2004) and points 
to the weakness of political institutions (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Bratton and van 
de Walle, 1997).  As stated by Christopher Clapham, the emergence of insurgency 
movements in West Africa in the 1990s can be ascribed to ―the experience of post-
independence government so bad as to lead... to resistance... and to the consequence 
of... immiseration, exploitation, and state decay‖ (quoted in Adibe, 2001: 28).   
Another approach to conflict is the resource or oil curse thesis, which explains how 
―huge natural resource endowments can blighten [rather than brighten] the prospects for 
development by serving as a source of motivation for people either to struggle over 
scarce resources or form armed groups to engage in conflict in order to exploit the 
opportunity to loot‖ (Obi, 2009: 109).  According to the resource-war proposition, that 
which motivates groups to engage in conflict is not grievance, but essentially economic 
agendas (greed) (Obi, 2009: 109).  Thus, ―issues of identity and self-determination are 
dismissed in favour of a focus on the role that resources, by and of themselves, play‖ in 
the onset of conflict (Obi, 2009: 109).   
More recent studies focus on ―the role played by scarcity or relative scarcity of 
resources as prime triggers of violence, both at the individual as well as the collective 
levels (resource-war thesis).‖19  For example, Rupesinghe and Anderlini (1998: 32-33) 
consider factors that may act as triggers of violent conflicts:  (1) stagnation and 
protracted income decline in poor and middle-income countries (for instance, the cases 
of Algeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Lebanon); (2) unequal growth and asymmetrical 
distribution of resources in cases of accelerated economic growth (for instance, Mexico 
and South Africa); and (3) structural adjustment policies and changing distribution of 
resources.  Quite aside, development theory focuses analytic attention on the role that 
resources and societal development play on the onset of violence (Porto, 2002).  In this 
respect, Ted Gurr (2000: 12) argues that ―for the last half century at least, societies at 
low levels of development have suffered much more from societal warfare than 
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 See, http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ad/article/viewFile/57373/45753.   
19
 See, http://www.iss.co.za/PUBS/BOOKS/ScarcitySurfeit/Chapter1.pdf.   
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prosperous societies.‖ A strand of the resource-war hypothesis has recently become 
known as the greed theory of conflict through the work of Collier and Hoeffler (1999).   
As Jakkie Cilliers (2000: 1) notes, this approach has been collated into that of 
―resource-wars‖ and is sometimes advanced as reflecting a ―new‖ type of war.  Collier 
(1999: 1) has lucidly captured the ―greed hypothesis‖ with the following words: 
... the discourse on conflict tends to be dominated by group grievance beneath 
which inter-group hatred lurk, often traced back through history.  I have 
investigated statistically the global pattern of large-scale civil conflict since 1965, 
expecting to find a close relationship between measures of these hatreds and 
grievances and the incident of conflict.  Instead, I found that economic agendas 
appear to be central to understanding why civil wars get going.  Conflicts are far 
more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance (emphasis 
added). 
Outcomes of a further research, Breaking the Conflict Trap, led Collier and others to 
adopt an economic approach to the causes of conflict.  The crux of this approach is that 
―the key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic development‖ (Collier et al. 
2003: 53).  Stated more fully, the approach argues that: 
countries with low, stagnant, and unequally distributed per capita incomes that 
have remained dependent on primary commodities for exports face dangerously 
high risks of prolonged conflict.  In the absence of economic development, 
neither good political institutions, nor ethnic and religious homogeneity, nor high 
military spending provide significant defences against large scale violence 
(Collier et al. 2003: 53).   
The economic approach aside, the horizontal inequality-conflict thesis is another 
approach which relates conflict to ―the existence of severe inequalities between 
culturally defined groups as distinct from vertical inequalities, and the fact that they 
affect individual wellbeing and social stability in a serious way‖ (Stewart, 2002: 2).  
Thus, there is a tendency for disadvantaged groups to challenge an unsatisfactory 
status quo where there is a real or perceived sense of inequality in access to power and 
resources (Ostby, 2008: 143).  This perspective draws on ―the human motivation of 
participants engaged in violent conflict, particularly the role of political, cultural and 
economic factors in influencing and constructing group identities and mobilizing such 
groups to compete for power‖ (Stewart, 2000: 246-247).  Stewart (2000: 247) makes the 
salient point that group identity is a product of ―political leaders, who find group 
cohesion and mobilisation a powerful mechanism in their competition for power and 
resources, adopting a strategy of ‗reworking of historical animosities‘ to engender group 
identity.‖  However, it is noted that shared group identities may not be enough to 
mobilise a group for conflict, except when the group has a sense of collective 
deprivation due to marginalisation (Obi, 2009: 111). 
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Though useful, the foregoing theories present the reader with some difficulties.  
Consider, for example, the neo-patrimonial approach and its emphasis on rapacious 
elites whose shenanigans lead to state failure.  In lieu of blaming the many crisis in the 
state on the occasion of elite corruption, it would be more intellectually satisfying and 
analytically rewarding to attribute them to several complex factors including ―the 
collapse of the post-colonial mode of accumulation that was in part linked to the 
pressures from globalisation, and the anti-state market reform agenda promoted by the 
IMF, World Bank and other donors‖ (Obi, 2009: 111).  What about the resource-curse 
thesis?  This approach largely fails to capture the ―complex dimensions of the politics 
and international linkages‖ that underscore violent conflicts in resource-rich African 
countries (Obi, 2000: 47-62).  Added to this, the approach is shockingly mute on why 
wars break out in resource-poor countries.  Instead, ―it exaggerates the role of a single 
factor, out of many, as the predisposing factor to violence‖ (Obi, 2000: 47-62).   
The account given by the political approach to conflict remains unpersuasive.  Bates 
(2008: 261) has asked a critical question:  ―How can one recognize which institutions 
are weak, which states fragile, or which governments ‗bad‘ other than by the rise of 
political disorder?‖  Further, Bates (2008: 261) argues that ―insofar as these ‗causal‘ 
factors are characterized by their consequences, then they add little by way of 
explanation.  They may highlight what has been observed, but they do little to explain 
it.‖ The political approach, therefore, ―borders on tautology‖ (Bates, 2008: 261).  Quite 
aside, the reductionist nature of the greed theory has also been criticised by Cilliers 
(2000: 2), thus: ―…although war may have both intended and unintended economic 
consequences, any analysis that seeks to reduce the study of extensive social conflict 
to a single determinant should be treated with care.‖  Therefore, the resource-war 
theory, or greed theory, does not does not seem to leave an aperture for a 
comprehensive or robust understanding of contemporary conflicts.   
On the economic approach, Bates (2008: 261) argues that the theory ―fails to point to 
the mechanisms that link economic conditions to political outcomes. While pointing to a 
set of relationships between macroeconomic aggregates and political behaviours, it fails 
to specify the micro-level mechanisms that generate those relationships or the 
incentives that animate them.‖ Adverting our attention to those theories that dwell on the 
economic incentives for war, a cursory look at the roots of violent conflicts in Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, and Liberia suggests several trends.  For example, the many wars in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia were the result of a complex amalgam of historical, political, 
and economic factors as well as deep-seated crises that engulfed both countries (Zack-
Williams, 1999; Abdullah, 2004).  While the horizontal inequality approach suffices for 
understanding the root causes of inter-group conflict and violence, ―it still faces 
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challenges in grappling with intra-group conflicts, measuring inequalities (sometimes 
represented statistically), and dealing with the factor of globalized pressures/actors that 
deepen existing contradictions and cleavages in some African societies‖ (Obi, 2009: 
112).  Despite its appeal, ―the horizontal inequalities school of thought have been 
disputed by the new political economy/war economies perspective that endorses the 
view that inequality does not increase the risk of civil war‖ (Ostby, 2008: 143). 
1.8.1 Relative Deprivation (RD) 
The relative deprivation (RD)20 approach furnishes a more useful analysis of internal 
conflict (especially collective violence) and is, thus, the preferred theoretical framework 
for this study.  The concept of RD finds its clearest expression in the works of James 
Davies (1962: 5-19), Ted Gurr (1970), Oberschall (1969: 5-23), and Birrel (1972: 317-
343).  Tersely, RD describes the tension that ―develops from a discrepancy between the 
‗ought‘ and the ‗is‘ of collective value satisfaction‖ (Gurr, 1970: 23).  This theory places 
the relative sense of deprivation as the main source of grievance and conflict 
behaviours among people.  As Runciman (1966: 9) pointedly notes, ―if people have no 
reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve, they will be less discontented 
with what they have, or even grateful simply to be able to hold on to it.‖  According to 
Davies (1962: 5), ―political violence results from an insupportable gap between what 
people want and what they get:  the difference between expectations and gratifications.  
This discrepancy is a frustrating experience that is sufficiently intense and focused to 
result in either rebellion or revolution.‖  In his masterpiece Why Men Rebel, Gurr (1970: 
24) argues that ―the greater the deprivation an individual perceives relative to his 
expectation the greater his discontent; the more widespread and intense discontent is 
among the members of a society, the more likely and severe is civil strife.‖  In essence, 
what Gurr is saying is that collective disadvantage and relative deprivation underlie 
violent political mobilisation.   
Obviously, no theoretical framework can claim to be infallible.  As such, RD has 
attracted some criticisms.  Gomes Porto (2002: 1-28) notes, for instance, that some 
scholars have commented on the fact that the reality of deprivation is not a guarantee 
                                                          
20
 Relative deprivation implies that ―people become dissatisfied if they feel they have less than they 
should and could have.  There are many different ways this can happen: members of a society or 
organization have decreasing amounts of what they previously possessed; improving conditions which 
then deteriorate; rising expectations, where people raise their expectations about what they could and 
should have‖ (Porto, 2002: 17). Furthermore it should also be pointed out that relative deprivation theories 
do not only refer to economic deprivation; it extends to the political level as well.  Samuel Huntington, for 
example, ―locates violent political action and revolution at the level of the political sphere: within a context 
of rapid socio-economic modernization, people are mobilized and induced to enter the political arena, and 
if their demands are not properly channeled, aggressive modes of behaviour may be taken‖ (quoted in 
Porto, 2002: 17). 
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that groups will seek to resolve their issues through violent means (Kopi, 1974: 1569-
1578; Kriesberg, 1973).   In fact, it has been argued that ―severe deprivation may make 
people despair of changing the conditions and, as accommodation to such despair, 
even the self-recognition of collective discontent may not occur‖ (Kriesberg, 1973, 
quoted in Porto, 2002: 17).  In any case, Porto (2002: 17) contends that RD‘s focus on 
―distributional aspects‖ provides an ―additional and plausible explanation as regards 
triggering mechanisms of violence.‖   
The assumptions of RD will be used in this study to make sense of the abiding 
grievances of the Niger Delta people with regards to their undue marginalisation within 
the Nigerian federation.   RD will also help to crystallize the paradox of development in 
the volatile Niger Delta region.   Finally, RD will help to shed light on how the failure of 
non-violent tactic such as ―peaceful protests, media publicity, and litigation‖ (Omotola, 
2006: 8), to achieve the desired result has warranted a pedagogy of violence.  As 
Omotola (2006: 8) notes, ―it is certain that the sense of deprivation shared by the [Niger 
Delta] people is deep-rooted, demanding more attention than is currently the case, 
before it degenerates into another Gulf war‖ (emphasis added). 
Importantly, the frustration-aggression relationship provides the psychological dynamic 
for the proposed nexus between intensity of deprivation and the potential for collective 
violence. The most influential formulation of frustration-aggression theory was proposed 
by Dollard and his colleagues at Yale in 1939.  The basic postulate of the theory is that 
―the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of 
frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form 
of aggression‖ (Dollard, 1939; see also Pear, 1950: 161-191; McNeil, 1959: 195-294; 
Yates, 1962).  A later clarification of this hypothesis is offered by Miller et al. (1941: 339) 
who contend that frustration produces instigations to various responses, one of which is 
aggression.  ―If the non-aggressive responses do not relieve the frustration, the greater 
is the probability that the instigation to aggression eventually will become dominant so 
that some response of aggression will occur‖ (Miller et al.  1941: 339).  The basic 
element that the frustration-aggression theory contributes to our understanding of 
human conflict, and specifically to our analysis of collective violence in the Niger Delta, 
is the principle that anger functions as a drive for violence.21 
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 In the latter formulation of the theory by Berkowitz (1964: 257-272), ―the perception of frustration is said 
to arouse anger.  Aggressive responses tend to occur only when they are evoked by an external cue, that 
is, when the angered person sees an attackable object or person that he associates with the source of 
frustration.‖  See, also, http://www.iss.co.za/PUBS/BOOKS/ScarcitySurfeit/Chapter1.pdf.    
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1.9 Research Methodology  
The qualitative method of data analysis is favoured by this study.  In his work titled 
Research Skills, Alan Thomas (2004: 191) clarifies that ―[p]rimary data have been 
constructed by the researcher in the context of his or her own research project.  
Secondary data have been constructed by others, who may or may not be fellow 
researchers, for purposes which may or not be research.‖  In line with this elucidation, 
this study prefers a secondary data analysis because of its capacity to facilitate a 
nuanced study and to employ broad-based interpretative practices to glean a better 
understanding of the area under discussion (Morse and Field, 1995: 2; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2003: 4; Bryman, 2008: 22).  The term secondary, when predicated of a data, 
may (mis)lead us to think that they are inferior to primary data.  Yet, as Thomas (2004: 
191) argues, ―it is often possible to carry out original and important research project 
using ‗old‘ data that have already been collected by others.‖  Working with such 
secondary data is known as secondary analysis.22  
For the most part, this research draws on data sourced from secondary sources.  
Secondary data on the Niger Delta conflict will be gleaned from various data retrieval 
techniques from scholarly sources, viz. textbooks, journals, magazines, newspapers, 
and governmental publications, inter alia.  Punch (1998) has spotlighted several 
advantages of secondary sources.  He notes, for instance, that ―expenditure on 
obtaining data can be greatly reduced‖ and ―data analysis can begin immediately,‖ thus 
saving time (Punch, 1998: 1).  Beyond this, ―the quality of some data may be superior to 
anything the researcher could have created working on his/her own‖ (Thomas, 2004: 6).  
Be that as it may, the secondary research methodology has its own caveats.  Data that 
have been collected by others for their own purposes is often difficult to interpret, 
especially when these data are taken out of their in situ context.  Besides, it is much 
more difficult to appreciate the weak points in data that have been obtained by others 
(Thomas, 2004).  Lastly, ―the data may only be partially relevant to the current research 
question.‖23  
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 ―Secondary analysis is any further analysis of an existing dataset which presents interpretations, 
conclusions, or knowledge additional to, or different from, those presented in the first report on the inquiry 
as a whole and its main results.  Secondary analysis will thus include studies presenting more condensed 
reports…; more detailed reports (offering additional detail on the same topic); reports which focus on a 
particular sub-topic… or social group…; reports angled towards a particular policy issue or questions; 
analyses based on a conceptual analysis; and reanalysis which take advantage of more sophisticated 
techniques to test hypotheses and answer questions in a more comprehensive and succinct manner than 
in the original report‖ (Hakim, 1982: 1).   
23
See, http://ivythesis.typepad.com/term_paper_topics/2010/06/sovereignty-versus-individual-human-




1.10 Research Contribution 
While many studies have made useful attempts to dissect the manifold causes of 
conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta, only a modicum of studies have actually attempted to 
discern the root causes of the conflict from its proximate causes.  Added to this, while 
researchers have investigated the internal dimensions of the conflict, there has been 
little systematic attention paid to its international or global ramifications.  With the 
following caveats in mind, this study undertakes to fill the gaps in existing literature in 
order to facilitate the intelligibility of empirical data and to support effective policy 






Preliminary Literature Review: A Conceptual Exploration 
2.1 Introductory Remarks 
In any qualitative study such as this, we do well to clearly define our key concepts.  ―A 
lack of conceptual clarity can only lend ambiguity and, hence obfuscation, to one‘s 
analysis.‖24  So conceived, this chapter reviews central concepts that are crucial to a 
proper understanding of ethnic minority conflicts in the Niger Delta.  At the close of this 
chapter, the reader should have a passable understanding of such important concepts 
as:  development, the oil-development-resource curse nexus, the Gulf of Guinea, the 
Nigerian state in perspective, security, ethnicity, ethnic conflict and minority problems, 
civil society, and ethnic militias-cum-resource control.  Particular attention will be 
devoted to the issue of ethnicity, ethnic conflict and minority problems since they 
provide the benchmark for the key thematic concern of this study. 
2.2 Development 
‗Development‘ is an amorphous concept that may be used in numerous contexts.   In all 
these contexts, however, ―it denotes some kind of change‖ (Dale, 2004: 21).  As 
chronicled by Remenyi (2004: 25), the concept of development has evolved from ―a 
relatively simple concern with industrialization along with increasing gross domestic 
product to a much more complex mix of quality of life, participation, empowerment and 
good governance—all of which have remained elusive to many of the world‘s poor.‖  
Remenyi (2004: 25) further notes that ―growth towards self-reliance and contentment‖ 
underlies the concept of development.  The opposite, de-development, is ―when the 
capacity for self-reliance and contentment deteriorates, usually because the means to 
be responsible for one‘s own livelihood, welfare or future has been [ceded] to war, civil 
unrest, natural calamity, or the [foisted] need to flee and adopt the life of a refugee‖ 
(Remenyi, 2004: 25).  According to Adinkrah (1984: 67), development refers to ―the 
conscious process of a country to seek a better life for its citizens.‖ This process, says 
Adinkrah (1984: 67), involves the steady expansion of a large number of non-revenue 
yielding services such as schools, hospitals, and communication systems, which are 
quintessential to long-term development.  In line with Adinkrah, Seidman (1966: 999) 
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 Hussein Solomon and Sally Matthews, ―Transforming Ethnic Conflicts,‖ Centre for International Political 
Studies, Available at, 
http://www.cips.up.ac.za/files/pdf/uafspublications/TRANSFORMING%2520ETHNIC%2520CONFLICTS.p
df. Retrieved on 6 June 2011.  
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opines that development refers to a country‘s deliberate attempt to ameliorate the living 
standards of its citizens. 
Now, development is sometimes defined solely in terms of economic development 
(Seabrook, 1993: 8; Wallis, 1989: 22).  Such a conception of development tends to 
exclude political development and the broader idea of social development which 
encapsulates both political and economic aspects of development.  Moreover, it 
reduces the degree of progress and maturity in a society to be measured by the level of 
its production.  In this regard, the definition of development proffered by the 1986 U. N. 
Declaration on the Right to Development is instructive.  It sees development as ―a 
comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the 
constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on 
the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair 
distribution of benefits resulting therefrom‖ (quoted in Ebeku, 2005: 369-370, emphasis 
added).‖  
For Dudley Seers (1977), the concept of development transcends capital accumulation 
and economic growth to include the condition in which a country‘s population have 
access to adequate food and job opportunities and the income asymmetry among them 
is greatly reduced.  In particular, development includes such core aspects of the quality 
of life as:  social justice, equal opportunities for all, equitable distribution of income and 
the democratization of the development process (Agbiboa, 2010: 480). One reliable 
United Nations publication views development as a process that creates the 
environment whereby people can meet their aspirations and fulfil their potentials 
(Ebienfa, 2010; Ake, 1996: 125).  Todaro (1982: 14) conceptualises development in 
terms of ―multidimensional changes involving progress or improvement in structures, 
institutions, and general aspects of life of a given people that entail the acceleration of 
economic growth, decline of poverty, and the reduction of inequality.‖  
The South Commission Report shifts the focus of development to the human person 
when it notes that ―true development has to be people centered‖ (Museveni, 1992: 9).  
To this end, the Commission defines development as  
a process which enables human beings to realize their potential, build self-
confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment.  It is a process which frees 
people from the fear of want and exploitation.  It is a movement away from 
political, economic, or social oppression. Through development, political 
independence acquires its true significance.  And it is a process of growth; a 
movement essentially springing from within the society that is developing 
(quoted in Museveni, 1992: 9). 
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Continuing with the theme of people-centered development, Reidar Dale (2004: 21) 
uses the concept of development normatively in the context of human societies.  So 
conceived, ―development is viewed as a process of societal change that generates 
some perceived benefits for people, or as a state of perceived quality of life attained 
through such a process‖ (Dale, 2004: 21; see, also, Eggers, 2000a; 2000b; 2002).   
Dale (2004: 22-23) has suggested a general typology of dimensions of development 
which this study considers useful.  A précis of the dimensions of development is given 
below: 
1. Economic features.  This involves income and income-related characteristics, 
expressed through phenomena such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita, income distribution, rate of employment, etc., at the macro or group level; 
and income, consumer assets, production assets, etc., at the level of the 
household or, less frequently, the individual. 
2. Social features.  This pertains to various aspects of social well-being, expressed 
through phenomena such as life-expectancy at birth, child mortality, school 
enrolment, etc., at the macro or group level; and health, level of literacy, social 
security, etc., at the level of the household or the individual. 
3. Dependent versus independent position.  This includes degree of bondage or, 
oppositely, freedom in making one‘s own choices about aspects of one‘s life or 
lives, expressed through features such as degree and terms of indebtedness, 
degree of struggle for scarce resources, degree of inequality or equality of 
gender relations, group relations, etc.   
4. Marginalised versus integrated position. This pivots on the degree and terms of 
participation in markets, politics and social life, and type and strength of 
economic and social security networks. 
5. Degree of freedom from violence.  This concerns the extent to which individuals 
and groups may lead their lives without deliberate mental or physical 
maltreatment or fear of such maltreatment, within their family and in the wider 
society. 
6. Degree of mental satisfaction.  This refers to the degree of mental peace, and the 
ability to enrich one‘s life through intangible stimuli. 
7. Survival versus development-oriented attitude. This involves perception of one‘s 
position, abilities and opportunities in the society, at the level of the social group, 
household or individual (Dale, 2004: 22-23). 
For many Niger Deltans, the common belief is that development, as reviewed above, 
has resoundingly eluded their region.  They are piqued by the fact that oil receipts are 
continually used to run the Nigerian state and develop areas occupied by the majority 
ethnic groups to the exclusion of minority groups, especially in the Niger Delta (Ebeku, 
2005: 370).  As Adewale (1995: 69) explains, ―members of the [oil-bearing] communities 
have expressed the view that it is inequitable for the government to leave their 
communities underdeveloped and utilize the proceeds of the oil extracted from their 
communities for the rapid development of other parts of the country.‖  Ikein (1990: 39) 
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supports the Adewale‘s explanation when he attributes the developmental stasis in the 
Niger Delta to the fact that ―their wealth is ripped away to benefit other areas.‖  Even the 
former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo agrees with the point made by Adewale 
and Ikein above.  He frankly declares that ―it is unfair for south-south [Niger Delta] 
states, the producers of the nation‘s wealth to languish in penury while the resources 
from their areas are used to develop other parts of the country‖ (This Day, September 
10, 2002).  Crucially, the major contention of community leaders in the Niger Delta, as 
noted by Adewale (1995: 69), is that development ―should start from the oil-producing 
area and spread to other parts of the country and not vice versa.‖ 
2.3 The Gulf of Guinea 
Since the late 1990s, the significance of the Gulf of Guinea has been underscored by its 
role as ―an energy repository and a strategic supplier to the global oil market‖ (Onuoha, 
2009: 245).  This importance was given a fillip by the renewed worldwide interest in the 
region‘s resources due largely to the tragic events that occurred on 2 September 2001 
in the United States, and the pressure to cut-back on global over-reliance on oil supplies 
from the volatile Middle East region by searching for other reliable sources of oil supply 
(Onuoha, 2009: 245).  Thus, ―the attempt to gain a strong foothold in the oil-rich West 
Africa by Europe and North America is linked to economic and geopolitical 
considerations.‖25   
On May 16 2001, the National Energy Policy Report noted that ―Africa is expected to be 
one of the fastest-growing sources of oil and gas for the American market.  Africa oil 
tends to be of the high quality and low in sulphur...  giving it a growing market share for 
refining centers on the East Coast of the U.S.‖ (Rozoff, 2011).26  Similarly, in 2002, U.S. 
Congressman Williams Jefferson frankly stated that ―African oil should be treated as a 
priority for U.S. national security post 9-11... our traditional sources of oil are not as 
secure as we thought‖ (Rozoff, 2011).  The expectation is that the Gulf of Guinea will 
provide a quarter of the oil imports of the U.S. by the year 2015 (Kwaja, 2011: 1). This 
underscores the strategic importance of the region.  Subsequently, the Gulf of Guinea 
has become increasingly crucial in issues that fall within the purview of global energy 
security (Onuoha, 2009: 245; see, also, Klare and Volman, 2004: 227).  These unfolding 
developments hold profound implications for the region.  Why? Because ―global project 
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 See, ―Oil and the Gulf of Guinea,‖ Available at, http://www.nigeriafirst.org/printer_230.shtml.  Retrieved 
on 12 July, 2011.   
26
 Rozoff, R.  (2011).  ―US Africa Command and Gulf of Guinea: Militarization of Energy Policy,‖ Available 
http://guineaoye.wordpress.com/2011/01/08/us-africa-command-and-gulf-of-guinea-militarization-of-
energy-policy/.   
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of securing the region is directed at controlling both the territorial space and the 
resources within it‖ (Onuoha, 2009: 245; Obi, 2005: 40). 
The Gulf of Guinea is popularly referred to as a coastal belt which includes many ―West-
Central-Southern African countries.  These include: ―Angola, Benin, Cameroon, the 
Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Cote d‘Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra-Leone, and Togo‖ (Onuoha, 
2009: 245).  According to Onuoha (2009: 245), the Gulf of Guinea produces 
approximately 5.2 million barrels per day and is estimated to hold as much as 50.4 
billion barrels of oil in proven reserves.‖27  Rozoff (2011) has noted that ―the Gulf of 
Guinea increasingly represent an important source of oil, with the U.S. estimating that it 
will supply over a quarter of American oil by 2015.  It has already sent U.S. military 
trainers to the region to help local nations to secure shipping.‖  
The importance of the Gulf of Guinea is also underscored by other factors:  
(1) With the exclusion of Chad, all the oil exporting countries of the region are 
coastal states with veritable access to the sea. 
(2) The bulk of the region‘s oil deposits are located offshore.   This reduces, though 
does not entirely rule out, face-offs with indigenous communities and other 
restive elements, unless piracy such as that in the Gulf of Aden begins in earnest 
off the West African coast. 
(3) Given its low sulphur content, the region‘s crude is de lure  in the global energy 
market,28 and with the emergence of technological innovations, such as the ultra-
deep water machinery and 3-D seismic expertise, the extraction of previously 
unreachable deposits has now began in earnest (Onuoha, 2009: 245).   
However, the Gulf of Guinea is home to some deep ironies.  Most states in the region 
present (on the whole) one of the most despicable forms of underdevelopment and 
squalor.  In a 2008 ―Index of State Weakness in the Developing World‖ conducted by 
the Brookings Institute, in which the performances of 141 developing countries were 
                                                          
27
 ―This is an approximation of crude oil production and proven oil reserves of oil producers in the Gulf of 
Guinea for 2008: Angola (daily total oil production: 2.014), proven reserves: 9.035 billion barrels) 
Cameroon (daily total oil production: 81.72;  proven reserves: 0.200 million barrels), Chad (daily total  oil 
production: 126.99; proven reserves: 1.5 billion barrels), Equatorial Guinea (daily total oil production: 
359.20; proven reserves: 1.100 billion barrels), Gabon (daily total oil production: 247.85; proven reserves: 
2.000) and Nigeria (daily total oil production: 2.168.86; proven reserves: 36.220 billion barrels)‖ (Energy 
Information Administration, 2008, quoted in Onuoha, 2009: 245). 
28
 ―Recent indications suggests that refineries in China and India are changing their crude oil diets from 
‗sweet crudes‘, and upgrading to process high-sulphur  and less-costly sour Middle east Crudes which 
may likely remain the base load in their future energy projections.  However, according to Kang Wu of 
FACTS Global Energy, China‘s sweet crude imports will keep rising, but sour crude imports will rise faster 
because most of the country‘s new refining capacity is designed to process sour crudes‖ (see Judy, 2009, 
quoted in Onuoha, 2009: 248). 
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assessed, it was discovered that ―32 African countries were among the top 50 worst 
performers and 12 of those were oil producing states from Africa‖ (Rice and Patrick, 
2008: 12).   Closely following other African oil states in the Gulf of Guinea, the index 
ranked Nigeria 28th on the list of ―critically weak‖ states (as a matter of interest), ―falling 
within the bottom quintile on critical issues such as inflation, rule of law, control of 
corruption, conflict intensity, gross human right abuses, coups, political instability and 
absence of violence, child mortality, access to improved water and sanitation.‖29  The 
above brings into bold relief the paradox of plenty (Karl, 1997)—a phenomenon which 
has characterised most petro-states in the region, viz. Nigeria, Angola, Gabon and 
Congo-Brazzaville.  Other new oil states—like Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, and 
Sao Tome and Principe—appear to be foredoomed to this fate too.30  The paradox of 
plenty is crystallized in the oil-development nexus. 
2.4 The Oil-Development-Resource Curse Nexus 
One of the greatest paradoxes of Africa is that its people are for the most part 
poor while its land is extraordinarily rich 
   Nicholas Krislof, International Herald Tribune, May 27th 
1997. 
The linkage between oil and development is a contradictory one.  In some countries, the 
oil resource has been the cause of development; in others, however, oil has been the 
curse of development.  Oil-exporting Norway, for example, has used the benefits of its 
North Sea petroleum proceeds to attain the high place it presently occupies on the 
UNDP List of best social development performance.  By contrast, other oil exporters like 
Nigeria and Angola poignantly lead from the rare (Karl, 2007: 2).  Added to this, while oil 
has given a welcomed boost to development in most developed countries like Russia, 
United States of America, Canada, France, and Australia, the experience in most 
developing countries and the Third World fluctuate with the exception of countries like 
Libya, United Arab Emirate, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where oil 
wealth is more efficiently utilized to diversify the economy and to better the lot of the 
citizens.  Most exponents of oil-led development often draw attention to some of the 
prospective benefits ranging ―from enhanced economic growth and the creation of jobs, 
increased government revenues to finance poverty alleviation, the transfer of 
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 C.  Ukeje, ―Oiling Regional Insecurity: The Implications of the Niger Delta Crisis for security and 
Stability in the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa,‖ Available at 
http://www.garnet.sciencespobordeaux.fr/Garnet%20papers%20PDF/UKEJE%20Charles.pdf. 
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technology, the improvement of infrastructure and the encouragement of related 
industries‖ (Karl, 2007: 2).    
There is little doubt that the oil industry can be a potent source of huge revenues, if not 
mixed with corrupt practices engineered by unscrupulous and visionless leadership.  
Also, income derived from oil-related rents—such as ―royalties, taxes, oil export 
earnings, interest on joint venture investments‖ (Omeje, 2007), often create the financial 
backdrop for the execution of impressive development programmes.  This aside, oil 
fuels technological development in the sense that, as a source of energy, it encourages 
the technological production of goods and services which creates job opportunities in a 
country.  Contrariwise, ―the consequences of oil-led development can be negative, 
including slower than expected growth, barriers to economic diversification, poor social 
welfare performance and levels of poverty, inequality and unemployment‖ (Karl, 2007: 
2).   
Karl (2007: 2) has also noted that countries over-reliant on oil as the mainstay of 
development are often characterised by an ―exceptionally poor governance and high 
corruption, a culture of rent-seeking, often devastating economic, health and 
environmental consequences at the local level, and high incidences of conflict and war.‖  
Moreover, such monocultural economies also suffer from devastating economic, health 
and environmental degradation at the local level, and high incidences of conflict and 
war.  The oil-development discourse has been largely informed by the resource curse 
thesis which has emerged strongly since the 1980s.  The thesis demonstrates how 
natural resource abundance can be a curse to a country‘s development (Auty, 2007: 
207).  In particular, it contends that wealth derived from oil usually brings out high levels 
of ―corruption, profligacy, social crisis, poor governance, human right abuses and 
ultimately violent conflict‖ (Gary and Karl, 2003: 9).  Thus, ―enormous natural resource 
endowments blighten [rather than brighten] the prospects for development, 
paradoxically motivating people to struggle over scarce resources, breeding corruption, 
marginalization, and armed insurgency‖ (Gary and Karl, 2003: 9).   
It is important to note that the idea of the resource curse is not novel.  Auty (2007: 207) 
explains how imperial Spain ―provides a long-recognized example of a country that 
failed to prosper from the gold and silver shipped from its New World colonies.  In 
contrast, Spain‘s beleaguered Dutch colonies were developing the economic dynamic 
that was to win them their freedom and make them the commercial model for Western 
Europe.‖  In his work The Shackled Continent, Robert Guest (2004: 63) argues that, 
―governments that depend on natural resources for most of their income are usually 
venal and despotic.‖  Indeed, most oil-rich Gulf States and African oligarchies such as 
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Nigeria, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea have a wretched record.  The case of Angola is 
illuminating.   
Angola is the world‘s ninth-largest oil producer but most Angolans are poorer than they 
were when oil was first discovered off the country‘s Atlantic coast (Guest, 2004: 63).  
Sadly, ―the [oil] industry [in Angola] accounts for over 90 per cent of Angola‘s export 
earnings but employs only 10,000 people‖ (Guest, 2004: 63).  Angola‘s offshore wells 
disgorged 800,000 barrels a day in 2000.  Half of the country‘s gross domestic product 
(GDP), as well as nearly all the taxes of the Angolan government, comes from oil.  This 
notwithstanding, many ordinary Angolans do not even know that their country has oil.  In 
Angola, ―oil fuelled a civil war that left [the majority in the country] scorched and 
starving, while allowing a tiny elite to grow fantastically rich‖ (Guest, 2004: 63).  Since 
the ruling government controlled the oil wells, it had more petrodollars to pay its troops 
and buy guns which in turn helped them to prolong the fighting and pillaging of 
resources.  As Guest (2004: 67) notes, ―The war gave the Angolan government an 
excuse (‗national security‘) for secrecy, which made it easy to pocket huge kickbacks on 
arms deals, or simply to funnel oil receipts into offshore accounts.‖  By one estimate, in 
the late 1990s between a third and a half of public spending in Angola was not properly 
accounted for (Angola Country Report, 1998: 16).    
By parity with Angola, Nigeria represents the ne plus ultra (perfect example) of the 
resource curse: ―the country is estimated to have absorbed oil rent in excess of $300 
billion during 1974-2004, averaging around an extra 23 per cent of non-oil GDP during 
1974-81‖ (Auty, 2007: 208).  Consequently,  
these revenues transformed a dynamic and diversified economy, which grew by 
7 per cent per annum during 1967-74 into a mono-product basket case with a 
per capita income by 2004 less than one-quarter of what it would have been if it 
had sustained its pre-oil boom growth rate (Auty, 2007: 208).     
In the light of the above, oil in Nigeria can be described as a ‗curse‘ rather than a 
blessing.  Indeed, as one editorial in the Guardian puts it: ―… it has been to our external 
shame that, unlike most other oil-producing countries, we have neither taken firm 
control of the industry nor have we reaped bountifully from the proceeds.  That is why 
Nigeria is an unflattering example of the oil curse‖ (quoted in Obi, 2010: 443).  In this 
regard, Obi (2010: 443) poses the germane question: ―Is it not an irony that Nigeria 
exports crude oil, but imports refined petroleum products despite having four 
refineries?‖  Importantly, due to the mono-cultural nature of the Nigerian economy, other 
viable sectors of the Nigerian economy that formerly fuelled development has been 
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sidelined, ―a classic symptom of the ‗Dutch disease‘‖31 (see, Auty, 1993; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004; De Soysa and Neumeyer, 2007: 202).32  For instance, the discovery of 
oil in Nigeria during the 1970s resulted, regrettably, in the gross neglect of the 
agricultural sector which was formerly the food basket of the economy.  Available 
statistics indicates that ―from less that 1 per cent in 1960, the contribution of oil to gross 
domestic product (GDP) rose to 14.6, 21.9 and 26-29 per cent in 1970, 1975 and 1979, 
respectively.  By 1992, it had reached a height of 46.8 per cent‖ (Omotola, 2006: 8).  
The contribution of oil to Nigeria‘s export earning has been much higher: ―From 58.1 per 
cent in 1970, it rose to 95.6 per cent in 1979.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it 
remained very high, accounting for N210 billion or 96.1 per cent of total export earnings 
in 1996‖ (Omotola, 2006: 8).  In 2011, the country suffers from severe shortage of 
agricultural goods to sustain its huge population; as a result, it depends on massive 
food importation.    
It is quite illuminating to note that that initial research into the resource curse focused 
empirical attention on the mineral economies, which appeared to have performed 
especially poorly during the years after 1973.  The macroeconomic response of six oil-
exporting countries have been analysed by Gelb et al. (1988: 262-288).  These 
countries include:  Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Venezuela.   The conclusion of their analysis shows that ―most governments found it 
politically difficult to resist pressure to spend the oil wind-falls, so that the over-rapid 
domestic absorption of the oil revenues triggered patterns of consumption that 
sustained Dutch disease effects and proved difficult to cut back when oil prices fell‖ 
(Auty, 2007: 208).  By contrast, Indonesia shows that ―a growth collapse can be avoided 
if sufficient oil revenue is used to diversify the economy competitively‖ (Timmer, 2004, 
quoted in Auty, 2007: 208)  
Part of the problem in Nigeria is the fact that the value system in the country has been 
devalued, so much so that public treasuries are unabashedly stolen by the same 
officials mandated to manage them (Agbiboa, 2010, 2011).  As Maria Costa pointedly 
notes, ―between 1960 when Nigeria became independent and 1999 when Democracy 
was restored, a staggering sum of $400 billion was stolen and stashed away by a 
generation of corrupt rulers.  That is within a space of 39 years…‖ (quoted in Ajanaku, 
2008: 36).  Notably, Nigeria‘s return to democratic rule in 1999 has done little to 
                                                          
31
 ‗Dutch disease‘ refers to ―a process whereby new discoveries or favourable price changes in one sector 
of the economy—for example petroleum—cause distress in other areas—for example agriculture or 
manufacturing‖ (Karl, 1997: 5). 
32
 This situation, according to proponents of the rentier state thesis was due mostly to ―the ready 
availability of rent revenue, and the fact that oil rents reduce the political and economic significance of the 
taxpayer, as it allows the state to be less dependent on taxation‖ (Idemudia and Ite, 2006: 396). 
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ameliorate the situation of pervasive corruption, looting, and rent-seeking activities in 
the country.  In a show of shame, Nigeria has often led from the top in most 
Transparency International (TI) corruption rankings (see Table 4 below).  
Against this backdrop, Babafemi Ojodu‘s (African Concord, 1992: 8) caricature of 
Nigeria is well taken.  He sarcastically articulates that ―corruption has become the major 
export [of Nigeria] apart from oil.‖  It is useful to note, however, that there is a steadily 
improvement in Nigeria‘s rankings in recent years.  This may point to the fact that ―the 
on-going initiatives to rein in corruption excesses in Nigeria seem to be making its 
inroads felt in the country‘s political economy‖ (Agbiboa, 2010: 483, emphasis added).33  
Whatever the merits, the state of affairs in Nigeria remains so mangled that the simple 
task of maintaining existing infrastructures remains a resounding debacle.  What is 
more, some contract figures are extra-legally inflated and those to whom they are 
awarded conceive them as an avenue to ‗cut‘ their share of the ‗national cake‘.  This 
explains the many ―white-elephant‖ projects that litter the country—an unflattering sign 
of growth without development (Agbiboa, 2010, 2011a).  In the light of the above, it 
behoves us to ask: What is the trouble with Nigeria? According to Nigeria‘s eminent 
writer and novelist, Chinua Achebe (1983: 22), 
[t]here is nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian character.  There is nothing 
wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else.  The 
Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the 
responsibility… of true leadership. 
Table 4 















                                                          
33
 For a well-documented presentation of the impact of the on-going anti-corruption initiatives in Nigeria, 
see author‘s earlier publication in 2010: ―The Corruption-Underdevelopment Nexus in Africa: Which Way 
Nigeria?‖ Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, 35(4): 474-509. 
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Source: Adapted from, Agbiboa, 2010, p.483. 
Achebe‘s quote is incarnated in the Niger Delta region.  The plethora of natural 
resources in the delta should make it a region with huge potentials in terms of industrial 
development.   Poignantly, however, these huge potentials have remained only on 
paper.  The above paradox has led many Niger Delta inhabitants to view the oil 
resource as a curse rather than a blessing.  Further, Nigeria has been described as a 
prime example of the rentier state (Kuru, 2002: 52).  A rentier state is generally 
regarded as ―a state reliant not on the surplus production of the domestic economy or 
population but on externally generated revenues or rents, usually derived from an 
extractive industry such as oil‖ (Kuru, 2002: 52; Karl, 2007).  Frequently, a rentier state 
is ―without a productive outlook in the sense that revenues from natural resource rents 
contributes a significant proportion of the GDP and dominate national income 
distribution, usually at the expense of the real productive sectors of the economy‖ (Kuru, 
2002: 52).  In other to appreciate the context in which Nigeria is being classified as a 
rentier state, it is useful to put the Nigerian state in perspective. 
2.5 The Nigerian State in Perspective 
Onuoha (2009: 248) has located the origins of the Nigerian state within ―a colonial state 
structure that was dominated by the coercive designs of the British colonial enterprise.‖  
To be sure, colonialism left certain conspicuous marks on Nigeria.  The first mark is that 
―the post-colonial Nigerian state (just like its colonial progenitor) remains a law and 
order state‖ informed by a pedagogy of force and violence (Omotola, 2006: 6).  The 
untimely incorporation of the Nigerian state into global capitalism also rests on the 
country‘s colonial origins.  This was done to realise the aim of colonialism—―exploitation 
of capital and surplus value‖ (Omotola, 2006).  This is what Osaghae (1998: 19) 
referred to as the ―extractive role‖ of the state.   Soon, ―the conception of the state as an 
instrument of accumulation and patron-client ties as the dominant mode of political 
relations‖ (Omotola, 2006: 7) gained currency in Nigeria.   
Omotola (2006: 7) argues that in this complex nexus, ―the state lacked autonomy 
because its apparatuses were not only underdeveloped, but also captured by the 
governing elite to advance their parochial interests.‖  Consequently, the Nigerian state 
became privatised, seen by Ake (1996: 42) as the appropriation of the state to ‗oil‘ 
private interests.  In this regard, Wayne Nafziger (2003: 2) has noted that   
these elites may not benefit from avoiding political decay through nurturing free 
entry and the rule of law and reducing corruption and exploitation.  Instead, 
political leaders may gain more from extensive unproductive, profit seeking 
activities in a political system they control than from long-term efforts to build a 
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well functioning state in which economic progress and democratic institutions 
flourish (quoted in Omotola, 2006: 7).   
Though Nigeria gained political independence in1960, the same perception of the state 
has endured, even after the local elites took over from the colonialists.   Such a 
perception holds serious security implications.   
2.6 (In)security  
Following the end of the Cold War, the concept of ‗security‘ is back on the radar screen, 
this time with renewed academic interest.   This allows writers in the field to think about 
security as something that transcends the customary notion of military defence of state 
interests and territory (Parris, 2001).  Traditionally, security has been understood in the 
light of military threats to the de-emphasis of other security threats (Buzan, 1983; Cable, 
1995; Mastanduno, 1998).  As Baldwin (1997: 9) contends, ―during the Cold War, 
security studies was composed mostly of scholars interested in military statecraft.   If 
military force was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military 
force was not relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics.‖  For 
several decades, the predominance of the realist paradigm meant that security was 
subsumed under the rubric of power and the state (du Pisani, 2007: 15).  As Tickner 
(1995: 176) notes, ―conceptually, it was synonymous with the security of the state 
against external dangers, which was to be achieved by increasing military capabilities.‖  
The scholar Barry Buzan (1991: 16-17) is in the vanguard of viewing issues of security 
in a new light.  According to Buzan (1984), individual security, state security and the 
international system are inseparably linked.  He argues that ―security cannot be isolated 
for treatment at any single level‖ (quoted in Baldwin, 1997: 8, emphasis added).  
Further, Buzan (1991: 16-17) notes that the concept of security should be broadened to 
include military, political, economic, societal and environmental aspects.  These are: 
1. That human security is a universal concern.  The notion of human security is not 
limited to the poor or rich countries.  It recognizes that there are common threats 
to all peoples including unemployment, crime, pollution, drugs and human right 
violations. 
2. That the components of human security are interdependent.  There are no 
territorial limitations to the components of human security.  Famine, floods, 
pollution, terrorism, ethnic disputes and social integration can no longer be 
conceived as circumscribed to national borders. 
3. That early prevention is an easier way to guarantee human security than later 
through intervention.  When weighted in the balance, the costs of preventive 
measure are less than the costs of dealing with the aftermath of a security 
breach.  For instance, rather than trying to stem the tide of death and diseases 
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after a disaster, prior emphasis placed on primary health care may lessen the 
potential damage to the population. 
4. That people are at the [epicenter] of human security.  Human security deals with 
how people live and breathe, how they exercise choice, how much access they 
have to opportunities and whether they live in conflict or peace (Buzan, 1991: 16-
17). 
Human security is the most recent formulation in a general broadening of the concept of 
security that has gained momentum over the past three decades.  Ojakorotu (2008: 39) 
argues that the human security paradigm is an inclusive conception of security that 
recognizes and accommodates a wider range of issues that borders on human concern 
such as security from poverty, disease, famine, illiteracy, environmental despoliation, 
and unemployment, which [individually or collectively] have contributed to the 
destruction of human existence.  These are the stuff of crisis in the Niger Delta.34  From 
a human security perspective, the security of the state is not an end in itself: ―it is a 
means of providing security for people‖ (du Pisani, 2007: 18).  As such, human security 
complements state security in four important respects: 
1. Its concern is the individual and the community rather than the state. 
2. Menaces to people‘s security include threats and conditions that have not always 
been classified as threats to state security. 
3. The range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone. 
4. Achieving human security includes not just protecting people, but also 
empowering people to fend for themselves (UN Commission on Human Security, 
2003: 4). 
  Most human security supporters share the idea that  
the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly; as security of 
territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign 
policy...  It has been related more to nation-states than to people...  Nations have 
forgotten the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their 
daily lives (Echeverri, 2010: 58). 
Continuing with the theme of human security, the comprehensive report of the U.N. 
Commission on Human Security (2003: 2) reminds the reader: 
Today‘s flows of goods, services, finance, people and images spotlight the many 
interlinkages in the security of all people...  The security of one person, one 
community, one nation rests on the decisions of many others—sometimes 
fortuitously, sometimes precariously. 
                                                          
34
 The shift from the authoritarian, state-centric view to the notion of human security is premised on the 
fact that people are the means and end of the development process.   
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According to the U.N. Commission on Human Security (2003: 2-4), human security 
―complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human 
development.  It seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals 
and communities and, further, to empower them to act on their own behalf.‖  Further, 
the commission (2003: 4) adduces the following definition of human security: ―to protect 
the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human 
fulfilment.‖  In practice, this means: ―protecting people from critical (severe) and 
pervasive (widespread) threats and situations.  It means using processes that build on 
people‘s strengths and aspirations.  It means creating political, social, environmental, 
economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of 
survival, livelihood and dignity‖ (U.N. Commission on Human Security, 2003: 4). 
The human security paradigm presents us with two important questions.  The first 
question is: Security for whom?  du Pisani (2007: 17) argues that the answer to this 
basic question is that human security is people-centered.  He notes that ―human 
security takes individuals and their communities, rather than territory, states, or 
governments, as its point of reference‖ (du Pisani, 2007: 17).  The second question in 
respect of human security is: Security from what? Again, du Pisani (2007: 17) notes that 
―human security addresses threats to the survival and safety of people from both 
military and non-military sources.‖ The first category—military—includes, inter alia, 
―intra-state war, small arms proliferation, communal-based violence, insurgency, rebel 
activity, and civil war‖ (du Pisani, 2007: 17).  The second—non-military—can include 
―serious human rights violations, famine, environmental degradation, violent crime, illicit 
drugs, economic collapse, infectious diseases, and natural disasters‖ (du Pisani, 2007: 
17).   
Onuoha (2009: 248) has noted that ―Nigeria‘s national interests include preserving its 
sovereignty, independence and economic security, and strengthening the institutions 
and frameworks for the realisation of these objectives.‖  As such, national security in 
Nigeria revolves largely around protecting these interests through the ―optimum 
combination of sound military defence policies and a favourable foreign relations 
position, and an administrative capability to support these‖ (Onuoha, 2008: 248).  At 
independence, Nigeria reproduced the marks of the colonial state—a state which was 
essentially authoritarian in nature with a security orientation that was best described as 
highly statist (Omotola, 2006: 8).  As Ake (2000: 36) avows, ―more often than not, the 
post-colonial state in Nigeria presented itself as an apparatus of violence, and while its 
base in social forces remained extremely narrow it relied unduly on coercion for 
compliance, rather than authority.‖  This aside, rent-seeking activities associated with 
Nigeria‘s mono-cultural economy also underscore the perceptions of national security in 
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the country.  As Onuoha (2009: 248) argues, ―Nigeria‘s excessive dependence on 
income from oil exports exposes the linkage between the rentier context of its economy 
and its national security.‖  To be sure, since the 1970s, Nigeria‘s economic survival 
have been exclusively tied, like an umbilical cord, to oil rents as the oil multinationals 
became quintessential to the survival of the Nigerian economy (Onuoha, 2009: 248).  
Against this backdrop, any internal or external disturbance of oil production poses 
serious threats to Nigeria‘s security interests.   
The above context, says Onuoha (2009: 249), ―reinforces the coercive approach to 
government which, in responding to internal legitimacy challenges, precludes more non-
coercive and social-oriented approaches‖ (see, also, Imobighe, 1987; Nweke, 1988; 
Olukoshi, 1992), which in turn mirrors the manner in which the state relates with its local 
constituencies.   According to Onuoha (2009: 249), the understanding of security was 
―largely characterized by the forceful repression of public discontent, the co-optation of 
local government officials in power and a system of top-down financial allocation.‖  
Quite aside, the state security apparatuses, working in complicity with the private 
security forces of the companies, also play a crucial role (Isike et al.  2007).  Through 
irresponsible practices, oil multinationals have unleashed severe havoc on the Niger 
Delta environment.  Regrettably, the Nigerian military have shielded them from been 
held responsible for their environmental damage and human rights violations.  The 
systematic neglect underlying the Niger Delta conflict has been described as a ―matrix 
of concentric circles of payoffs and rewards built on blackmail and violence‖ (Ibeanu, 
2002: 165), involving key players from the local and international scene.  According to 
Ibeanu (2002: 165): 
The closer a person is to the centre, the greater his/her capacity to blackmail oil 
companies and therefore the greater his/her payoff.  In time, members of the 
raucous inner circle fade away in a wimper and silence as a new core of vocal 
community leaders emerge: more blackmail, more payoffs. 
Another dimension to security challenges in Africa is the proliferation of small arms and 
light weapons (SALW).  This alarming development calls for serious attention on the 
part of respective states in Africa as the proliferation of SALW tends to sustain tension 
as well as intra-state conflicts (Agbiboa, 2011b).   More often than not, the currency of 
SALW in Nigeria has asphyxiated any efforts at ending the conflict in the Niger Delta 
region.  The violent confrontations between the Ijaws and their immediate neighbours, 
the Itsekiri and Urhobos, all serve as salutary reminders (this subject will be taken up 
again later on in chapter three). 
Crucially, two mutually exclusive conceptions inform the security situation in the Niger 
Delta.   These two conceptions are supported by the two contending stakeholders in the 
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crisis—the Nigerian government and the Niger Delta communities.  On the one hand, 
the Nigerian government, as well as the oil companies, endorse a traditional state-
centric view of security.  On the other hand, local people in the Niger Delta, as well as 
other stakeholders in the region, favour the human security conception (Uzodike and 
Isike, 2009).   The conflict between these two conceptions of security in the Niger Delta 
is partly responsible for the pervasive tensions in the region since the 1990s.  The 
traditional state-centric conception of security frequently favours the use of military force 
as a means of quelling dissent.  The case of Umuechem (1990 and 1993) and that of 
Uwheru (2004) and Odioma (2005) are especially instructive in this regard (Uzodike and 
Isike, 2009).   
2.7 Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflicts, and Minority Problems 
So strong is… [the] propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that 
where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful 
distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and incite 
their most violent conflicts.  But the most common and durable source of factions 
has been the various and unequal distribution of property (James Madison, The 
Federalist, No.  10, November 24, 1787). 
At different times, Africa‘s cultural diversity—especially its ethnic, racial, class, religious, 
and regional differences—has been her most abiding source of conflict in the 
postcolonial period.  The issue of identity, especially why people see themselves and 
others as belonging to particular cultural groups, is beyond the immediate scope of this 
study.  Nonetheless, I will like to draw the reader‘s attention to the opening quote of 
James Madison as a reminder about not only the time-honoured and nonspecificity of 
social differentiation but also its continued salience, resilience and persistence.  
Contemporary analysts of group strategy echo the sense in Madison‘s words.  They 
contend that the theory of collective definition suggests that, under certain conditions, 
 subordinate groups will tend to insist on their own ‗specialness‘ and thus 
reinforce the solidarity of their group… the insistence on specialness occurs 
when economic mobility is unlikely and group members instead opt for an 
improvement in their lives through political action (Blumer and Dustin, 1980: 211-
238, emphasis added). 
In recent times, understanding the casus belli for war and internal conflict has captured 
the interests of social scientists.  But what do we mean by ‗conflict‘? Thomas Hall (2004: 
139) defines conflict as ―an immense category for human disputes that range from 
relatively mild disagreements, such as the meaning of words, interpretation of events, 
and so on, to extremely violent attempts to eliminate another person or group of 
persons.‖  Further, Hall (2004: 139) notes that conflict comes in different ranges: ―from 
blatant and overt, to very subtle and hidden.‖  According to Francis (2006: 71), ―A 
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conflict arises between individuals or groups with incompatible interests and objectives.‖  
For Paul Richards (1996: xxiv), conflict is a violent attempt by belligerents ―to ‗cut in on 
the conversation‘ of others from whose company [they] feel excluded.‖  One recurring 
theme in all the adduced definitions is the point that conflict overridingly concerns 
incompatible interests and resultant violence.    
There is a sense in which one can argue that conflict is endemic to human relationships 
and societies.  Zartman (1991: 370) has noted that conflict arises from interaction 
among people; ―an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions and an 
expression of the basic fact of human interdependence.‖  According to Coser (1956: 
16), conflict emerges ―whenever two or more people engage in struggle over values and 
claims to status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to 
neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals.‖  Further, Coser (1956: 16) explains that ―these 
perceived threats occur especially if both parties are seeking to expand into the same 
physical sphere or field of influence or activity.‖  In line with Coser, Stagner (1995: 5) 
contends that the occasion of ―aggressive behaviour always suggests the existence of 
frustration which always leads to some form of conflict.‖  Hugh Miall (1992: 1) has 
outlined some key defining features of a conflict.  These include: 
(1) Perception amongst parties that a conflict exists. 
(2) Incompatible views regarding interests, values, objectives or hostile interaction 
must lie at the root of a conflict. 
(3) The parties may be either states or non-state actors or sub-national groups within 
the state. 
(4) The outcome of conflict must be considered important by the parties (Miall, 1992: 
1).   
Ibeanu (2003) has identified three types of conflicts in Africa: (1) conflicts that arise as a 
result of struggle for political participation or over political space, (2) conflicts 
precipitated by the contest for access to resources, and (3) conflicts caused by the 
struggle over identity.  To this list, Kahler (2002: 1) has added a fourth dimension when 
he alluded to conflicts caused ―by persistent attachment to territory.‖  A regular type of 
conflict is armed conflict which describes a situation where ―parties to a conflict engage 
in hostile interaction and use of force with the aim to control, injure or destroy the 
opponent‖ (Francis, 2006: 71).  Peter Wallensteen and Karen Axwell (1994: 333-349) 
have both developed a causality criterion to categorize armed conflicts into three 
classifications35:  
                                                          
35
 The classification of armed conflict into distinct categories is problematic when applied to contemporary 
intra-state wars in Africa for a variety of reasons.  It is not only difficult to secure reliable statistics on 
battle-related causalities, but also these ‗civilian-based‘ internal wars have induced starvation, disease 
and appalling human misery, resulting in deaths.   
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(1) Minor armed conflict: where battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict 
are below 1000. 
(2) Intermediate armed conflict: where there are more than 1000 battle-related 
deaths recorded during the course of the conflict, and where more than 25, but 
less than 1000 deaths, have occurred during a particular year. 
(3) Wars: where there are more than 1000 battle-related deaths during the course of 
one particular year (Wallensteen and Axwell, 1994: 333-349). 
In an edited work Between Development and Destruction, Luc van de Gor et al. (1996: 
1-28) categorized the causes of conflict into four distinct areas:  
(1) The crisis of state formation and nation-building, in particular, the factors 
contributing to the failure and disintegration of the post-colonial state. 
(2) Cultural factors with a specific focus on the manipulation of ethno-religious and 
nationalist identities. 
(3) Socio-economic factors.   
(4) The availability and proliferation of weapons (van de Gor et al. 1996: 1-28).   
According to Kenneth Waltz (1979: 8), the causes of conflict can be analysed at three 
levels: (1) individual, (2) the nation-state and (3) the international system.  The 
individual level pivots on the ―human nature and predispositions towards aggression; 
and on individual political leaders and their belief systems, personalities, and 
psychological processes‖ (Waltz, 1979: 8).  Further, Waltz (1979: 8) relates the national 
level to ―both governmental variables such as the structure of the political system; the 
nature of the policy-making process; and societal factors such as the structure of the 
economic system; the role of public opinion and non-economic interest groups; ethnicity 
and nationalism; and political culture and ideology.‖  The systemic level identifies the 
causes of conflict as involving ―the anarchic structure of the international system; the 
number of major powers in the system; the distribution of military and economic power 
among them; patterns of military alliances and international trade; and other factors that 
constitute the external environment common to all states‖ (Waltz, 1979: 8).  However, 
Clarence Tshitereke (2003: 83) has argued that an appreciable lacuna in Waltz‘s level 
of analysis framework is that much of the theoretical outline does not seem relevant 
when dissecting African conflicts as most African conflicts are largely civil wars with only 
a modicum of interstate conflicts. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the political economy analysis of civil wars in Africa gained 
currency with especial focus on how the nature of domestic politics or prebendal36 
politics creates the sources for violent conflict in Africa.  The most recent version of this 
analysis is the ‗greed and grievance‘ thesis advanced by Paul Collier and others of his 
                                                          
36
 Prebend is a term coined by Max Weber to describe ―personal benefits acquired from the appropriation 
of public office‖ (Gerth and Mills, 1958). 
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ilk as the casus belli for wars in Africa.  The thesis supports the position that ―economic 
considerations often shape the calculations and behaviour of parties to a conflict, giving 
rise to a particular war economy‖ (Collier, 2000; Berdal and Malone, 2000: 2; Obi, 2009: 
108).  However, as earlier noted, Collier‘s thesis has come under the stick for 
simplifying the causes of conflict in Africa and, in particular, playing down the 
importance of deep grievances such as socio-economic inequality, political repression 
and social fractionalization of communities (Francis, 2006: 83).  In the so-called proxy 
economies such as Sierra Leone, DRC and Angola, contrary evidence highlights the 
place of grievances as the root cause of conflict rather than ‗greed‘.  More so, the 
proclaimed link between greed and grievance is far more complex than merely 
financing, rent-seeking and predatory motivations of warlords, political leaders and 
warring factions (Ikelegbe, 2005: 159-177; Francis, 2006: 83).    
An extensive corpus of work exists on ethnicity, ethnic conflicts and minority problems 
(Young, 1976; Amersfoort, 1978; Thornberry, 1980; Horowitz, 1985; Rupesinghe, 1987; 
Welsh, 1993; Naanen, 1995; Nagel, 1995: 443; Hall, 2001), on the problems and 
prospects of democracy in culturally segmented societies (Babushka and Shipley, 1972; 
Lijphart, 1977), and on the Nigerian experience with democracy, ethnic conflicts and 
minority politics (Steady, 1975; Sandal, 1976; Kopi, 1977; Nnoli, 1978; Osaghae, 1986, 
1991; Diamond, 1988; Akande, 1988; Olowu, 1991; Uzodike and Allen, 2005; Uzodike 
et al. 2010: 160-185; Suberu, 1996: 3).   Ethnicity and ethnic politics in Nigeria is also 
well documented (Anifowose, 1982; Nnoli, 1978, 1994, 1995; Otite, 1990; Ihonvbere, 
1994; Osaghae, 1991, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1998; Adekanye, 1995; Soremekun and 
Obi, 1993b; Saro-Wiwa, 1989, 1992, 1994b).   Attention has also been paid to ethnic 
minority politics (Osaghae, 1998; Kopi, 1977; Alagoa and Taman, 1989; Akinyele, 1990; 
Ihonvbere and Shaw, 1998; Suberu, 1993, 1996; Udogu, 1997; Obi, 1997a, 1998b, 
1998c; Obi, 2001). 
Two predominant scholarly approaches to ‗ethnicity‘ can be gleaned from the literature.   
On the one hand, ―ethnicity is considered a primordial group characteristic that some 
scholars would argue is biologically based‖ (Steady, 1993: 3, emphasis added; van den 
Berghe, 1981; Davies and Rothchild, 1996: 41-75).  But what is ‗primordialism‘?  
According to Sergey and Sokolovski (1996: 190-192), ―primordialism is an ‗objectivist 
theory‘ or ‗essentialist theory‘ which argues that ultimately there is some real, tangible, 
foundation for ethnic identification‖ (Sergey and Sokolovski, 1996: 190-192).  As 
Wsevolod Isajiw37 writes (1992: 1), ―[t]he primordialist approach is the oldest in 
                                                          
37
 Elsewhere, Isajiw (1992: 5) argues that ―the most common approach in the literature is to begin with 
ethnic groups and see ethnicity as emerging from one‘s relationship to a particular ethnic group.‖ He 
argues for this approach, thus: ―First of all, the meaning of the concept of ethnicity depends on the 
46 
 
sociological and anthropological literature.   It argues that ethnicity is something given, 
ascribed at birth, deriving from the kin-and-clan structure of human society, and hence 
something more or less fixed and permanent.‖  The two crucial factors in a primordialist 
perspective are underscored by this quote: (a) that ethnicity is something that is derived 
from birth (b) that the nature of ethnicity is fixed and permanent. 
On the other hand, ―ethnicity has been conceptualized as an instrument, a contextual, 
fluid and negotiable aspect of identity, a tool used by individuals, groups, or elites to 
obtain some larger, typically material end‖ (Porto, 2002: 1-28; Glazer and Moynihan, 
1975; Rothchild, 1986; Brass, 1985).  According to Sisk (1996: 12), instrumentalists 
argue that ethnic identities: 
…wax and wane, contingent on a wide variety of variables, including the 
capacity and skills of political entrepreneurs who can effectively mobilize groups 
for collective aims and articulate beliefs about common ancestry and 
destiny…some instrumentalists (alternatively known as structuralists) suggest 
that ethnic identity is socially constructed, often created or de-emphasised by 
power-seeking political elites in historically determined economic and social 
arrangements. 
Further, some scholars like Abner Cohen, Paul Brass and Ted Gurr have 
conceptualised ethnic groups as ―a product of political myths, created and manipulated 
by culture elites in their pursuit of advantages and power‖ (Sokolovski, 1996: 190, 
quoted in Wan and Vanderwerf, 2009).  In a similar fashion, Eghosa Osaghae (1995b: 
11) defines ethnicity as ―the employment and or mobilisation of ethnic identity or 
differences to gain advantage in situations of competition, conflict or co-operation.‖  
Thus, the ethnic group is one ―whose members share a common identity and affinity 
based on a common language and culture, myth of common origin and a territorial 
homeland, which has become the basis for differentiating ―us‖ from ―them,‖ and upon 
which people act‖ (Osaghae, 1995b: 11).38  
Nnoli (1995: 1) has argued that ―ethnicity arises when relations between ethnic groups 
are competitive rather than co-operative.   It is characterized by cultural prejudice, and 
political discrimination.‖  In line with this logic, ethnic identity becomes the umbrella 
under which the ―game‖ of politics is ―played‖ by ethnic group.  In the words of Obi 
(2001: 12), ethnic identity becomes ―the political key to the engine room of ethnicity as a 
mobilizing element for the capture of power.‖  Notably, ethnicity is not always a matter of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
meaning of several other concepts, particularly those of ethnic group and ethnic identity. The concept of 
ethnic group is the most basic, from which the others are derivative‖ (Isajiw, 1992: 5). 
38
 Osaghae (1998: 3) has noted that ―minorities in Nigeria may be defined in contradistinction to the three 
major ethnic groups in the country—Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo—as linguistically, culturally, 
territorially and historically distinct groups which have been subjected to subordinate political, social and 
economic positions in the federation and its constituent units.‖ 
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numerical calculations, ―for it is possible for smaller ethnic groups through a 
combination of historical (and socio-economic) factors and mobilizational capacities and 
by their position in a given structure of power relations to dominate larger groups‖ (Obi, 
2001: 12; Osaghae, 1998: 3; Oyediran, 1996).   At the conceptual level, ―there has been 
a discernible shift from the debates between those who viewed ethnicity as a paradigm 
for explaining politics in Africa, and those who viewed it as a disruptive or negative 
element which had to be transcended in any accurate analysis of African politics‖ (Obi, 
2001: 12; Doornbos, 1998).   
The concept of ethnicity can also be viewed from the lenses of class phenomenon, 
which emerged from the inordinate desire of the European to exploit their various 
colonies, especially in Africa (Anugwom, 2000: 64). Nnoli (1978: 5), for example, argues 
that ―ethnicity in Africa emerged and persisted either as a mechanism for adaptation to 
the imperialist system or as an instrument for ensuring a facile and more effective 
domination and exploitation of the colonised.‖  This form of ethnic control is seen as 
leading to negative consequences in terms of distribution of national resources, 
ultimately resulting in ethnic tension (Anugwom, 2000: 64).  The end of the colonial era, 
however, does not mean that the objective realities upon which ethnicity was 
constructed have disappeared—‗black faces‘ have merely replaced ‗white faces.‘  
Beyond this, ethnicity in Africa has also played itself out in the entrenchment before the 
1990s of one-party rule.  After independence the new African leaders embarked on ―the 
elimination of institutional checks and balances, and the centralization and 
concentration of state power in presidential offices, as well as the termination of open 
party politics and the regulation and confinement of political participation—usually within 
the framework of a single ruling party‖ (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; 23-24).  Often 
times, these leaders have justified single-party rule as crucial to the maintenance of 
national unity and peace within their countries (Mamdani, 2000: 228-231).  The logic 
behind it is simple: one-party system yoked together groups that were otherwise 
separated by the centrifugal forces of ethnicity, thereby providing opportunities for their 
reconciliation (Uzodike, 2003: 292).  As Nyerere argued regarding the Tanzania one-
party state, ―where there is one-party and that party is identified with the nation as a 
whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be when you have 
two or more parties each representing only a section of the community‖ (quoted in 
Wanyande, 2000: 108). 
Following independence, majoritarian democratic political arrangements were replaced 
by one-party systems in several African states, including Cote d‘Ivoire, Guinea, Malawi, 
Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  As Jackson and Rosberg 
(1986: 54), Lofchie (1993: 436-446), Wanyande (2000: 108-119), among others, have 
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observed, single-party rule can be an important instrument of control and incorporation 
in many countries throughout the continent.  For example, President Daniel arap Moi of 
Kenya created an ethnic electoral base anchored on the Kalenjin—an umbrella 
designation that refers to a diverse grouping such as Elgweyo, Kipsigis, Nandi, and 
Tugen—that excludes most Kikuyu, thus intensifying the relevance of ethnicity in politics 
and also the level of interethnic conflict (Uzodike, 2003: 292).  Moreover, some African 
leaders have sought to consolidate power by using ethnic cleavages in other ways.  
Increasingly, the issue of citizenship has become crucial to the ethnicity-related conflicts 
in Africa.   
Two strands of the concept of citizenship generate conflicts among groups on the 
continent (de Waal, 2000: 47).  The first strand is the idea of an ethnically homogenous 
state.  In such situations, as in Rwanda and Burundi, a particular ethnic group is 
systematically marginalised and deprived of basic human rights.   The second strand 
appertains to the idea that citizenship is a privilege and not a right.  Thus, the state 
arrogates to itself, through its officials in government, the exclusive right of awarding or 
withdrawing citizenship within the society.  In Zambia and Cote d‘Ivoire, for instance, 
rival presidential candidates have been prohibited by the rulers from contesting 
elections on the ground that they are not citizens of the country.   In some instances, 
such as Burundi and Rwanda and, to some extent, in Sudan, ethnically based divisions 
may evolve over time to other forms of cleavages.  For instance, in Burundi and 
Rwanda, ethnicity appears to have overlapped with social class.  Furthermore, the 
numerically preponderant Hutu now share similar language and culture with the socially 
dominant Tutsi.  Although the deep societal division and genocidal conflicts that are 
manifested today are not without pre-colonial historical contexts, they seem to have 
been accentuated by Belgian colonial policies that further distorted and entrenched 
aspects of the hierarchical arrangement (Uzodike, 2003: 293). 
Ethnic conflicts have long been recognised as one of the core threats to institutional 
stability, political order and state cohesion in the multi-ethnic societies of the Third world 
(Diamond, 1987; Suberu, 1996: 4).  In recent decades, ethnic conflicts and ethnic 
violence have been identified as the major sources of casualties in warfare (Gurr, 1993, 
2000; Harff and Gurr, 1998; Hall, 2001).  However, authors have differed in their 
interpretations or explanations of the sources and nature of these conflicts.  In 
particular, ethnic conflicts have been variously attributed to: (1) the emotional power of 
‗primordial givens‘ or cultural ties; (2) the struggle for relative group worth; (3) mass-
based resource competition; (4) electoral mobilization; (5) elite manipulation; (6) false 
consciousness; (7) defective political institutions and inequitable state policies (Suberu, 
1996: 4; Diamond, 1987; Doornbos, 1991).  According to Vincent Maphai (2000: 312), 
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competition for scarce resources like land, funds, aid or buildings fan the embers of 
ethnic conflict.   In Africa, says Ake (1992: 4), ―ethnicity is politicized, politics is 
ethnicized and ethnic groups tendentially become political formations whose struggles 
with each other and competing interests may be more conflictual for the exclusivity of 
ethnic group membership.‖  James Fearon (2008: 853) has noted that ―ethnicity is 
politicized when political coalitions are organized along ethnic lines, or when access to 
political or economic benefits depends on ethnicity‖ (emphasis added).   
Nagel (1995: 442-443) argues that where competition for resources and economic 
rewards is organized along ethnic lines, there is tendency for the following to happen: 
(1) ethnic identification; (2) racism and prejudice (against rival competitors); (3) 
internecine conflict; and (4) ethnic mobilization.  This aside, Fearon (2008: 857) has 
noted that many different sorts of violent events may be referred to as ―ethnic,‖ from bar 
fights to hate crimes to riots to civil wars.  In general, a violent attack might be described 
as ―ethnic‖ if either (a) it is motivated by animosity towards ethnic others; (b) the victims 
are chosen by ethnic criteria; or (c) the attack is made in the name of an ethnic group 
(Fearon and Latin, 2000). 
One serious problem in understanding ethnic conflicts derives from efforts by some 
leaders to ‗ethnicize‘ conflicts (Hall, 2001: 148).  Indeed, social scientists contend that 
―ethnic identities and grievances are created, or at least made salient, by contemporary 
politicians with quite different, nonethnic agendas‖ (Roxborough, 2001: 340; see, also, 
Kakar, 1996; Kaufman, 2001; Sadowski, 1998).  To corroborate this point, Franke 
Wilmer (2002) argues that conflicts in former Yugoslavia were not precipitated by 
ancient ethnic antagonisms, but in fact were ―fomented by leaders who sought deeply 
emotional issues around which to mobilize their followers in order to maintain or 
enhance their political positions‖ (quoted in Hall, 2001: 148).  In other words, what can 
be properly described as political conflicts took on the ethnic cloak.   In Africa, a range 
of political problems such as inept leadership, non-delivery of services, lack of job 
opportunities in the public sector, maldistribution of resources and economic 
perquisites, and the abuse of power, are frequently given ethnic explanations.  Not 
surprising, societal groups coalesce along ethnic lines to press for their own ―share‖ of 
state benefits (Uzodike, 2003: 292).  As such, many of Africa‘s most serious tensions 
and conflicts have been (and are being) played out under ethnic banners.  For instance, 
many serious national tensions and conflicts during the 1990s in many African countries 
such as Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d‘Ivoire, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, have seen the lifting of ethnic banners (Uzodike, 2003: 
292).  The consequences of such conflicts have been described by Horowitz (1985: 31):  
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When ethnic violence occurs, unranked groups usually aim not at social 
transformation, but at something approaching sovereign autonomy, the exclusion 
of parallel ethnic groups from a share of power, and often reversion—by 
expulsion or extermination—to an idealized, ethnically homogenous status quo 
alone. 
What about the underlying and proximate causes of ethnic and internal conflicts?  There 
has been an appreciable tendency for scholarly literature to focus on the underlying 
factors that make some places and some situations more prone to violence than others.  
In particular, scholars have pinpointed four main constellations of factors: (1) structural 
factors, (2) political factors, (3) economic/social factors, and (4) cultural/perceptual 
factors (see table 5).   Three structural factors have been identified as key precursors of 
ethnic and internal conflict: (a) weak states (b) intrastate security concerns, and (c) 
ethnic geography (Zartman, 1995: 1-11; Helman and Ratner, 1993: 3-20).  Four main 
political factors have become the cynosure of scholarly analysis of ethnic and internal 
conflict: (1) discriminatory political institutions, (2) exclusionary national ideologies (3) 
intergroup politics (4) elite politics (Pfaff, 1993; Rothschild, 1981; Horowitz, 1985; Tilly, 
1973: 425-477; Coser, 1956; Newman, 1991: 451-478; Goldstone, 1980: 425).   
The potential sources of ethnic and internal conflict have been variously subsumed 
under three broad economic and social factors.  They include: (1) economic problems 
(2) discriminatory economic systems, and the (3) trials and tribulations of economic 
development and modernization (de, Samarasinghe and Coughlan, 1991; Woodward, 
1995; Gordon, 1993: 66-87; Cohan, 1975; Huntington, 1968; Gurr, 1970; Conner, 1972: 
319-355; Conner, 1994; Aya, 1979: 1-38).  Economic and social factors aside, two main 
cultural and perceptual factors have been identified by scholars as sources of ethnic 
and internal conflict: (1) cultural discrimination against minorities (2) group histories and 
group perceptions of themselves and others (Eyal, 1989: 205-208; Osiatynski, 1990; 
Rosenfield, 1992).   
Table 5 
Underlying Causes of Ethnic and Internal Conflicts 
Structural Factors 
Weak states 




Discriminatory political institutions 









Patterns of cultural discrimination 
Problematic group histories 
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Source: Miall et al. 1998, p.86. 
While scholars have done a useful job of probing the underlying factors that make some 
situations particularly prone to violence, they have devoted less effort to analyzing the 
catalytic factors—the catalytic or proximate causes—of ethnic and internal conflicts 
(Brown, 2001: 218).  As James Rule put it in his review of literature on civil violence, 
―We know a lot of things that are true about civil violence, but we do not know when 
they are going to be true‖ (quoted in Brown, 2001: 218).  The result is that we know a lot 
less about the causes of ethnic and internal conflict than one would guess from looking 
at the rather massive corpus of work on the subject.  A useful way to analyse the 
proximate or catalytic causes of ethnic and internal conflict is to draw a distinction 
between conflicts that are triggered by (1) elite-level (as opposed to mass-level factors), 
and (2) internal (as opposed to external development) (Brown, 2001: 219).39  Conflicts 
can therefore be triggered by four different combination of factors: (1) by internal, mass-
level factors (bad domestic problems); (2) by external, mass-level factors (bad 
neighbourhoods); (3) by external, elite-level factors (bad neighbours); and (4) by internal 
elite-level factors (bad leaders).  These combinations can be depicted in a two-by-two 
matrix (see Table 6). 
Table 6 
Proximate Causes of Ethnic and Internal Conflicts 
 Internally Driven Externally Driven 
Elite Level Bad leaders Bad neighbours 
Mass Level Bad domestic problems Bad neighbourhoods 
Source: Brown, 2001, p.219. 
Crucially, one of the issues adding a further complication to the search for solutions to 
ethnic minority conflicts is the fact that the casus belli for ethnic conflicts are ―diverse 
and complex ranging from cultural differences to minority politics to religion to territorial 
disputes‖ (Hussein and Sally, 2006: 1).40 In many cases, the complex nexus of ethnic 
identities and class fan the flames of conflict.   For instance, particular ethnic groups 
may feel excluded from the benefits of economic production.  This is the case with many 
communities in the Niger Delta of Nigeria.  Supporting this view, Richard Davies (quoted 
in Hussein and Sally, 2006: 1) argues that where inequalities ―… result from ethnic 
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 Similar distinctions have been made by others.  See Renée de Nevers (1990).  The Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe: The End of an Era, Adelphi Paper no.  249.  London: International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, pp.  27-29; and Stuart J.  Kaufman (1996).  ―An ‗International‘ Theory of Inter-Ethnic War,‖ 








discrimination and also affect material interest, ethnicity provides a cohesive basis for 
mobilization because of the power of its subjective attachments.‖  
The above view is further supported by Rupesinghe and Anderlini (1998: 14) as they 
illustrated lucidly the vast and variegated variables fuelling the 1994 genocide: 
... in Rwanda, one of the world‘s poorest nations, a rapidly increasing population 
coupled with decreasing agricultural productivity, few opportunities and uneven 
government support for rural areas exacerbated social tensions.  This, combined 
with a drop in tea and coffee prices in the late 1980s and structural adjustments 
policies implemented in 1990, led to even harsher living conditions and eroded 
the government‘s legitimacy in the eyes of the people.  These factors in 
themselves did not create sufficient conditions for the outbreak of civil war or the 
genocide of 1994.  Within the wider context, however, they were instrumental in 
the build-up of tension and grievance in a country with a history of social and 
ethnic divisions and recurrent communal violence. 
Other scholars also note the uniqueness of some variables exacerbating ethnic conflicts 
on the African continent:  
… throughout the continent states preside over divided societies containing widely 
divergent ethnic groups.  This has made it particularly difficult for post-colonial states to 
generate a moral basis for government which endows rulers with legitimacy or authority, 
rather than with the mere control of the state machinery… The weakness of the African 
state institutions and the fragile nature of its public acceptance provide a unique socio-
political environment which encourages informal networks of personal relationship 
between powerful and well-placed individuals (patrons) and the rest of their ethnic 
communities (clients) (Poku, 1996 quoted in Hussein and Sally, 2006: 1). 
If anything, says Hall (2001: 150), ―ethnic conflicts will remain a major source of 
intergroup violence in coming decades.‖  So much for ethnicity and ethnic conflicts; 
what about minority problems?  While a lot of conceptual and ideological confusion 
encases the term ―minority,‖ most writers acquiesce that minorities are ―culturally 
distinctive and relatively cohesive groups‖ which occupy a position of ―numerical 
inferiority and/or socio-political subordination‖ vis-à-vis other cultural sections in the 
society (Suberu, 1996: 5; see, also, Amersfoort, 1978).   According to one United 
Nations source, minorities are groups that are  
numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant 
position, whose members possess ethnic religious or linguistic characteristics 
differing from those of the rest of the population, and show, if only implicitly, a 
sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or 
language (quoted in Thornberry, 1980: 257). 
Baldwin et al.  (2007: 4) have argued that ―a minority is often, but not always, defined as 
such with reference to their position within a country, but can also be defined with 
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reference to a wider area (e.g., regional) or narrower area (e.g., by province).  What 
matters is whether the minorities lack power—i.e. the ability to affect the decisions that 
concern them.‖  Hans van Amersfoort (1978) contends that minority groups differ 
according to whether they are geographically concentrated or dispersed, whether they 
seek participation in, or isolation from, the wider political system, and whether the 
policies of the dominant groups are framed in such a way as to achieve the 
emancipation or continued subordination of such minorities (Suberu, 1996; Amersfoort, 
1978: 228-232).   In his work The Multiple Character of Minority Problems in Nigeria, 
Osaghae (1998: 4) advances the argument that  
ethnic minorities are usually defined in contradistinction to major groups with 
whom they coexist in political systems, as groups which experience systemic 
discrimination and domination because of numerical inferiority and a host of 
historical and sociological factors, and have taken political action in furtherance 
of their collective interests.‖41  
Perhaps, the most compelling examination of ethnic minority issues is to be found in 
Ted Gurr‘s Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts.  The overriding 
argument of this work is that ethnic groups are ―at risk‖ only to the degree that they are 
discriminated against economically, socially, culturally, or politically (Gurr, 1993: 5-11).  
Notably, Frances Stewart‘s (2003: 38; 2005: 42) work on ―horizontal inequality‖ has 
inspired research on how inequalities in economic and political resources between 
culturally defined groups may influence conflict (Mancini, 2005: 41; Ostby, 2006: 30).42  
Reverting to Gurr (1993: 5-11), he adopts a broad definition of ethnic minorities.  His 
major argument is that minorities are communal groups which experience systematic 
discrimination in a state, and have taken political action in support of their collective 
interests (Gurr, 1993: 6).   
Evidence shows that ―a significant number of people who belong to minorities across 
the world live in extreme poverty,‖ and that often ―this poverty is directly linked to the 
discrimination and racism they face at the hands of majority communities and 
governments‖ (Minority Rights Group [MRG], 2010: 9).  Roughly ―370 million of the 
world‘s population in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Europe and the Pacific‖ (MRG, 
2010: 9) are indigenous people.  The MRG report states that ―[indigenous people] are 
                                                          
41
― Almost as a rule, minorities which are not subjected to domination or discrimination, and instead 
constitute dominant and hegemonic groups, such as white colonial regimes in Africa and Asia, the 
Afrikaner whites in apartheid South Africa, the Tutsi in post-1994 Rwanda and the Fulani in Nigeria, are 
excluded from the category of proper minorities‖ (Osaghae, 1998: 15). 
42
More precisely, high levels of inequality have two effects that are likely to contribute to grievances.  
First, high levels of inequality exacerbate the redistributive claims that minorities are likely to make on the 
centrals state.  Second and consistent with current models of democracy (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2000), as the prospective costs of such redistribution climb, the central government may be 
less likely to meet them.  Ethnicity is likely to accentuate these dynamics.   
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among the most impoverished and marginalized people in the world‖ (MRG, 2010: 9).  
Further, the MRG report (2010: 9) avows that 
discrimination resulting in exclusion impacts on these groups‘ ability to gain 
access to better educational opportunities, economic opportunities, health and 
well being, that often leaves them in a cycle of inter generational and chronic 
poverty, and has also been linked to conflict affecting these communities. Their 
lack of participation, or, more to the point, their lack of access to development 
policy discussions, means that international and national development strategies 
often fail to target them specifically. 
Gurr (1993: 23) has highlighted several conditions that have had a snow-ball effect on 
the mobilisation of ethnic minority grievances since 1945.  These conditions include:  
1. Unequal treatment of minority communities by dominant or ―mainstream‖ groups. 
2. Competition with other groups for access to power in new states. 
3. The contagious effect of ethnopolitical activism elsewhere. 
4. Patterns of state building, political power and economic development that 
channel communal energies into either protest or rebellion. 
5. The emergence of new ethnic minority elites who are willing to, and are adept at, 
mobilising their constituents in response to changing political developments, 
opportunities and resources (Gurr, 1993: 23). 
Osaghae (1998: 4) have argued that in Nigeria, minority groups are frequently defined  
in contradistinction to the majority ethnic groups—Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and 
Igbo—as linguistically, culturally, territorially and historically distinct groups 
which, because of their diffusion, numerical inferiority and historical evolution 
within the modern Nigerian state, have been subjected to subordinate political, 
social and economic positions in the federation and its constituent units.   
2.8 Civil Society 
The concept of ‗civil society‘ describes ―the layer of voluntary, popular, public and social 
action of non-state actors that utilises social, cultural, political and ethnic networks and 
non-state activities, in pursuance of objectives, which are usually of a public nature‖ 
(Ikelegbe, 2001: 439; Young, 1992: 33-50; Makumbe, 1998: 305-317).  A proper 
understanding of civil society should also include ―the organisations of the professions, 
labour, youth, women, peasants, communal, social, cultural, neighbourhood, 
development, environmental and civil rights groups that build identities and platforms in 
respect of collective claims, civic actions and solutions‖ (Ikelegbe, 2001: 439).  
According to Bratton (1994: 2), civil society refers to ―a sphere of social interaction 
between the household and the state which is manifest in norms of community 
cooperation, structures of voluntary association, and networks of public communication.  
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Bayart (1986: 112) has noted that the concept of civil society is ―not necessarily 
embodied in a single, identifiable structure.‖ Informed by the above definition of civil 
society, Bratton (1994: 2-3) goes on to distinguish the institutions of civil society as: 
(1) The norms of civic community.  The most important values for the construction of 
civil society are trust, reciprocity, tolerance, and inclusion.  Trust is a prerequisite 
for individuals to associate voluntarily; reciprocity is a resource for reducing the 
transaction costs of collective action; political tolerance enables the emergence 
of diverse and plural forms of association.  These values are promoted by 
citizens who actively seek to participate in public affairs.  The presence of civil 
norms can be measured by sample surveys and public opinion polls and 
observed in voting, ―joining,‖ and varieties of collective behaviour.  These norms 
of civic community are taught not only in the family but also by civic organisations 
such as schools, churches, and community groups. 
(2) The structures of associational life.  In order for civic life to become 
institutionalised, it must be expressed in organizational form.  The most common 
organisational structure in civil society is the voluntary association, a grouping of 
citizens who come together by reason of identity or interest to pursue a common 
objective.  There are various types of voluntary associations ranging from the 
localized, informal, and apolitical on the one hand to national, legally-registered, 
policy advocacy organizations on the other.  While policy advocacy groups may 
have the largest and most direct impact on national political life, they do not 
exhaust the relevant organisations in civil society.  Whether or not they are 
explicitly oriented to civil or political functions, all types of voluntary association 
help to populate and pluralize civil society. 
(3) The networks of public communication.  In order to be politically active, citizens 
require means to communicate with one another and to debate the type of 
government they desire for themselves.  Civil discourse can take place in various 
fora, the most important of which are the public communications media, both 
print and electronic.  State or private monopolies of media ownership and public 
opinion are not conducive to civil society; civil society is always stronger where 
there is a diversity of media outlets and political views.  New technologies of 
personal communication can strengthen civil society by empowering citizens to 
communicate independently of state supervision. A healthy civil society is a multi-
stranded web of crosscutting channels of communication (Bratton, 1994: 2-3). 
In Africa, ―civil society activities have been characterised by popular mobilisation, social 
protests, opposition, advocacy and criticisms in favour of reform, change, accountability, 
control of state excesses and abuses, and have contributed immensely to regime and 
policy changes, democratisation, increased liberalisation and observance of civil rights‖ 
(Ikelegbe, 439-440; Bratton, 1992; Makumbe, 1998).  Many scholars generally 
acquiesce that civil society has ―broadened individual and group influence, access and 
participation, pluralised power relations, and enabled the emergence of a culture of 
engagement, protests, contestations, challenge and resistance against improprieties 
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and abuses of organisations and the state‖ (Ikelegbe, 2001: 439; Keane, 1988; 
Harbeson, 1992; Bratton, 1992; Grindle, 1996).   
Crucially, civil society is often placed under threat by most African states.  Indeed, ―the 
tendency of the post-colonial state to dominate, subordinate, incorporate and suppress 
because of its hegemonical, personalistic, patrimonial, authoritarian and absolutist 
characteristics, and its prevalent abuse, lawlessness, predatoriness, ineptitude and 
corruption makes the state intolerant to autonomous, civil and popular actions‖ 
(Ikelegbe, 2001: 440; Callaghy, 1984; Chazan, 1988; Nyang‘oro and Shaw, 1989; 
Mamdani, 1995; Ake, 1996; Ekeh, 1998).  In addition, both ―business and private 
corporations‖—especially multinational corporations—tend to be also hostile civil society 
(Keane, 1988: 5; Makumbe, 1998: 305-317). 
It is also important to mention the increasing tendency for social groupings to establish 
relationships beyond the borders of their countries with a view to internationalising the 
issues they seek to address.   Granted that social movement activity transcends 
national boundaries, four modes of action define the overall character of these social 
networks: (1) movement diffusion ([that is] temporary interactions that generate similar 
movement in another state); (2) transnational issue networks (enduring information 
exchange between main actors within the social movement circle); (3) political 
exchange (the networking of social groupings in a number of societies); and (4) 
transnational social movements (interactions between groups with shared visions and 
ideals) (Ojakorotu, 2009: 1).  This typology approximates the character of social 
movement activity in the Niger Delta.  The emergence of social movements and the 
internationalization of their activities can be ascribed to a number of factors such as:  
(1) Democratisation: the ascendance of liberal ideological issues pertaining to the 
environment. 
(2) Human rights and minority rights. 
(3) The revolution in information and communications technology with its attendant 
integration of the world economies (Ojakorotu, 2009: 1; Ikelegbe, 2005).   
The above variables have joined forces with local factors to bring about the formation 
and survival as well as the transnationalisation of social movements in Nigeria.   
2.9 Ethnic Militias and Resource Control 
According to Akaruese (2003: 218), militias are ―properly armed group with overt or 
covert command structures, enjoying some forms of legitimacy and permanency; and 
capable of resorting to the use of arms in pursuance of their objectives.‖  For his part, 
Adejumobi (2003: 1) contends that ―ethnic militia groups are essentially youth based 
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groups formed with the purpose of promoting and protecting the parochial interests of 
their ethnic groups, and whose activities sometimes involve the use of violence‖ 
(emphasis added).   Falana (2003: 183) has argued that ―such ethnic militias that make 
the liberation of their ethnic nationality its main pre-occupation may sometimes be 
described as a guerrilla movement.‖  Conceived in this way, Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro‘s 
Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) becomes the first ethnic militia group in Nigeria.  
This was the precursor to the Egbesu Boys which in February, 1966 announced the 
secession of the Niger Delta region from Nigeria. 
The rapid increase of ethnic militia groups in modern-day Nigeria is best situated within 
the skewed nature of the Nigerian political economy and decades of leadership failures 
(Agbiboa, 2011).  The first pertains to the violent character of the Nigerian state 
(Adejumobi, 2003) best exemplified by decades of military rule in Nigeria.  As Ken Saro-
Wiwa (1996: 43) noted during his farcical trial by the Abacha regime: ―[t]he Nigerian 
military dictatorship survives on the practice of violence and the control of the means of 
violence‖ (quoted in Adejumobi, 2003: 3).  In a similar fashion, Asobie (1990: 6) argues 
that military regimes in Nigeria 
… breeds violence because they block all chances for peaceful change.  The 
structural inequality that is intrinsic of the socio-economic system of a rentier 
capitalism state, like Nigeria is compounded by military rule and militarism.  
Military rule and militarism breed not just physical violence but also structural 
violence (quoted in Falana, 2003: 184).   
As a result of the state‘s appetite for violence as a negotiating tool, any peaceful 
demonstration by the people was often stamped out with violence.  The state‘s appeal 
to violence aside, most political society in Nigeria have often tilted towards the use of 
armed politics as one of the means for achieving political ends.  Such inclination 
towards armed violence is a common trend that runs through most of the political 
parties in Nigeria right from the first republic in 1960.  As Edwin Madunagu (2000: 1) 
puts it:  
The nature of politics, whose ultimate form is the struggle for power, compels 
every political organisation at a certain stage in its development to acquire an 
armed detachment, or be militarised.  Some political organisations, utilising their 
entrenchment in the state, use national armies, the police and other security 
forces as armed wings.  There should be no hypocrisy or self-righteousness or 
attempt at falsification of history here.  All political formulations in our history, 
which had developed to the point of directly pushing for power as an immediate 
political project (not as mere distant hope), had been armed or militarised in one 
form or another… it does not matter what you call the armed group: youth wings, 
thugs, intelligence officers or body guards (quoted in Adejumobi, 2003: 2, 
emphasis added).   
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The emergence of ethnic militias in Nigeria coincided with the brutality of military 
dictatorships in Nigeria, especially during the 1990s.  A key background to the 
mushrooming of ethnic militia groups under the Babangida and Abacha regimes pivot 
on the phenomenon of relative deprivation that developed to its acme in the country—a 
harsh reality that was felt most by ethnic minorities situated the Niger Delta.  The oil 
resource played a salient role in this development.  Though the Nigeria economy 
depends largely on the exportation of oil which is derived from the Niger Delta region, 
the communities therein live under odious conditions, lacking elementary social 
amenities like ―feeder roads, electricity, pipe-borne water, and cottage industries‖ 
(Adejumobi, 2003; Agbiboa, 2011a). The general perception among minority groups in 
the area is that there is a nexus between their marginalisation and their minority status 
within the skewed Nigerian federation.  The general claim is that the dominant ethnic 
groups use the resources gained from the oil producing areas to develop their own 
places (Adejumobi, 2003: 3) and to line their pockets.  
Notably, a substantial body of work has been written on the travails of the Niger Delta 
people (Civil Liberties Organisation [CLO], 1996; Ekine, 2001; Obi, 2002; Human Rights 
Watch, 1999). In complicity with oil multinationals, the Nigerian state have always had 
an inordinate penchant for the use of military force to quell any form of dissent in the 
area (Omotola, 2009).  Indeed, they have cordoned-off the environment by ―stationing 
an ‗army of occupation‘ in the oil producing communities that would keep at bay restive 
youths, and associations through the use of arms in order to ensure the uninterrupted 
flow of oil to the Nigerian state‖ (Adejumobi, 2003: 2).  In the Niger Delta, it is not 
uncommon for several human/minority rights activists to be detained or put to death by 
the state without trial.  Chagrined by the iron-fist approach of the state, some groups in 
those marginalised communities have also resorted to armed reaction ostensibly in self-
defence.   
Subsequently, the region witnessed the emergence of various militant youth groups and 
radical youth wings.  At risk of oversimplification, the major objective of these groups 
was ―to counter the violence of the state, and drive home their point of deprivation and 
marginalisation‖ (Adejumobi, 2003: 3).  The extra-judicial murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa—
the passionate leader of MOSOP—in 1996 increased the determination of those groups 
that only a resort to violence will protect them from the gross repression of the Nigerian 
state.  Consequently, the Niger Delta people ―reconceived and sharpened their 
demands from purely social and economic claims to political claims.  Their demands 
were refocused on relative autonomy and self-determination for their ethnic areas within 
the context of the Nigerian federation‖ (Adejumobi, 2003).  This is the only way they felt 
that their grievances could be heard and addressed. 
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Between 1990 and 1999, the Niger Delta region witnessed the rise of more than 24 
ethnic based minority rights groups (most with radical bent) (Adejumobi, 2003: 3).  
Notable among these groups are:  ―the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Chikoko, Ijaw 
National Congress (INC), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Ijaw Peace Movement (IPM), Isoko 
National Youth Movement (IYM), Itsekiri Nationality Patriots (INP), and the Movement 
for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)‖ (Adejumobi, 2003: 3).43  The 
overarching reason for the existence of these groups is essentially resource control.  
Briefly put, the concept of resource control that is dominant in the Niger Delta has three 
main components: 
(a) The power and right of a community to raise funds by way of tax on persons, 
matters, services and materials within its territory 
(b) The executive right to ownership and control of resources, both natural and 
created within its territory 
(c) The right to customs duties on goods destined for its territory and exercise duties 
on goods manufactured in its territories (Osaghae et al. 2007: 8).   
Thus, for minority groups in the Niger Delta, resource control would mean a favourable 
transition in their political and economic demands from ―Fairer sharing to total control of 
the natural resources found in a state by the state for use in its development at its own 
pace‖ (Osaghae et al. 2007: 8). 
Thus far, our discussion has focused analytical attention on a review of important 
variables that set the scene for a proper understanding of the Niger Delta conflict.  
Omotola (2006: 24) has noted that a crucial first step in addressing the crisis in the 
Niger Delta is a discernment of the underlying causes of the grievances felt by the 
people in the region.  So conceived, the next chapter seeks to examine the root causes 
of conflict and spiralling violence in the Niger Delta with particular focus on its political 
and economic dimensions.  At the close of this chapter, the reader should be au fait with 
key historical, economic, and structural factors that have contributed (and still 
contributes) to the frustration and aggression of the Niger Delta people. 
  
                                                          
43
 ―The specific conjuncture for the rise of each of these groups differs.  For example, while the militia 
groups in the Niger Delta emerged as a result of the peculiar problems in the Niger Delta, of 
environmental degradation and political insensitivity of the state, the OPC emerged as a consequence of 
the annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election won by a Yoruba man named Moshood Abiola.  
The perception from the Yoruba ethnic group of the annulment was that it was an ethnic agenda of the 
Hausa Fulani aristocracy to perpetually control political power in the country and to regard people from 
other parts of the country as ‗second class‘ citizens.  Further persecution of some Yoruba elite after the 
annulment by the Abacha regime reinforced the conviction of the Yoruba ethnic group that the Hausa 
Fulani oligarchy was out to ‗exterminate‘ them.  The resolve was to resist such through all means 




Root Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
This chapter seeks to explain the root causes of the Niger Delta conflict which it 
identifies as political and economic in nature.  The chapter suggests that ethnic minority 
problems in the Niger Delta have their roots in complex historical and structural 
processes of pre-colonial and colonial incorporation of diverse ethnic segments, federal 
territorial evolution and re-organisations, revenue allocation, oil politics, and political 
representation.  These processes have operated not only to foster and institutionalise 
the oppressive hegemony of the country‘s three major ethnicities—Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, 
and Yoruba—but also ―to legitimize the inordinate expropriation of the resources of the 
oil-producing communities as part of an official strategy of centralized national ‗cake 
sharing‘‖ (Suberu, 1996: xi). 
3.2 Political Root Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict 
The dawn of the 19th century saw the scramble for, and partitioning of, Africa by the 
West—an act which had profound consequences for the independent states of Africa.  
One major consequence of the faux boundaries was the creation of culturally diverse 
states and the forcible bringing together of strange ethno-cultural groups in single 
political entities.  Modern-day Nigerian history can be traced to the amalgamation of two 
disparate regions of the Northern and Southern Protectorates by Lord Lugard on 
January 1, 1914.   Nigerians sometimes refer to this act as ―the mistake of 1914‖ 
(Guest, 2004: 122).  It is important to note that the British were not completely blind to 
the rifts within their new colony.  They did seek to avert religious strife by discouraging 
Christian missionaries from preaching in the Muslim north, but while this seemed wise 
at the time, it stored up problems for the future.  Because the missionaries were 
effectively barred from northern Nigeria, they built all their schools in the south (Guest, 
2004: 122).  By 1950, there were thousands of university graduates in the south, but 
only one in the north (Mustapha, 2004: 4).  Southerners dominated all the jobs in the 
civil service that required numeracy or literacy.  Members of the south-eastern Igbo, 
owing to a long tradition of trading, dominated commerce in the north as well as in their 
own region.  The Hausa and Fulani of the north felt excluded.  But they had the edge in 
the army because the British thought them good soldiers (Guest, 2004: 122), which was 
to prove vital later on.  Most importantly, the country was balkanized by the British into 
three regions of unequal sizes:  the Western Region, the Northern Region and the 
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Eastern Region, with the perception that the West was mainly Yoruba; the East, Igbo; 
and the North, Hausa-Fulani (Ojakorotu, 2008: 24).  This arrangement created a 
situation whereby other ethnic groups—popularly referred to as minority groups—were 
insulated from the Nigerian enterprise.  A brief account of the political history of the 
Niger Delta people follows.  
3.2.1 A Brief Political History of the Niger Delta People 
Historically, the Niger Delta area ―predates Nigeria‘s emergence as a British Colony by 
at least a decade.  British Niger Delta Protectorate and the Niger Delta Coast 
Protectorate were already well established by the mid-1880s and the late 1890s…‖ 
(Onduku, 2001, quoted in Ojakorotu, 2008: 28).  A bulk of the communities that 
occupied this region had established their local leaders long before the Second World 
War.  The reforms adopted by Arthur Richard in 1946 led to regionalism—a 
phenomenon which had serious implications for so-called minority groups in the South.  
The city-states of the Niger Deltans predate political independence in Nigeria.  This city-
states system refers to a confederation of houses, while the house system describes 
the grouping of people into households and wards (Ojakorotu, 2008: 28).  Up until the 
18th century, it would appear (according to oral tradition) that villages were founded 
upon the principle of wards and/or houses being politically equivalent.  Government was 
largely in the hands of descendants‘ group leaders while houses were founded on 
localized descent groups which were very homogenous in their composition, consisting 
mainly of descent group members, their wives and offsprings. 
The Canoe House system was another key political system of the Ijaw people.  As one 
Ijaw puts it, ―Ijaw Canoe Houses were corporate organisations of kinsmen, strangers 
and slaves assembled for the purpose of successful participation in the overseas slave 
trade.  To trade, a canoe house needed naval power.   New canoe houses were 
established when a group which possessed a fleet of canoes separated from the parent 
house‖ (Ojakorotu, 2008: 29).  The popular conception was that a new house is 
economically independent but subordinate, politically, to the mother house.  Beyond 
this, there was a widespread belief among the communities in the Niger Delta that a 
visible demonstration of a man‘s prosperity and strengths subsists in the number of 
canoes (Ijaw) or wives (Urhobo) he commands.  Prior to the colonial era, many 
communities in the Niger Delta recognised their senior ward or house lords as superior 
ritual authority over others (Ojakorotu, 2008: 29).  Upon the arrival of the colonialists, 
however, a man whom they dubbed ‗king‘ became sufficiently powerful to become the 
―sole representative of his kingdom in commercial dealings with European merchants‖ 
(Ojakorotu, 2008: 29).  Considerably enriched from his role as principal negotiator with 
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the Europeans, the political office of king developed and successors were provided by 
the royal lineage.   Powerful house heads, even of slave descent, acted as kingmakers, 
choosing the new king from princely candidates (Ajayi and Crowder, 1976).   
Another salient aspect of governance in the Niger Delta city-states was the secret 
societies.  Ojakorotu (2008: 30) notes that in Nembe and Kalabari, Ekine was the most 
important secret society.  Ekine was divided into sections, each of which produced its 
own masks and plays.  Ekine had some executive functions in that ―it brought together 
all important men whose decisions concerning Ekine were then executed by the 
society‘s junior members‖ (Osaghae, 1998b: 3).  The salience of Ekine subsists in the 
fact that its membership cuts across house divisions; thus, enhancing the integration of 
houses into a unified political entity—city-states.  Beyond this, the Niger Delta was 
permeated by scores of segmented Igbo, Urhobo, Ogoni, Ijaw, Kalabari and other city-
states with political organisation that were non-centralist in nature (Osaghae, 1998b: 3; 
Ojakorotu, 2008: 30).   
Having experienced a decentralized and egalitarian system, the hopes of the Niger 
Deltans were tailored towards a state system that would protect their individual and 
collective rights, one of which is the right to ownership of property including natural 
resources within their domain.  It is against this backdrop that the Niger Deltans began 
to challenge the Nigerian state in the light of dashed expectations.  Now, the skewed 
nature of Nigeria‘s federal system is central to the Niger Delta struggle and by extension 
the other problematique in the Nigerian state.   The gaps in the Nigerian Federal 
system, exemplified for instance by the overarching power of the central government 
and the lack of real autonomy at the state level, have been an aggravating factor in the 
Niger Delta conflict (Suberu, 1996). Expected to give local governance structures and 
communities a measure of control over certain matters that affects them, the practice of 
true federalism has been a recurrent issue in the contestation with respect to the 
structure of the Nigerian state.   
The next section(s) undertakes a theoretical exposition of the role of federalism in 
conflict management.  Further, an exploration of the national question with regards to 
finding an appropriate revenue allocation formula and associated minority struggles in 
the Niger Delta is intended to illuminate the thematic concern of this chapter. 
3.2.2 Federalism and Conflict Management  
Since the end of the Cold War-era in the 1990s, how to contain conflict in internally 
divided states has topped the agenda of many Third World countries, not least Nigeria.  
While all these states are awash with unresolved issues about how to organise the 
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divisions of powers between tiers of government and how to achieve domestic peace, 
―policy makers... have turned to some form of federalism or decentralized governance 
as a means for managing conflict between the central government and subnational 
groups‖ (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006: 1).  But what do we mean by federalism? 
Conceptually, the idea of ―federalism includes autonomy for a state‘s subunits while 
leaving international borders intact‖ (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006: 3).   Uzodike et al. 
(2010: 163) argues that ―federalism refers to a system of government where sovereignty 
or final authority is divided between a national government and its constituent regional 
(state, provincial) units.‖  In his classic definition, William Riker (1964: 11) states that ―a 
constitution is federal if 1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, 2) 
each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and 3) there is 
some guarantee (even through merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy 
of each government in its own sphere.‖  By combining regional self-rule and shared 
governance, ―federalism may represent a compromise between regional groups that 
seek self-determination and/or protection of their rights and the central leadership of the 
state, which is reluctant to give up territory and power‖ (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006: 1).  
Uzodike et al. (2010: 163) notes that ―federalism by its nature is meant to compel 
responsible relationship between the national government and its constituent units 
because such tier is forced by constitutional imperatives to act with due regard for the 
other.‖  Ever more, writers maintain that ―federalism can peacefully accommodate 
heterogeneous interests by decentralizing key policies and thus providing a stake for 
decentralised elites in the maintenance of the existing state‖ (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006: 
1).  Given this context, the following sections undertakes to probe the origin of Nigeria‘s 
federalism, its potential for conflict management, as well as its implication for ethnic 
minority groups in the Niger Delta region. 
3.2.3 Nigeria’s Federalism: A Brief Explorative Study 
In a recent article The Nigerian Federal System: Performance, Prospect, Challenges, 
Suberu (2010: 460) underscores six key phases in the development of Nigerian 
federalism:  
[t]he late British colonial period (1954-1960); the First Republic (1960-1966); the 
first phase of military rule, including the civil war (1966-1979); the Second 
Republic (1979-1983); the second phase of military rule, including the abortion of 
an elaborate transition to the Third Republic (1984-1999); and the Fourth 
Republic (1999 to date). 
In a combined work, Suberu and Osaghae (2005: 16) argue that the 1954 colonial 
institution of a tripodal federal system ―reflected the historic patterns by which the British 
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acquired and administered Nigeria as well as the country‘s tripartite major ethnic 
configuration, the three-region federal structure was inherently divisive, disintegrative 
and unstable.‖  In particular, the tripartite federal structure (emplaced by the British) 
created a dominant Hausa-Fulani northern region, which officially comprised of ―over 
half of the country‘s population and two-third of its territory; fostered ethnic majority 
chauvinism and secessionism by erecting the boundaries of the northern, western and 
eastern region around the identities of the major ethnic formations of Hausa-Fulani, 
Yoruba and non-Igbo and Igbo, respectively‖ (Suberu and Osaghae, 2005: 16).  Beyond 
this, the tripodal federalist set-up fuelled ethnic minority agitations due to the fact that  
it denied the country‘s non-Hausa-Fulani, non-Yoruba and non-Igbo groups the 
security of their regions; and encouraged an enormous degree of ethno-regional 
polarization as the imbalanced tripartite ethno-region structure (which became 
even more structurally lopsided with the creation of the Mid-west region in the 
south in 1963) inexorably collapsed into a bi-polar north-south confrontation 
(Suberu and Osaghae, 2005: 16). 
Further, Uzodike et al. (2010: 163) argues that ―Nigeria‘s federalism basically sought to 
regulate the coexistence of the majority groups with little or no reference or concern for 
the minority groupings, which were subsumed variously under the not-so-protective 
umbrellas of the majority entities.‖  Crucially, Nigeria‘s vast heterogeneity (especially its 
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and regional diversity) has been an abiding source of her 
societal tensions and conflicts.  The mixture serves not only as a source of national 
strength and potential but also as a seam interminably threatening to tear at the core of 
national unity and prosperity.   This has led to various conceptualizations of the Nigerian 
state as: the ―conglomerate society‖; a mere ―geographic expression‖; a ―multi-national 
state‖; a ―vertical-horizontal mosaic; and ―unity in diversity‖ (Graf, 1988: 29-30).  More 
than anything else, Nigeria‘s diversity serves not only as the decisive factor that has 
shaped the high instability that characterises its political economy but also as the key 
factor that has rendered fruitless all efforts at institutionalizing democratic values within 
the country.   
Since independence, Nigeria has also been plagued by primordial sentiments that, for a 
long time, were suppressed under colonial rule.  The late Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (1961: 
249), Nigeria‘s first president, was once quoted as extolling the virtues of his ethnic tribe 
by saying that ―it would seem that the God of Africa has specially created the Igbo 
nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of ages.  The Igbo nation cannot 
shrink from this responsibility.‖ The incidence of primordial sentiments in Nigeria once 
led Justice Chukwudi Oputa, the Chairman of the Human Rights Violation Investigation 
Commission (HRVIC), to bemoan:  ―Where is Nigeria going? Indigenization politics 
didn‘t solve problems.  State-creation did not solve anything.  Everybody still clings to 
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his ethnic group.  It is either you are Hausa or Kataf or Yoruba or Igbo.  What will 
become of Nigeria?‖ (Akaruese, 2003: 217). 
Arguably, the history of Nigeria‘s primordial sentiments, as well as its embedded 
structural inequalities, can be traced back to its federalist origins which are steeped in 
the colonial times.  Nigeria‘s first post-colonial rulers inherited a state made up of three 
regional structures, which were configured by the British to use the majority ethnic 
groups as anchors for the regional governments:  Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in 
the southwest and Igbo in the southeast.  The vast territorial, population, and economic 
power disparities between these regions quickly proved politically damaging.  Quite 
aside from the differences in the level of social and economic development of the 
ethnically based regions, there was an explosive contradiction between the political 
power of the Muslim Hausa-Fulani of the north and the socio-economic power of the 
Yoruba in the industrial southwest and the Igbo of the oil-rich southeast.  Although this 
arrangement has turned out to be inherently problematic, it reflected British thinking that 
given Nigeria‘s ethnic makeup that regionalism should be emplaced as the organizing 
principle for the post-colonial state.  The assumptions were simple and, as it turned out, 
inherently specious.   
The first was the assumption that although the dominant ethnic groups in each region 
would dominate their respective regional governments; no ethnic group would be 
sufficiently powerful to dominate at the center.   With about two-thirds of the land mass 
and over half of the population, the Northern Region dominated the center (Graf 1988: 
29).  The second was the belief that each region would develop a multi-party system, 
which would help to temper or prevent the possibility of parochial dominance at the 
center by any ethnic group.  The actual reality was that the regions became one-party 
monoliths.  The Nigerian People‘s Congress used its narrow ethnic majority in the north 
(16 million out of 31 million northerners were Hausa-Fulani) to control and dominate the 
entire country.   
The third was that the constitutional machinery at the center would ensure the 
emergence of effective national governing institutions.  The problem here was that the 
regional governments had advantages over the center due to established jurisdictional 
legacy.  They not only preceded the federal government by more than a decade but 
also had established ―Nigerianized‖ bureaucracies, self-contained economic systems 
with their control of the marketing boards, direct access to the international economic 
system, and residual powers through the Independence Constitution (Graf, 1988: 29-
30).  Finally, that there would be no discrepancy between political and economic powers 
that could not be easily tackled by the new federalism.  A cursory examination of 1961 
statistical figures on regional revenue and personal taxes demonstrate built-in problems.  
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For that year, the total regional revenues (exclusive of federal allocations) were 
accounted for by: the West – 58.5 percent; the East – 25.7 percent; and the North – 
15.7 percent.  In regard to national aggregate of collected taxes, the percentages were 
as follows: West – 67.7 percent; East – 27.2 percent; and North – 9 percent.  These 
figures were supported by educational enrolment figures.   In 1965, the North with more 
than half of the national population had 10 percent of the national total of all primary 
school population.  For higher education in 1965, Northerners made up 8 percent of 
total student population compared 48 percent for the East, 5 percent for Lagos, and 39 
percent for the West (Graf, 1988: 29-30; Mustapha, 2004).   
Thus, the skewed federal structure in Nigeria combined with the equally problematic 
Westminster majoritarian model bequeathed by the British (complete with its winner-
takes-all and dual executive arrangements), nurtured deep social and political tensions 
and grievances among all the ethnic groups in Nigeria.  As Momoh (2002: 24) argues,  
for the Niger Delta and oil producing minority, it is oil exploitation and 
environmental degradation; for the Igbo it is political marginalization; for the 
Hausa-Fulani it is uneven development (and the failure to have a perpetual and 
uninterrupted right and monopoly control of the federation); for the minorities of 
the north, particularly the Middle Belt it is one of internal colonialism (by the 
majority Hausa-Fulani); for the Yoruba it is power exclusion. Hence, everybody is 
demanding empowerment on the basis of one assumption-xenophobia. 
In the absence of mediating influences (which the British provided as colonial overlord) 
and an enabling appropriate history and political culture, Nigeria gravitated rapidly 
towards political bedlam (1961-1966), coup (1966), counter-coup (1966), and civil war 
(1967-1970)—all these within ten years of independence.  This is despite the efforts of 
several governments to address serious structural problems inherited from the British 
colonial government.  Indeed, the defective structure of the immediate post-colonial 
state was a key factor in the prolonged political crisis and civil war between 1967-1970.   
3.2.4 Nigeria’s Federalism and Conflict Management  
The genius of Nigeria‘s tripartite federalist system in mitigating conflict is reflected 
through the following five mechanisms (Horowitz, 1985: 602-613; Diamond, 1999: 152): 
(1) The partial compartmentalisation or decentralisation of conflicts in separate, 
multiple, sub-federal arenas (rather than a few large regional centres), thereby 
reducing the capacity of such conflicts to polarize or destabilize the entire 
federation; 
(2) The fragmentation and relegation of each of the three major ethnic groups into 
several states, thereby promoting the political accommodation and empowerment 
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of communities that were previously disenfranchised under the defunct regional 
structure; 
(3) The establishment of several more or less heterogeneous ethnic minority-
dominated states thereby promoting the political accommodation and 
empowerment of communities that were previously disenfranchised under the 
defunct regional structure; 
(4) The moderation and sublimation of ethnicity through the promotion of 
intergovernmental alignments that cut across ethnic fault-lines as constituent 
states that are not exactly isomorphic with ethnic boundaries cooperate and 
compete along functional lines of interest, including issues of states‘ rights and 
constitutionalism; and 
(5) The promotion of some form of distributive justice through the devolution and 
redistribution of resources to multiple sub-federal jurisdictions as well as the 
representation of diverse sub-federal elites in national government institutions, as 
concretized in Nigeria‘s revenue sharing and ―federal character‖ policies, 
respectively (Suberu and Osaghae, 2005: 20-21). 
Whatever the merits of Nigeria‘s tripartite federalist system, the fact remains that it has 
been vexed by deep contradictions as corroborated by ―the continuing acrimonious 
debates about the country‘s federal arrangements, the instability that has plagued both 
military and civilian governments since the civil war, and the loss of more than ten 
thousand lives in ethnic and religious violence since the restoration of democratic rule in 
May 1999‖ (Suberu and Osaghae, 2005: 21). The major shortfalls of Nigeria‘s post-civil 
war multi-state federalism can be effectively summarised as follows:  
(1) Nigeria‘s multi-state federalism has suffered enormous structural erosion both 
from the country‘s extended lapses into military rule and from the overwhelming 
dependence of sub-national state and local authorities on centrally collected 
revenues, which have accounted for over 80 percent of all government finances 
in the federation since the seventies.  The economic over-centralisation of the 
federation, in particular, has explosively focused partisan, sectional, and factional 
political and economic competition in the country on the control of the central 
government, with devastating implications for national stability. 
(2) The centralized funding of sub-federal authorities has stimulated ethnic and sub-
ethnic pressures for the formation of new sub-national units as an avenue for 
easy access to national oil revenues. Yet, the sweeping proliferation of states, 
now 36 in number, has simply compounded the syndrome of over-centralization 
since ―the greater the number of states, the weaker and less viable individual 
states will become, with the direct consequence that the center [sic] would 
actually gather more powers‖ (Diamond, 1987: 211). 
(3) The proliferation of sub-federal administrative boundaries and identities, in a 
context defined historically by discrimination against settlers and non-indigenes, 
has led to a sharp contraction of the geo-political space in which a Nigerian can 
claim indigene status within a particular state and enjoy full citizenship rights. The 
Nigerian constitutions since 1979 have compounded the unfortunate dichotomy 
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between indigenes and non-indigenes at the state level by explicitly mandating 
the representation of an indigene of each state in the federal cabinet, and then 
defining an indigene genealogically (rather than residentially) as a person whose 
―parent or...  grandparent was a member of a community indigenous to that state‖ 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999: 318).  In essence, in several Nigerian 
localities and states considerable turmoil and violence, sometimes involving 
hundreds of fatalities, has resulted from attempts to exclude large, but ostensibly 
non-indigenous, resident communities from socio-economic and political 
opportunities, including land and placement in educational and politico-
bureaucratic agencies, claimed or controlled by ―indigenes‖ or local or state 
governments. 
(4) The proliferation of economically inefficient and dependent sub-federal 
jurisdictions, and the emphasis on the redistribution of opportunities among 
sectional constituencies or ―indigenes,‖ reflect and reinforce the ―ethno-
distributive‖ nature of Nigerian federalism and ―federal character.‖ This invariably 
involves the systematic subordination of principles of economic efficiency and 
viability to politico-distributive considerations, which nudges the federation 
towards economic stagnation and fiscal insolvency.  At the same time, the fiscal 
crisis of the Nigerian federation has promoted the recruitment of economically 
disillusioned youths into violent ethnic movements (the so-called ethnic militias 
and vigilantes), while undermining the capacity of the federation to maintain 
ethnically neutral and professionally competent police and security forces that 
can prevent the escalation of sectional conflict into large-scale violence. 
(5) Nigeria‘s distributive multi-state federalism, which is based essentially on the 
massive redistribution of resources from the oil-rich Niger Delta to the rest of the 
federation, has engendered violent struggles for local or regional ―resource 
control‖ in the oil-rich sections.  These economic grievances have persisted in 
spite of recent constitutional and statutory provisions that are designed to return 
at least 13 per cent of centrally collected oil revenues (including offshore oil 
revenues) to the oil-bearing states on a derivation basis (Suberu and Osaghae, 
2005: 21-22). 
3.2.5 Overcentralization and the Defective Federal State  
As noted by Jonathan Rodden (2008: 358), ―federations have a natural tendency to 
become either too centralized—perhaps even despotic—or so decentralized and weak 
that they devolve into internal war...‖ Thomas Jefferson, as cited in Rodden (2008: 358), 
feared a center that would accumulate too much power and run roughshod over the 
rights of the constituent units.  Thus, ―the task facing institutional designers is the 
creation of a central government that is simultaneously strong and limited: strong 
enough to achieve the desired collective goods, but weak enough to preserve a robust 
sense of local autonomy‖ (Rodden, 2008: 359).  This was the nub of William Rieker‘s 
(1964) classic work on federalism.  A decentralized federalism is thought to align the 
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incentives of political officials with citizen welfare by improving information and 
increasing competition (Rodden, 2008: 359).   
Perhaps, the most lamented characteristics of the Nigerian federal system has been 
―the overcentralization of power and resources‖ (Suberu, 1996: 67).  Various factors are 
blamed for this extreme centralisation:  
(1) The protracted periods of military rule. 
(2) The heavy reliance of the political economy on centralised oil revenues.   
(3) The popularity of centralist philosophies and strategies of development. 
(4) The weak commitment of key elites to the practice of democratic decentralisation 
(Suberu, 1996: 67).   
Nigeria‘s overcentralized federal system has led to the following problems:  
The virtual abrogation of authentic federalist institutions and values, the 
destructive competition for the control of the central government machinery 
(especially the federal presidency), the loss of financial coherence and discipline 
at the federal level, the extreme dependence of the states and localities on 
federal developmental patronage and financial largesse and, consequently, the 
persistent communal pressure for new, federally-funded units of state and local 
government (Suberu, 1996: 67).   
For the ethnic minority groups, especially in the Niger Delta, overcentralization has led 
to specific inauspicious outcomes such as:  
(1) The erosion of the autonomy and security that genuine federalist arrangements 
guarantee for minorities. 
(2) The inordinate appropriation by the center of the resources of the oil-rich Delta 
minority communities 
(3) The direct and often counter-productive intervention of central authorities in 
those local and regional issues, such as the determination of local government 
boundaries, that are best left to sub-national authorities or communities (Suberu, 
1996: 67; The Guardian, 27 June 1994: 5).44 
A strong state apparatus is sometimes prescribed as a useful tool of intervention in 
order to check abuses of ethnic minority rights at the sub-national level (Suberu, 1996: 
67).  This view would appear to be supported by Nigeria‘s experiences during the late 
                                                          
44
 MOSOP, for instance, purports that ―the fundamental problem of Nigeria is the centralization of state 
and economic powers which has led to the abject marginalisation and impoverishment of minority groups 
and to some extent other non-ruling groups‖ (The Guardian, 27 June 1994: 5).  Similarly, a communiqué 
issued during February 1994, by Ademota, Graham Douglas, Edwin Clark, George Innih and other 
prominent southern ethnic minority elites, generally opined that ―repeated military intervention and 
dictatorship had fully established unitary government in Nigeria, which was exploited by the three largest 
ethnic nationalities to the utter neglect of the interest of the small nationalities, especially the Southern 
minorities‖ (The Guardian, 6 February 1994: A20). 
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sixties, when ―the abrogation of the centrifugal regional system, and the consolidation of 
centralised federal powers, played a significant role in helping to secure the autonomy 
and dignity of Nigeria‘s marginalised regional minorities‖ (Suberu, 1996: 67).  This 
notwithstanding, the unchecked concentration of powers at the federal level exposed 
the political process to abuses which invariably have hurt politically excluded segments, 
especially the ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta (Suberu, 1996: 67).  Given Nigeria‘s 
relatively centralised ethnic structure (with three ethnic groups holding sway), it is no 
surprise that political processes at the federal level has revolved largely around the 
accommodation of the interests of the majority ethnic groups, at the expense of the 
interests of the more fragmented ethnic minority groups.  According to Uzodike et al. 
(2010: 166), ―the crux of the problem is that the national government [in Nigeria] has 
centralised the ownership and control of oil resources in such a way that nearly all 
component states and local government areas depend primarily on transfers.‖  Further, 
Uzodike et al. (2010: 166) contends that ―many in the South, particularly the Niger 
Deltans, often adjudge the transfers to be done so unfairly that the North—with 
apparent control of political power and, as such, resource sharing power—is unduly 
favoured.‖  
The skewed nature of the relationship between the majority ethnic groups and ethnic 
minorities in the Nigerian federation prompted Ben Naanen (1995: 8) to argue that ―in 
regard to oil producing minorities, and the Ogonis in particular, an appropriate 
conceptual framework to help explain the situation giving rise to their present struggle is 
that of internal colonialism (emphasis added).‖  According to Naanen (1995: 9), internal 
colonialism includes the manner in which majority ethnic groups have come to acquire 
political power on the basis of their numerical superiority, and the use of such political 
power to transfer resources from ethnic minority territories to areas controlled by ethnic 
majorities.  Interestingly, evidence abounds to support the claim of internal colonialism.  
For instance, the gradual de-emphasis of the derivation principle of revenue (which 
stood at 50 per cent between 1960 and 1967 and fell to a low of 3 per cent in 1999) by 
the federal government is used to buttress this argument (Ogundiya, 2011).  The 
foregoing has led to calls from Nigeria‘s minority groups—especially the Niger 
Deltans—to address the national question. 
3.2.6 The National Question 
Throughout the country… ethnic minorities are in ferment.  They are striving to 
shake off age-long usurpations, to cast off the yoke of distant suzerains and to 
take their own destinies in their own hands.  This ferment, which this nation can 
ignore only at its peril, is what has been subsumed under the national question.  
It is real, and it is urgent.  To pretend that it does not exist is to be deluded  
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―Zangon-Kataf:  A tainted verdict,‖ editorial in  
The Guardian, 9 February 1993. 
Ethnic minority tensions and agitations form an important feature of the ongoing 
struggle to resolve the ―national question‖ (Suberu, 1996: 1).   According to Osaghae 
(1998: 315), the crux of the national question involves ―how to structure the Nigerian 
federation in order to accommodate groups and guarantee access to power and 
equitable distribution of resources.‖  Osaghae‘s avowal is informed by the perceived 
domination of some ethnic groups by the others ―engendered by the structural nature of 
the Nigerian federation, the lopsidedness in center-state relations, and the growing 
impoverishment, frustrations and disillusionment of the people, which is viewed as a 
direct consequence of power structure and ruling class politics in Nigeria‖ (Adejumobi, 
2000: 126).   
As stated by Adejumobi (2000: 126), the basic issues involved in the national question 
are: 
1. What should be the component units and tiers of government in the Nigerian 
federation? 
2. How should they be constituted, based on ethnic contiguity or administrative 
expediency?  
3. How should political power and administrative responsibilities be shared among 
the levels and tiers of government?  
4. How should the ownership of economic resources be structured in the Nigerian 
federation?  
5. What should be the acceptable formulae for sharing federally collected revenue?  
6. What should be the nature of inter-governmental relations in Nigeria? 
Against this backdrop, Adejumobi (2003: 175) advocates for a Sovereign National 
Conference where different nationalities can meet to discuss two pressing issues: 
The first is the inter-group relations.  That is, the tensions and contradictions that 
arise from this relationship dwelling on the issues of marginalisation, domination, 
inequality, fairness and justice among ethnic groups.  The second...  is the class 
dimension.  That is, the exacerbation of class inequalities and antagonisms in 
society between the rich and the poor, the affluent and the underclass...  The 
latter sometimes reinforce the former and do increase ethnic conflicts and 
antagonism in society (Adejumobi, 2003: 175). 
Some attention has been paid to the above issues since independence with the 
establishment of a number of commissions to address them.   For instance, priority was 
given to the principle of derivation by the Phillipson (1946), Hicks-Phillipson (1951), 
Chick (1953) and Raisman (1958) Commissions and later the Bimms (1964), Dina 
(1968), Aboyade (1977) and Okigbo (1979) Commissions (Ojakorotu, 2007: 56).  Many 
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principles that were espoused by these Commissions could have helped to rein in the 
excesses of the Nigerian federation if adequately implemented.  But the majority ethnic 
groups have manipulated state affairs to their own advantage thereby leaving the issues 
the Commissions tended to address worse than before (Ojakorotu, 2007: 56).   
Ojakorotu (2007: 57) has argued that there is a sense in which the national question 
can be seen from its internal and external dimensions.   The focus of this research, 
however, will be on the external dimension bearing in mind that the country‘s internal 
contradictions bear on the external dimension.  The internal dimension appertains to the 
nexus between oil and the national question, which sheds some light on the struggles 
between ethnic groups and the government for the control and sharing of petrodollars 
(Agbu, 2000: 104).  At the external level, the national question has assumed a 
transnational dimension with the sudden resurrection of ethnic minorities‘ agitation for 
self-determination and resource control.   The demise of communism, coinciding with 
the gradual triumph and spread of Western-inspired democratic ethos throughout the 
globe, made this possible, as the clamour for self-determination and freedom by 
minorities received a welcomed boost (Ojakorotu, 2007: 57).  These global trends have 
underscored the Niger Delta struggle as a critical aspect of the national question in 
Nigeria (Agbu, 2000: 104).  For example, MOSOP was not only recognised by the 
United Nations as a representative of a marginalised ethnic minority group but also took 
on the Federal Government and the oil multinationals (led by Shell) that had pitched 
their tent in Ogoniland (Agbu, 2000: 104; Olukoshi and Agbu, 1995).  The formation of 
MOSOP in the early 1990s therefore rekindled the agitation for the reconfiguration of 
the disfigured Nigerian Federation.   
From the 1970s, following the end of the civil war in Nigeria, ethnic nationalism defined 
by the quest to gain political ascendancy and access to oil revenues formed a crucial 
part of the Niger Delta conflict.  The increasing dependence of the Nigerian state on oil 
rents and the equation of oil-producing communities in the calculus, made them more 
assertive and vociferous.  However, they were soon torn apart by land and oil 
contestations between themselves as each group sought to outdo the other through 
political stratagems (Olukoshi and Agbu, 1995).  It was during this period that the Ijaws, 
for example, gained political ascendancy within the old Rivers state, controlling 
important crude oil reserves.  Onosode (1993: 8) contends that the issues of 
deprivation, ignorance and poverty are central to the inter-ethnic/communal wars of the 
region since people fight their neighbours when they are poor and lack political 
consciousness.   Farther afield, forces outside the Niger Delta region have been 
implicated as sponsors of violence, ―given the frequency of the wars and the 
sophistication of the weapons used‖ (The African Guardian, 1994: 8).    
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Beyond this, the origins of oil as an issue in the national question at the external level 
can be traced to the creation of the Nigerian state in 1914, ―when colonial legislation 
granted monopoly of oil concessions in Nigeria to British and British allied capital‖ 
(Agbu, 2000: 104).  Shell maintained this monopoly until 1957 when other oil 
multinationals like Mobil, Gulf (now Chevron), Agip, Safrap (now Elf), Tenneco and 
Amoseas (now Texaco) also became major stakeholders in oil exploration and 
production in Nigeria. But since 1960, oil multinationals, acting in complicity with the 
Nigerian state to the exclusion of the local people, have dominated the oil industry.  
Hence there have been violent militant battles between the oil-bearing communities, on 
the one hand, and the state-oil multinational alliance, on the other.  
It is important to note that the oil boom in the mid-1970s saw not only the devaluation of 
the traditional economic staples such as tin, groundnuts, cocoa and palm oil but also the 
exponential increase in the importance of petroleum as the fulcrum of the Nigerian 
political economy.  The over-reliance on crude oil, which (unlike agriculture) requires 
less extensive administrative and managerial support system and labour input, has 
opened the floodgates not only for the centralised Nigerian government to foster the 
dependency of state and local governments on federal allocations but also to overlook 
the need and efficacy of rational and sustained economic planning and policy (Uzodike 
et al.  2010).  The centrality of crude oil to survival of the Nigerian economy since the 
1970s necessitated the problem of revenue allocation: what is the most equitable and 
acceptable revenue sharing formula?  
Available sources indicate that the search for an appropriate revenue sharing formula, 
adjudged by all Nigerians as fair, has a long history.  In fact, ―several 
commissions/committees have addressed this issue [of revenue allocation formula] over 
the years and, yet, it remains controversial‖ (Ebeku, 2005: 380).   This point is 
corroborated by the report of the Revenue Allocation Committee of the country‘s 
Constitutional Conference of 1994-1995: 
Besides politics, revenue allocation is about the most contentious issue in 
Nigeria.  Thus, every constitutional development has with it a new fiscal 
relationship. Also at several other times when there were no constitutional 
arrangements, some revenue sharing schemes have been recommended for the 
nation.  Consequently, several Revenue Allocation Commissions and/or 
Committees have been appointed in addition to several decrees on revenue 
allocation.  The number and frequency of the commissions notwithstanding, no 
recommended formula met general acceptability.  No sooner than some were 
recommended than they were found wanting (quoted in Ebeku, 2005: 381). 
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In 1987, similar observations were made by the Political Bureau emplaced by the 
federal government to ―conduct a national debate on the political future of Nigeria‖ 
(Report of the Political Bureau, March 1987: 3) as follows:  
Revenue allocation or the statutory distribution of revenues from the Federation 
Account among the different levels of government has been one of the most 
contentious and controversial issues in the nation‘s political life.  So contentious 
has the matter been that none of the formula evolved at various times by a 
commission or by decree under different regimes since 1964 has gained general 
acceptability among the component units of the country.  Indeed, the issue, like a 
recurring decimal, has painfully remained the first problem that nearly all 
incoming regime has had to grapple with since independence.  In the process, 
as many as thirteen different attempts have been made at devising an 
acceptable revenue allocation formula, each of which is more remembered for 
the controversies it generated than issues settled (Report of the Political Bureau, 
March 1987: 169). 
For many years now, the principle of revenue allocation in Nigeria has ―vacillated 
greatly—mostly on the principle of derivation‖ (Ebeku, 2005: 381).  In an inaugural 
address to the 1994-1995 Constitutional Conference, the Nigerian Head of State 
General Sani Abacha noted that ―since independence [in 1960], successive 
administrations have grappled with the question of an equitable statutory distribution of 
revenue from the Federation Account—the question was whether allocation should be 
based on derivation or on need‖ (Ebeku, 2005: 381). 
A historical excursion into the annals of Nigeria‘s pre-independence history shows that 
in the 1950s, prior to the discovery and dominance of oil as the mainstay of the Nigerian 
economy, derivation principle was emphasized to the point that it was at times 100 
percent (Ikein, 1990: 29-30; Naanen, 1995: 56; Kaiama Declaration, 1998).  During this 
period, Nigeria depended heavily on agricultural products such as cotton and granduts 
from the north, cocoa and rubber from the west, and palm oil from the east (Naanen, 
1995: 56; Ebeku, 2005: 381).  In the 1970s, however, when oil emerged as the 
mainstay of the Nigerian economy, the emphasis on the principle of derivation began to 
be de-emphasized.  Informed by the financial statistics of Nigeria, Ebeku (2005: 381) 
argues that ―before 1999 the percentage of revenue allocated on the basis of derivation 
principle plummeted as follows: 100 per cent (1953), 50 per cent (1960), 45 per cent 
(1970), 20 per cent (1975), 2 per cent (1982), and 1.5 per cent (1984).‖   
Writing on this issue of derivation, Obi (2009: 115) agrees with Ebeku that ―the revenue 
allocation principle of derivation [in Nigeria] was progressively changed to reduce the 
share of oil producing states of the Niger Delta from 50 percent in 1966 to 1.5 percent in 
the 1990s.‖  Obi (2010: 115) describes the situation, thus:  
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The progressive reduction of the derivation principle—which provided for 
revenue allocation in proportion to the contribution to the federal purse by each 
state—and the introduction of the Distributive Pool Account (DPA) or federation 
account that emphasized the allocative principles of population size and need 
(and de-emphasized derivation), was viewed as an injustice by the ethnic 
minorities, particularly in the context of decades of marginalization and neglect of 
the Niger Delta by past governments.  It was also strongly felt that the principle 
of derivation which gave 50 percent of revenues to the old regional governments 
controlled by the dominant ethnic groups was abandoned in order to enable 
these same groups to control the oil wealth produced from the oil minority states. 
Hence, the struggle between the oil minorities/states of the Niger Delta and the 
non-oil producing ethnic majority groups/states/federal government became the 
object of the politics of controlling revenue or resource control (Obi, 2009: 115-
116). 
Seeking to explain other possible reasons for the 50 per cent reduction in the derivation 
principle in the 1960s, Naanen (1995: 56) contends that ―one important feature of this 
period was the beginning of the rise of petroleum in the Nigerian economy.  Mining rents 
and royalties, instead of going back to the region of origin as before, were now to be 
shared between the region of origin and the federal government and other regions, on a 
50-50 basis.‖  In the same vein, one commentator observed:  
there has been disheartening contradictions and inconsistencies in Nigeria, a 
nation that recognized 100 per cent derivation as a basis for revenue allocation 
in 1950, but reduced it to 50 per cent at independence; to 45 per cent in 1970; 
20 per cent in 1975; 1.5 per cent in 1982 and 3 per cent in 1992, as crude oil, 
found in the Ijaw country, became the main source of national revenue (National 
Concord, 11 December 1992: B2, see table 7 for states and federal share of 
petroleum proceeds). 
The oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta have linked the conscious and 
systematic obliteration or de-emphasis of the principle of derivation by successive 
Nigerian governments to their minority status in the Nigerian federation and their lack of 
political power to influence the state of affairs (Ebeku, 2005: 383).  As Suberu (1996: 
29) argues, the Niger Deltans view the change in the rules for allocating revenue as ―a 
politically motivated assault by the majority nationalities on the economic rights of 
minority communities who are perceived as too small and weak to threaten the stability 
of the federation.‖  The level of unhappiness in the Niger Delta, as per the distortion of 
the derivation principle by the Nigerian Federal Government, is well captured in the 
statements of the first civilian Governor of Rivers State and the representatives of the 
Ijaw community:  
Derivation as a revenue allocation criterion is not new in this country.  It featured 
prominently when cocoa, groundnuts, etc, were the main sources of revenue for 
Nigeria.  But it has continued to be deliberately suppressed since crude oil 
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became the mainstay of the country‘s wealth… simply because the main 
contributors of the oil wealth are the minorities (Okilo, 1980: 3, quoted in Suberu, 
1996: 29) 
In support of the above contention, Saro-Wiwa pointedly argues that ―if the oil had been 
in any of the majority areas, in Hausa/Fulani country or Yoruba country, the federal 
government would never have seized the royalties‖ (Interview in Tell Magazine, 
February 8, 1993: 31).  Saro-Wiwa‘s avowal is evinced by the following observation: 
The oil producing areas of Nigeria are mostly inhabited by minority groups... 
These groups lack the power to make any political or economic decision in their 
favour.  The balance of power in Nigeria is such that the national interest reigns 
supreme over local rights... There seems to be a direct relationship between 
revenue allocation and the exercise of political power; political decision-makers 
can apparently reverse at will the formula for sharing national wealth.  For 
example, prior to the oil boom, the formulae for revenue allocation were based 
on the derivation principle, where by the resource-producing region received the 
greatest share... (Ikein, 1990: 28-29). 
Table 7 
States and Federal Share of Petroleum Proceeds, 1953—Present 
Years Producing State  
(%) 
Federal Account 
including DPA (%) 
1953-1960 100 — 
1960-1969 50 50 
1969-1971 45 55 
1971-1975 45 minus offshore 
proceeds 
55 plus offshore 
proceeds 
1975-1979 20 minus offshore 
proceeds 
80 plus offshore 
proceeds 
1979-1981 — 100 
1982-1992 1.5 98.5 
1992-1999 3 97 
1999— 13 87 
Source: UNDP, 2006, p.6. 
The consequence of the power asymmetry in Nigeria is that ―little regard is given to the 
need for equity in the distribution of oil revenue‖ (Ebeku, 2005: 384).  This point is 
crystallized in the words of Ikein (1990: 38) who argues that ―the method of revenue 
allocation that has been in force over the years has very little regard for the adverse 
consequences of the impact of the oil industry on the oil producing areas.  Nigeria public 
policy toward the oil producing areas seems to support the questionable view that the 
national interest supersedes local rights.‖  It is important to clarify that the point been 
made here is not that national interest is immaterial, but that ―equity demands fairness 
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to the indigenous people who suffer the adverse consequence of oil operations‖ (Ebeku, 
2005: 384).   
The Constitutional Conference of 1994-1995 played a significant role in bringing the 
principle of derivation back on the map as an important and equitable principle of 
revenue allocation in Nigeria.  The Conference recommended ―the adoption of 13 per 
cent derivation principle in any future revenue allocation formula in the country, and this 
was enacted in section 162 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria‖ 
(Ebeku, 2005: 385).  The section provides in part: 
1. The Federation shall maintain a special account to be called ―the Federation 
Account‖ into which shall be paid all revenue collected by the Government of the 
Federation, except the proceeds from the personal income tax of the personnel 
of the armed forces of the Federation, the Nigerian Police Force, the Ministry or 
Department of Government charged with responsibility for Foreign Affairs and the 
residents of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. 
2. The President, upon the receipt of advice from the Revenue Mobilisation 
Allocation and Fiscal Commission, shall table before the National Assembly 
proposals for revenue allocation from the Federation Account, and in determining 
the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account, the allocation 
principles especially those of population, equality of states, internal revenue 
generation, land mass, terrain as well as population density (Ebeku, 2005: 385).  
However, it appears that the upward review of the revenue allocation formula has not 
resolved the issue of injustice felt by the Niger Deltans.  Indeed, the people are still 
dissatisfied with the 13 per cent derivation principle (Ebeku, 2005: 386).   According to 
Badmus (2009: 28), ―the dissatisfaction of the minority groups with these revenue 
sharing formulas, and their ‗perceived‘ deprivation resulted in the confrontations with the 
forces of transterritorial extraction, especially Shell, and the Nigerian state.‖  In 2005, 
the country held a National Political Reform Dialogue Conference.  During the 
proceedings, Niger Delta representatives demanded an increase in the derivation 
revenue from the current ―constitutionally prescribed 13 per cent to 25 per cent and 
gradually up to 50 per cent‖ (Ebeku, 2008: 27).  But their proposal was strongly 
opposed45 (especially by northern delegates) at a plenary session of the entire 
representatives and this led the Niger Delta representatives to walk out from further 
participation in the proceedings (Ebeku, 2008: 27). 
Another issue that is in proximity with the issue of derivation is the problem of ―onshore-
offshore dichotomy‖ (Ebeku, 2005: 387).  This dichotomy was put in place around 1971, 
―whereby offshore oil revenue is excluded from the principle of derivation on the basis 
                                                          
45
The Conference agreed only to an increase from 13 percent to 17 percent. 
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that such revenue exclusively belongs to the federal government under the International 
Law of the Sea‖ (Ebeku, 2005: 387).  The Niger Deltans, however, see this as ―yet 
another clever political device to deprive the oil producing states of additional revenue‖ 
(Report of the Political Bureau, 1987: 170).  In their opinion, ―the dichotomy between 
onshore and offshore in the allocation of revenue due to the oil producing states should 
be abolished, as it is oblivious of the tremendous hazards faced by the inhabitants of 
the areas where oil is produced offshore‖ (Report of the Political Bureau, 1987: 172).  
This issue is a subject for further study. 
Having probed the political root causes of the Niger Delta conflict, with particular 
reference to the deep contradictions in Nigeria‘s multi-state federalist system and the 
unresolved nature of the national question-cum-revenue allocation formula, it behoves 
us to now turn our attention to the economic root causes of the ethnic minority ferment 
in the Niger Delta in order to glean a more nuanced understanding of the causal basis 
of the conflict.   
3.3 Economic Root Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict 
The story of the Niger Delta is the story of a paradox, grinding poverty in the 
midst of vulgar opulence.  It is the case of a man [sic] who lives on the banks of 
a river and washes his hands with spittle.  It is the case of a people who live on 
the farm and die of hunger (Ekpu, 2004: 10). 
The above quote brings into stark relief the banality of prosperity and the dramaturgy of 
surfeit and scarcity in Nigeria‘s delta region.  Economic factors intensifying the Niger 
Delta conflict can be conceptualized in terms of the political-economic nexus (Idemudia 
and Ite, 2006: 396).  Such a nexus is perched atop oil revenue allocation (which we 
have already considered in the previous section), which accentuated the sense of 
relative deprivation among the people of the Niger-Delta.   The bone of contention is 
that ―the bulk of the oil revenues generated from the region should be returned back to 
the [Niger Delta] region on the basis of fairness, compensation and self-determination‖ 
(Ibeanu, 2000: 19-32; Obi, 1997).  Put differently, the source of the frustration and 
aggression is that 
[f]or fifty years, foreign oil companies have conducted some of the world‘s most 
sophisticated exploration and production operations, using million of dollars‘ 
worth of imported ultramodern equipment, against a backdrop of Stone Age 
squalor.  They have extracted hundreds of millions of barrels of oil, which have 
sold on the international market for hundreds of billions of dollars, but the people 




3.3.1 A Brief Economic History of the Niger Delta People 
Before the colonial enterprise in the Niger Delta, the popular belief among Nigerian 
historians was that the region seemed to have been inhabited predominantly by the Ijaw 
people that engaged in farming and fishing and lived in small and scattered villages 
(Crowder, 1962: 79; Ojakorotu, 2008: 31). The slave trade era stimulated the growth of 
trading partners in the Niger Delta region, which invariably expanded versions of small 
Ijaw fishing villages that occupied strategic positions on the creek of the Niger Delta.  
Notable among these are Bonny, Owome, Okrika, Itsekiri, Brass, among others 
(Crowder, 1962: 79). The predominant activities among these communities were 
subsistence farming, fishing, hunting and gathering of the natural products of the deltas 
(Ojakorotu, 2008: 31).  In addition, the people engaged in trade by barter with 
neighbouring delta communities.  This relatively small barter trade was followed by 
―long-distance trade with the peoples of the delta hinterland, and also with the western 
delta‖ (Alagoa, 1971: 291-292).   Ojakorotu (2008: 31) argues that ―[f]or this purpose, 
large canoes were manufactured.  The articles of trade were yams, slaves, cows, goats 
and sheep, and the manufacture of salt from seawater on the coast for sale in the 
hinterland.‖  The ignoble trade in slave which heralded the beginning of contact with the 
Europeans changed the pattern of trade between the Ijaw and their hinterland 
neighbours into centers of redistributions: collecting European merchandise for sale in 
the hinterland, and receiving hinterland produce for exports (Alagoa, 1971: 292). 
One deducible point from the economic history of the Niger Deltans is the fact that 
people engaged in ventures that ―impacted directly on their existence and well being‖ 
(Ojakorotu, 2008: 34).   The people of the delta had a strong attachment to their 
environment which was their source of livelihood before the advent of the western 
merchandise.   Even the dawn of the slave trade did not supplant local practices like 
farming and fishing.  And with the abolition of the slave trade, the people reverted to the 
agricultural activities that they had previously engaged in.  Following independence, the 
economic life of the people which had pivoted on farming, fishing and trading in 
agricultural produce, remained unaltered.   Bearing in mind that every commodity was 
derived from land and resources embedded within its substructure as well as 
superstructure, one begins to appreciate the reason why the Niger Delta people are so 
attached to the land.  Ojakorotu (2008: 33) notes that ―this especially called for 
sensitivity in the use of land and its resources as well as the evolvement of measures to 
protect the environment.‖  
The discovery of oil had disastrous consequences for the stately environment of the 
Niger Delta environment which, in the view of the Niger Delta people, had not been 
adequately addressed by the Nigerian state and oil companies.  The despoliation of the 
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environment by oil activities was therefore interpreted by the people as an affront on 
their economic well being, survival and posterity.  It is within this context that one can 
locate the economic and environmental considerations that underscore the violent 
agitations of the Niger Delta people since the 1990s.   
3.3.2 The Oil Industry in Nigeria 
To state that oil is central to the violence in the Niger Delta is to restate the obvious.   
Ibeanu (2006: 21) argues that ―understanding the persistence of conflicts in the Niger 
Delta necessitates a review of the historical development to the oil industry [in Nigeria].‖  
Such a historical context makes for a varied and intriguing trajectory.  In 1956, oil was 
discovered in commercial quantities at Oloibiri (Bayelsa state).   Since then, the oil 
sector in Nigeria has experienced impressive growth and has assumed a high place in 
the country‘s political economy.  From 1970s, crude oil has totally eclipsed agriculture 
as the engine of the economy in all ramifications.  For example, Omotola (2006: 8) 
argues that ―from less than 1 per cent in 1960, the contribution of oil to GDP rose to 
14.6, 21.9 and 26-29 per cent in 1970, 1975 and 1979, respectively.  By 1992, it had 
risen to 46.8 per cent.‖ The contributions of crude oil to Nigeria‘s export incomes have 
been much higher: ―From 58.1 per cent in 1970; it rose to 95.6 per cent in 1979.   
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it remained very high, accounting for 210 billion naira 
or 96.1 per cent of total export earnings in 1996‖ (Omotola, 2006: 8).  The pride of place 
that oil occupies in the Nigerian economy can be further gleaned from Table 8. 
According to Obi (2010: 446), the oil industry in Nigeria has undergone three phases: 
―(1) the oil concession, (2) state participation, and (3) deregulation eras.‖   The earliest 
era had its roots in the first oil exploration work by the German Bitumen Company 
based on a 1914 colonial minerals oil ordinance granting the monopoly of oil 
concessions in Nigeria to ―British or British-allied capital‖ (Obi, 1997: 140).   Under this 
ruling, Ibeanu (2006: 21) argues that ―the Anglo-Dutch group Shell D‘Archy (later Shell-
BP) got an oil exploration Concession covering the entire 367, 000 square miles of 
Nigeria in 1938.‖   Thus, ―the stage was set for over six decades of dominance of the 
Nigerian oil economy by Shell (currently about 50 per cent of Nigeria‘s total production 
and about 53 per cent of total hydrocarbon reserve base)‖ (Ibeanu, 2006: 21).  In 1956, 
oil was struck in a commercial quantity in Oloibiri (Bayelsa state).   The next year, oil 
MNCs, such as Mobil, Texaco, Esso, Agip and Safrap entered into the Nigerian oil 
sector to occupy oil acreages given up by Shell in 1958 (Schaltz, 1969: 3).   In other 
words, ―Shell ceded 95 per cent of its concession to other non-Nigerian companies, 
leaving itself prime 16,000 square miles‖ (Ibeanu, 2006: 21; see chart 4 for a depiction 















Source: These data are taken from the Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigeria: Major 
Economic, Financial and Banking Indicators, Abuja: CBN, 1997, p. 8; quoted in Omotola 
2006, p.9. 
By February 1958, Nigeria became an oil exporter with a production level of 6,000 
barrels per day (Ibeanu, 2006: 21; Schaltz, 1969: 3)—although it was not until after the 
Civil War (1967-1970) that the country became a major producer on a global scale 
(Ibeanu, 2006: 21).  Obi (2010: 447) notes that ―the early era of the oil industry was 
marked by foreign control and non-participation by the state that simply collected rents 
and taxes.‖  However, by the 1970s, there was a change in the trend, owing to the 
following factors: (1) increased contribution of oil to national revenues, (2) the ‗OPEC 
revolution‘ that led to the quadrupling of international oil prices, and (3) the economic 
nationalism of the Nigerian post-civil-war military government that embarked on the 
indigenization of the oil industry (Obi, 2010: 447). Notably, ―Decree No. 51 transferred 
the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under, or upon any lands to the 
federal military government‖ (Obi, 2010: 447).   What is more, the Nigerian state sought 
to gain greater control of proceeds of the oil exports.  According to Ibeanu (2006: 21), 
the Nigerian government ―passed the 1959 Petroleum Profit Tax Ordinance, which 
provided for 50/50 profit sharing between government and producers.  This marked the 
early beginnings of a petro-rentier state.‖  Subsequently, the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was formed by the Nigerian government through a 
merger of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources with the Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation (NNOC) (Obi, 2010: 447).  The growing interests of the Nigerian 












1988 31.7 89.5 10.5 8.8 
1989 63.2 87.0 13.0 4.7 
1990 120.1 88.8 11.2 2.3 
1991 132.4 88.3 11.7 3.5 
1992 226.9 88.8 11.2 1.9 
1993 245.7 87.0 13.0 2.0 
1994 215.5 93.2 6.8 2.5 
1995 875.5 92.0 8.0 2.3 
1996 1186.1 93.2 6.5 1.7 
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―including its equity interest based on a 60:40 ratio in the downstream sector of the oil 
industry‖ (Obi, 2010: 447).   
Unfortunately, this ratio was decided without consulting or involving the local oil-bearing 
communities (Pearson, 1970: 24-26). Ojakorotu (2008: 36) has argued that ―the non-
involvement of the local [Niger Delta] communities in fashioning this arrangement 
signalled the continuation of the alienation of the people of the Niger Delta.‖  He further 
noted that ―it is an obvious fact that the exclusion of key actors from decision making 
processes inexorably undermine efforts at resolving problems that pertain to these 
actors‖ (Ojakorotu, 2008: 36). 
Chart 4 
Nigeria Oil Fields 
 
Source: Isike et al. (2007: 38) 
Three new refineries were built by the Nigerian state.  The first was located in Warri 
(1998); the second in Kaduna (1980) and; the third in Port Harcourt II (1989).  Obi 
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(2010: 447) argues that these refineries were built by the state in order to ―ensure 
secure supplies of refined products for the bourgeoning domestic market and provide 
revenue for government‖ (Obi, 2010: 447).  Further, petrochemical plants were 
commissioned at Ekpan (near Warri), at Eleme (Port Harcourt II), and the Kaduna 
refinery.  Obi (2010: 447) comments that ―the expectation was that these refineries will 
use the feedstock from the refineries to produce raw materials for the manufacturing 
sector.‖  In the upstream sector, a 60:40 cost and profit sharing ration was at play.  
Following the nationalisation of the BP component in 1979, the formula used in the case 
of Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) was thus: ―NNPC 55 per cent, Shell 
30 per cent, Elf (now called Total) 10 per cent, and Agip (ENI) 5 per cent‖ (Obi, 2010: 
447).  Government‘s indigenisation policy enabled state incorporation into the 
transnational operations of the oil industry.   
In 1977 and 1981, the global economy was hit with a sudden downturn in global oil 
prices.  This reality had negative consequences for the Nigerian political economy.   
Nigeria‘s mono-cultural economy nose-dived as revenues from the sale of oil shrank 
significantly, and by 1982, the country had entered discussions with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  In fact, ―many companies were closed and workers were 
retrenched‖ (Obi, 2010: 447).  To use the eloquent words of Ibeanu (2006: 21), ―the 
silhouette had become a very clear picture and the Nigerian economy was already deep 
into a tailspin.‖  Ibeanu (2006: 21) lucidly describes the fiscal crisis in which the Nigerian 
economy was enmeshed: 
Crude oil revenues fell from N201 million in 1980 to about N56 million in 1983, 
triggered by precipitous declines in world crude oil prices.  Sine public revenues 
were largely dependent on crude oil exports, the decline set-off a serious 
financial crisis that is clearly expressed in the sudden increase in import of 
capital, which rose by 280% between 1979 and 1981.  In 1983, external debts 
stood at about N15 billion, with a N5 billion backlog of repayments, while internal 
public debt stood at N22 billion.  Expectedly, the economy virtually collapsed.  
Industrial capacity utilization fell to only about 20%, there were massive layoffs of 
workers in the private and public sectors, inflation rose from 7.7% in 1982 to 
23.2% in 1983, GDP fell by 4.4% in 1983 and GDP per capita fell from $960 in 
1980 to about $300 in 1987. 
At the time, the civilian regime of President Shehu Shagari tried to dissociate itself from 
the crises by blaming the difficulties on the sudden downturn in the world oil prices 
(Ibeanu, 2006: 23).  For its part, the international financial institutions (IFIs) attributed 
the difficulties to ―structural imbalances in the economy‖ (Ibeanu, 2006: 23).  However, 
one can predicate the fiscal crisis on the effect of an entrenched Dutch disease (Karl, 
1997: 5) described by Ibeanu (2006: 23) as ―Nigeria‘s inability over the years to 
creatively use oil money to develop the industrial sector and in tandem neglected the 
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agricultural sector of the economy, which sustained the country before crude oil exports 
became dominant.‖  As a result of the ―fiscal crisis, pressures from IFIs, growing 
domestic discontent and decline in foreign investment in the oil sector, a reprisal for 
policies of the indigenization period‖ (Ibeanu, 2006: 23), the Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) witnessed a partial deregulation and commercialisation of its 
various operations.   
We see a marked difference when we juxtapose the Nigerian petroleum legislation in 
the period before independence with what operated in other African countries like 
Algeria and Libya (Ojakorotu, 2008: 36).  In significant aspects, the Algerian-French 
Petroleum Agreement of 29 July 1965 contrasted sharply with the Nigerian legislation.   
For example, a good level of cooperation existed between the oil company to be 
founded by the French and the Algerian states (Schatzl, 1969: 95-96; Ojakorotu, 2008: 
36).  Beyond this, ―the legislation abolished the depletion allowances, the Algerian share 
of profit was fixed at 53 per cent and assessment of profits was made on the basis of 
fixed prices‖ (Ojakorotu, 2008: 36; Schatzl, 1969: 96).   For its part, the Libyan 
Petroleum Legislation of October 20, 1965 also differs fundamentally from that of 
Nigeria in crucial aspects.   Schatzl, quoted in Ojakorotu (2008: 36) observes that ―the 
Libyan petroleum law complied with practically all the requests of OPEC in regard to the 
operation of oil multinationals in less developed countries.‖  Further, he noted that 
―petroleum legislations in Algeria and Libya guaranteed to the state a considerably 
higher share of petroleum profits than Nigeria under the Petroleum Profit Tax Ordinance 
of 1959‖ (quoted in Ojakorotu, 2008: 36).   
In 2011, the oil sector in Nigeria is hobbled by elite corruption and remains the site of 
violence on the part of the three contending stakeholders in the industry: the oil 
multinationals, the Nigerian state, and the oil bearing communities.  It is useful to note 
that the present ethnic minority agitations in the Niger Delta against their perceived 
marginalisation within the Nigerian federal system is partly rooted in historical factors 
and is therefore not a new phenomenon.  In fact, it has been the case in the region prior 
to independence and throughout the post 1990 struggles. Broadly, the developmental 
hiatus in the Niger Delta is a consequence of a basic structural contradiction traceable 
to the dawn of the colonial enterprise and reinforced by the character of the Nigerian 
state.   For instance, Jike and Okinomo (2008: 11) argue the following:  
In juxtaposition with the other five geopolitical regions of Nigeria i.e.  South East, 
South West, North Central, North West and the North East, the South-South or 
more appropriately the Niger Delta has a consistent history of being short 
changed and marginalised...  the Niger Delta has often been at the receiving end 
of the exploitative tendencies of colonial and neo-colonial policies.  The oil palm 
trade in colonial Niger Delta as well as the rubber and timber trades from which 
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the Royal Niger Company made enormous profits did not stimulate any 
discernible measure of multiplier entrepreneurship for the local people in the 
region. As oil palm mercantilism blossomed for the coloniser, the indigenous 
peoples, who sustained this trade, remained in relative poverty.  Their life 
circumstances and chances revolved around primitive conditions.  Without piped 
water, without energy supply, without a modern household and with little access 
to modern education, the colonised was essentially incapacitated and 
fatalistically resigned to fate in a better world hereafter.   
In view of the foregoing, the next section identifies and disentangles the key grievances 
and demands of the oil-bearing ethnic minority communities in the Niger Delta. 
3.3.3 Demands of the Oil-Producing Communities in the Niger Delta 
The Nigerian economist Professor Milton Iyoha (2007: 4) has asked a critical question:  
―Where did Nigeria‘s natural resource rents end up, if not as productive domestic 
investments capable of supporting economic growth?‖  Iyoha (2007: 4) notes that a 
possible answer is ―capital flight‖:  it is no longer a news that nearly all the former 
military rulers amassed mammoth fortunes and stashed them away in foreign bank 
accounts (Agbiboa, 2011a: 83-85).  This aside, one can also argue that ―the political 
environment of military rule rewarded rent-seeking activities, bribery and corruption‖ 
(Iyoha, 2007: 5).  A final potential response is to argue that domestic investment, 
particularly by the public sector, was often highly inefficient and sometimes extraneous.  
Ethnic rivalries encouraged Northern political elites to ignore the Southern part of the 
country, where oil resources originate, in favour of developing the North.46  This has 
irked the oil-producing communities and led them to demand various concessions from 
the Nigerian government and the oil multinationals in the area. 
The overriding demands and grievances of oil-bearing communities in Nigeria‘s Niger 
Delta may be subsumed under five broad themes:  these pertain, respectively, to: 
1. The disposition of mineral land rents. 
2. The application of the derivation principle to the allocation of federally collected 
mineral revenues. 
3. The appropriate institutional and fiscal responses to the ecological problems of 
the oil-producing areas. 
4. The responsibility of the oil-prospecting companies to the oil producing 
communities. 
5. The appropriate arrangements for securing the integrity and autonomy of the oil 
producing communities within the present federal structure (Suberu, 1996: 27).   
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Claims to mineral land rents remain the most forceful demands expressed by the oil-
bearing states in Nigeria.  For instance, Suberu (1996: 27) argues that, traditionally 
speaking, local communities in the Niger Delta where in control of land rights.  However, 
the introduction of the Land Use Decree of 1978 meant that ―ownership of land in any 
state of the federation is vested in the State Governor in trust for the people of the state‖ 
(Suberu, 1996: 27-28).  The justification for the Federal Government‘s action is the 
Petroleum Decree of 1969 and the relevant provisions of the 1989 Constitution which 
vest in the Federation ―control of all minerals and gas in, under or upon the land and 
territorial waters of Nigeria‖ (Federal Republic of Nigeria [FRN], 1989: Sec.  42).   
A perusal of these provisions indicates, however, that they ―clearly refer to mineral 
wealth ownership and not land ownership which, under the practice of the constitution, 
remains vested in the states‖ (Suberu, 1996: 28). In essence, therefore, ―the Federal 
Government‘s retention of mineral land rents would appear to be unconstitutional since 
the states are clearly entitled to such rents as of right‖ (Suberu, 1996: 28; FRN, 1980: 
93).  Perhaps, a more complex issue pertains to ―the attempt by elements from the oil 
bearing communities to juxtapose mineral rents and royalties as resources legitimately 
belonging exclusively to the oil-producing sections‖ (Suberu, 1996: 28).   The following 
assertion by MOSOP is illuminating: ―MOSOP insists that oil royalties and rents are the 
property of landlords and that the Federal Government must return to the oil-bearing 
communities all royalties and rents paid to it by the oil companies since 1958‖ (The 
Guardian, 17 March 1993: 9).   
This notwithstanding, the constitutional position on the matter is unequivocal.   Suberu 
(1996: 28) argues that ―while rents are a tribute to the owners of land – in this case the 
state governments – royalties are levies on minerals, whose ownership remains in the 
hands of the Nigerian Federal Government.‖  The Pius Okigbo Commission on Revenue 
Allocation clearly states that 
the owners of the minerals on which royalties are levied are indisputably, under 
the existing laws and under the Constitution, the Government of the Federation.  
It follows that the payment of a part or the whole of the revenues from this 
source to the state (or community) were the mineral is produced does not derive 
from a legal right but from political or other considerations.  To transform this 
political act into a legal claim of right as the producing states seem to want is to 
do violence to reality (FRN, 1980: 93, quoted in Suberu, 1996: 28). 
It is useful to note, en passant, that the ownership of natural resources is informed by 
the ―Regalian Theory‖ and the power of ―Eminent Domain‖ respectively (Ebeku, 2007).   
Briefly stated, the ―Regalian Theory‖ or jura regalia ―refer to royal rights, or those rights 
which the King [State] has by virtue of his [its] prerogatives‖ (Ebeku, 2007: 19).   On the 
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other hand, the power of ―Eminent Domain‖ is the power of the state to arrogate private 
property ―for its own use without the owner‘s consent (with or without payment of 
compensation to the owner)‖ (Ebeku, 2007: 19).  Crucially, this power rests squarely on 
the dominion of its sovereignty over all lands within its defined territory (Ebeku, 2007: 
19).   
Shifting focus away from the ownership of land issue, the negative effects of oil 
exploration on the Niger Delta environment have been extensive.  In particular, oil 
exploration has led to ―the indiscriminate destruction of marine life by explosives used in 
seismic surveys; the pollution of water, land and vegetation by seepages and spills from 
oil wells, tankers and exposed high-pressure pipelines; and the devastation of crops 
and trees by the intense heat resulting from gas flaring‖ (Suberu, 1996: 31).  All of this, 
of course, is compounded by the naturally difficult terrain of the oil producing 
communities.  As the following quote indicates: 
Like in many other oil-rich areas of the world, the regions where oil is found in 
Nigeria are very inhospitable; they are mainly in swamps and creeks.  They, 
therefore, require massive injection of money if their conditions, and standards of 
living, are to compare with what obtains elsewhere in the country where 
possibilities of agriculture and diversified industry are much greater (Asiodu, 
1993: 36) 
Ikporukpo (2007: 27-31) has also noted that  
[t]he complex networks of distributaries, creeks and extensive swamps making 
up the Niger Delta are awe inspiring to people, [governments and potential 
developers]...  the area is usually described in geography and other related 
books and documents as a difficult environment...  Being intimidated by the 
physical geography of the Niger Delta, the perspective that the area cannot be 
developed emerged very early in the history of Nigeria.  For instance, this was 
apparent in the debates in the Eastern and Western Nigerian Houses of 
Assembly before and early independence.  The common belief then was that an 
area (particularly the outer Niger Delta) where everywhere is water [logged] 
cannot possibly be developed.  Request for locating infrastructural facilities in 
some parts of the Niger Delta were met by ―are you going to put them on top of 
water?‖ responses (quoted in Ogundiya, 2011: 68-69). 
Such perceptions, according to Ikporukpo (2007: 30),  
... lingers to the extent that even such attempts to develop the region through 
Commissions such as the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in the early 
years of independence, the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development 
Commission (OMPADEC) and the Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC) have been largely unsuccessful (Ikporukpo, 2007: 30, quoted in 
Ogundiya, 2011: 69). 
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Against this backdrop of what Ogundiya (2011: 1) describes as the ―Geography of 
Terrorism and the Terror of Geography‖ thesis, certain implications are deducible: 
1. that the apparent prolonged neglect of the Niger Delta is perhaps non-intentional, 
but associated with the geomorphology and the topography of the region and the 
perception that the area is a difficult terrain naturally unsupportive of 
infrastructural development; 
2. that the cost of development in the Niger Delta is probably unbearable to the 
Nigerian state because the cost of development in the Niger Delta is probably 
several times the cost in any other part of the country; 
3. that the governments of the region (state and local) have apparently behaved not 
much differently from the Nigerian state (Ikporukpo, 2007: 32); 
4. that the physical geography makes the area prone to diseases of all kinds which 
poses serious challenge to healthy living; 
5. that there is a significant relationship between the ecology of Niger Delta and the 
prevalence of poverty in the region; and  
6. that the oil companies, though not terrorized by the region‘s geography when oil 
is being exploited, apparently get terrorized when it comes to being good 
corporate citizens (Ogundiya, 2011: 69-70). 
Whatever the merits of the above contention, Ogundiya (2011: 70) contends that ―[t]he 
terror of geography is superficial, and nothing but an attempt by the political elite [of 
Nigeria] to cover up their atrocities and further perpetuate underdevelopment in the 
Niger Delta.‖  The paradoxical reality is that, in the course of oil exploration and 
exploitation, most oil companies have managed to penetrate ―the remotest swamps of 
the Niger Delta whose poor development has been predicated on the difficult terrain‖ 
(Ogundiya, 2011: 70).   Moreover, 
[t]he abundance of modern infrastructural facilities of electricity, water, housing, 
telecommunications, and recreation, even to international standards, around oil 
installations, sharply contrasts the dearth and decay witnessed in host 
communities, demonstrating the fact that communities could be better developed 
in spite of terrain constraints (Ogundiya, 2011: 70; Chokor, 2000: 63). 
There can be little doubt that the most radical demand of the oil-bearing communities 
involves the agitations for a restructuring of the internal territorial configuration of the 
federation.  Among the Ogoni community, for example, there have been demands for 
greater ethno-political autonomy in order to give to the Ogoni the ―right to the control 
and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development‖ 
(OBR, 1990: 4). On the other hand, the Ijaws have called for an autonomous Ijaw 
federation within a Nigerian confederation (National Concord, 11 December 1992: B2). 
89 
 
3.3.4 Government Policies towards Oil-bearing States in the Niger 
Delta 
In line with Theodore Lowi (1964: 677-715) and Edmond Keller (1983), three manner of 
state responses to the demands and activities of ethnic minority oil producing 
communities can be pinpointed.  These include: (1) redistributive (2) reorganizational 
and (3) regulatory state policies or responses.47 Summarily explained, redistributive 
policies refer to ―state decisions that consciously dispensed valued resources to one 
group at the expense of other claimants to state resources‖ (Suberu, 1996: 33). 
Reorganizational policies involve efforts by the state to reconfigure political institutions 
in order to accommodate group demands.  Regulatory policies refer to the foisting of 
sanctions or restrictions on individuals or groups that are perceived to threaten state 
peace and equipoise (Suberu, 1996: 33).  The next section focuses attention on the 
implementation and impact of each of these policy responses as per ethnic minority 
ferment in the oil-producing states of Nigeria‘s delta. 
3.3.4.1 Redistributive Policies 
By way of response to the increasing tensions among the oil-producing communities, 
the government of Nigeria adopted a new policy in 1991. The aim of this policy was to 
address the development needs and demands of chagrined oil-bearing communities in 
the Niger Delta region.  According to Suberu (1996: 36), ―the policy required the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and its joint-venture multinational oil 
companies to allocate three per cent of their total capital investments to community 
development purposes.‖  This new policy marked an appreciable break from previous 
practice according to which the companies voted any amount as they deemed fit for 
developing specific projects in their communities of operations (The African Guardian, 
16 September 1991: 35; Suberu, 1996: 36).   
The most crucial redistributive policies that have been introduced to tackle ethnic 
minority ferment have, however, involved mainly revisions in federal revenue sharing 
arrangements.  For instance, at its inception in August 1985, the Babangida regime was 
bequeathed a revenue sharing formula which allotted 2 per cent and 1.5 per cent of oil 
mineral revenues to the oil producing states.  Subsequently, the allocation to the oil-
producing states was reduced from 2 to 1 per cent.   It appears that ―this reduction was 
designed to release funds for the development of the new federal capital territory at 
Abuja, whose special allocation in the Federal Account was increased from 1 to 2 per 
                                                          
47




cent of the Account‖ (Suberu, 1996: 36).  However, hard-on-the-heels of forceful 
demands by the irked oil-producing states and their elected representatives and 
governments, the Federal Government in June 1992 announced the following revisions 
in fiscal and administrative arrangements for revenue sharing: 
1. The statutory allocation to mineral producing areas was increased from 1.5 to 3 
per cent of federally collected mineral revenues. 
2. A statutory commission was established to administer this allocation, thereby 
putting an end to the practice of disbursing the mineral producing areas‘ fund 
through an ad hoc presidential committee.  Named the Oil Mineral Producing 
Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), this 12-member agency has its 
headquarters in Port-Harcourt and state offices in Abia, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, 
Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers States.  Ten of its members, including the 
chairman, Chief Albert Horsfall, are from the mineral producing states, while the 
remaining two sit on the commission as representatives of the non-oil producing 
states.  [The main responsibility of the OMPADEC was ―to address the difficulties 
and sufferings of inhabitants of the Oil producing Areas of Nigeria‖ (OMPADEC, 
Decree 203 of 1992)] 
3. The statutory allocation for the amelioration of ecological problems throughout 
the federation was increased from 1 per cent to 2 per cent of the Federation 
Account. 
4. The Government committed itself to the establishment of a new national body 
which will combine the administration of the ecological fund with the extant 
responsibilities of the National Emergency Relief Agency‖ (Suberu, 1996: 37).48 
Let us look a bit more closely at the formation of OMPADEC.  The OMPADEC was 
established as a response to the grievances and frustrations felt by the Niger Delta 
people.  The Commission, which had its headquarters in Port Harcourt, had the 
following objectives or functions, as stated in section 2(1): 
a) to receive and administer the monthly sums from the allocation of the Federation 
Account in accordance with confirmed ratio of oil production in each state—  
(i) for the rehabilitation and development of oil mineral producing areas;  
(ii) for tackling ecological problems that have arisen from the exploration of 
minerals; 
b) to determine and identify, through the Commission and the respective oil mineral 
producing states, the actual oil mineral producing areas and embark on the 
development of projects properly agreed upon with the local communities of the 
oil mineral producing areas; 
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 It is useful to note that the increases in statutory allocations to the mineral producing areas and the 
ecological fund entailed a corresponding reduction by 1.5 and 1 per cent, respectively, of statutory 
allocations from the Federal Account to the Federal and State Governments.  This is in the nature of 
redistributive policies, which characteristically involve the gratification of some interests or demands at the 
expense of others. 
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c) to consult with the relevant federal and state government authorities on the 
control and effective methods of tackling the problem of oil pollution and 
spillages; 
d) to liaise with the various oil companies on matters of pollution control; 
e) to obtain from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation the proper formula for 
actual mineral production of each state, local government area and community 
and to ensure the fair and equitable distribution of projects, services and 
employment of personnel in accordance with recognized percentage production; 
f) to consult with the federal government... and oil mineral producing communities 
regarding projects... (quoted in Ebeku, 2005: 404). 
 During the late 1994, OMPADEC made some laudable achievements which are evident 
in two developments:  
The first was the decision of the Revenue Allocation committee of the National 
Constitutional Conference to recommend not only the retention of the 
Commission, but also the expansion of its financial allocations from 3 to 6 per 
cent of oil revenues in the Federation Account... The second was the vigorous 
and vehement opposition of many concerned indigenes, politicians and 
traditional rulers of the oil producing states to alleged clandestine moves by 
elements close to the Federal Government to have the commission abolished, 
reorganised or downgraded (Suberu, 1996: 39). 
Despite its impressive achievements, a major reason why OMPADEC failed to achieve 
its intended impact was due to elite corruption which showed its ugly face in the 
misappropriation and embezzlement of funds.  Omotola (2009: 43) argues that ―in quick 
succession, the first two sole administrators of the OMPADEC, Albert K.  Horsfall and 
Professor Eric Opia, were dismissed for corruption.‖ Opia lost his post in September 
1998 due to his ―inability to account for N6.7 billion, then worth US$80 million‖ 
(Omotola, 2009: 43; Fynas, 2001: 38).  Confirming the foregoing, Ebeku (2005: 407) 
contends that ―members of the [OMPADEC] were accused of high level corruption 
mostly perpetrated in the inflation of contract costs, which were largely paid upfront.‖ 
This aside, the Commission also came under the stick for not ―monitoring the 
performance of contractors, especially those they have paid ‗mobilization fees,‖ with the 
result that several projects were abandoned‖ (Ebeku, 2005: 407). 
Omotola (2009: 43) further contends that ―[t]he Commission was also reputed for its 
undue politicization, which also manifested in frequent reorganisation and instability that 
characterized its management.‖  For many Nigerians, ―OMPADEC was seen as merely 
another arm of the federal bureaucracy for the distribution of patronages‖ (Omotola, 
2009: 43; Ovwasa, 1999: 81-98).  One of the strong proponents of this view, Ken Saro-
Wiwa, argued:  
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OMPADEC is illogical, an insult and an injury. If you have your own money, why 
should government set up a Commission to run your money? They are treating 
us like babies here... OMPADEC is [designed] to bait us and destroy us (The 
News 17 May, 1993: 25).   
The formula used by OMPADEC to distribute development projects among the oil-
bearing communities has also raised some eyebrows.  According to Suberu (1996: 38): 
This formula prescribes that each community‘s share of OMPADEC-sponsored 
development projects be tied to the size of its current contribution to the total 
volume of produced oil. Apart from the unavailability and unreliability of the 
required data, this requirement has the potential impact of marginalizing those 
communities, like Oloibiri, which were major oil producers in the past, but which 
no longer produce oil in appreciable quantities 
Not surprisingly, OMPADEC was dissolved and substituted with the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000.  This was to fulfil the promise made to the 
Niger Deltans by President Olusegun Obasanjo during his election campaign in 1999.  
At this campaign, Obasanjo had vowed to tackle, if elected into office, the state of 
uneasy stasis and resultant tensions in the Niger Delta (Omotola, 2009).  The NDDC 
was inaugurated on 21 December 2000. Its central plank the formulation of ―policies and 
guidelines for the development of the Niger Delta and conceive plans and implement 
projects capable of fostering sustainable development of the area in line with set rules 
and regulations‖ (Section 7 of the NDDC Act, 1999, quoted in Omotola, 2009: 43).  The 
NDDC Act was described as ―an Act to provide for the repeal of the Oil Minerals 
Producing Areas Decree... and among other things, establish a new Commission with a 
re-organized management and administrative structure for more 
In terms of funding and regulation, the NDDC fared better given the seemingly several 
viable sources of its revenues, monitoring, and evaluation.  For instance, ―the NDDC Act 
mandated the federal government to contribute 15 per cent of the total monthly statutory 
allocations due to member states of the commission from the federal account‖ 
(Omotola, 2009: 43).  Oil-producing companies, including gas-processing companies 
operating onshore and offshore in the delta, were also mandated to pay 3 per cent of 
their total annual budget to the commission. The Act also funnelled ways to monitor and 
ensure accountability over the commission‘s finances.49  Omotola (2009: 43) articulates 
that these concerns may have been informed by the woeful experiences of the 
OMPADEC and the need to forestall such a reoccurrence.   
Despite the improved measures, the NDDC still failed to deliver as expected.   There is 
a sense in which the NDDC can be said to have improved on the shortcomings of 
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See Sections 14 and 18 of the NDDC Acts for sources of funding and control respectively.   
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OMPADEC, ―judging by the impressive number of projects it has executed in the region 
in the various sectors of the economy‖ (Omotola, 2009: 43).   This notwithstanding, ―a 
major allegation against the NDDC related to the impact of these projects on the lives of 
the Niger Deltans as well as its representativeness of the varied interests of the region 
across classes and groups‖ (Omotola, 2009: 43).  In short, the problems that accounted 
for the fall of both OMPADEC and NDDC have been effectively summarised as follows: 
1. The greedy and corrupt practices of the persons put on the helm of affairs in the 
institutions/bodies. 
2. Faulty composition of the administrative boards of the institutions (members of 
the board were exclusively appointed by government, without regard for the need 
for genuine local representation). 
3. Non-participation of the local people—there was no room for the participation of 
the local people in the planning and execution of project (Ebeku, 2007: 11-12). 
3.3.4.2 Reorganizational Policies 
The state has also responded to the unpleasant situation in the Niger Delta through 
constant ―fragmentation of state structures, particularly to mollify ethnic minorities 
(Osaghae, 1999).   From a federation of three regions in 1960, Nigeria is composed of 
36 states and a federal capital territory in 2011.   By way of emasculating the 
―secessionist Biafra,‖ the federal military government decided to woo the support of the 
Niger Delta, hitherto under the control of the Eastern region (Omotola, 2009: 44).   
Thus, ―as Nigeria was transformed from four regions to twelve states in 1967, Rivers 
state was created in the Niger Delta‖ (Omotola, 2009: 44).   Furthermore, the 1987, 
1991, and 1996 period witnessed the creation of statutes for Akwa-Ibom, Delta, and 
Bayelsa, respectively (Omotola, 2009a: 129-147).   
Other ways through which the state has sought to respond to the impasse in the Niger 
Delta is through ―transitional justices and constitutional conference‖ (Omotola, 2006: 
45).   For the former, the most notable efforts remain the institution of the Human Rights 
Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC).  The sole raison d’être for HRVIC was 
the reconciliation of ―aggrieved Nigerians for the violation of their rights under 
successive military regimes. Under an ideal situation, it was a step in the right direction‖ 
(Omotola, 2009: 44).  Regrettably, HRVIC‘s was poorly planned (on the part of the 
state) and, most notably, it failed to ensure the adequate involvement of major 
stakeholders, especially the ex-military head of states and the Ogoni people of the Niger 
Delta (Omotola, 2006).   The lack of involvement, or refusal to cooperate, on the part of 
these key people dealt a fatal blow to the panel.   Worse still, very little has been heard 
of the report ever since the panel ―completed‖ its assignments in 2002.   This aside, the 
other attempt to address the tensed situation in the Niger Delta was through the 
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National Political Reform Conference (NPRC).   However, this chance was squandered 
and, up until now, no report has been issued from the conference (Omotola, 2006).   
Following the glaring failure of its redistributive and reorganizational policies, however, 
the Nigerian government has resorted increasingly to repressive and violent strategies 
of ethnic minority containment.   Suberu (1996: 1) has highlighted some of these 
repressive measures of the Nigerian state: the proscription of ethnic minority 
associations; the confinement, detention, arbitrary conviction and/or imprisonment of 
outspoken ethnic minority elites; the violent suppression, through the leviathan of 
military force, of protests, demonstrations and uprisings by ethnic minority communities; 
and the official declarations of ethnic minority agitations for autonomy or self-
determination as a treasonable offence punishable with the death penalty!  The 
following section looks closely at these repressive measures. 
3.3.4.3 Regulatory or Repressive Policies 
Reflecting the inadequacy and failure of its redistributive and reorganized policies, the 
Nigerian state resorted to regulatory/repressive measures of oil minority containment. 
These unenviable measures are well documented by Suberu (1996: xii)  
the proscription or banning of ethnic minority associations; the confinement, 
detention, arbitrary conviction and/or imprisonment of outspoken oil minority 
elites; the violent suppression, by military force, of protests, demonstrations and 
uprisings by oil minority communities; and the official declaration of ethnic 
minority agitations for self-determination, or any disturbances of oil production 
activities for that matter, as a seditious or treasonable offence punishable with 
the death penalty!  
Nigeria, for the past 39 years, has been a militarised state even when so-called civilian 
governments were in power.  According to Ekineh (1997: 272), ―[n]o other country in 
Africa or even in the whole world has been as coercively dominated for so long a period 
by their own military as the people of Nigeria.‖  Militarisation consists of the use of the 
threat of violence to settle political conflicts, the legitimization of state violence, the 
curtailment of freedom of opinion, the domination of military values over civilian life, the 
violation of human rights, extrajudicial killings and the gross repression of the people 
(Chunakara, 1994, Turshen, 1988: 7).  The Niger Delta is a region that has been 
subjected to excessive militarisation for the past 13 years (see table 9), where violence 
is used as an instrument of governance to force the pummel people into total 
submission (Okonta and Douglas, 2001; Na‘Allah, 1998).  This is usually carried out via 
security agents, including the military to cage all forms of resistance in the Niger Delta. 
For example, in 1994, the Abacha regime came up with ‗Operation Order 4194‘ meant 
‗to restore law and order in Ogoni land‘ as a response to the Ogoni uprising. The 
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operation consisted of about 406 police and navy officers, who effectively occupied 
Ogoni land (Roberts, 2000: 57).  
Ekine (1997: 265) has noted that, as the leader of the Ogonis, ―Ken [Saro-Wiwa] had 
been the sharpest thorn in the flesh of the military junta since Babangida‘s regime.  The 
military found him a much more principled fighter for what he believed to be right and 
just…‖ With this prelude in mind, on 21st of May 1994, during a meeting held 
surreptitiously by the Ogoni movement, four prominent Ogoni chiefs were brutally 
murdered.  However, the military regime did not allow the state police to complete their 
investigation of the matter and refer it to the Ordinary Courts as was usual.  As Ekine 
(1997: 265) observes, ―even as the police were investigating the matter, the military 
government took it over. They cited the precedence for their action from a decree of 
General Obasanjo‘s regime titled Federal Civil Disturbances Tribunal, 1977.‖  
Subsequently, in 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP members were 
arrested and charged with incitement to murder. As Suberu (1996: 44) contends, ―the 
Government‘s clampdown on Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP activists is premised on the 
belief that they must have instigated some members of the military youth wing of 
MOSOP, the National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP), to kill the four 
‗moderate‘ Ogoni leaders.‖ According to the military administrator of Rivers State, Lt. 
Colonel Dauda Komo: 
MOSOP activists carried out the action, after its leader, Mr. Ken Saro-Wiwa, had 
been politely turned down away from a privately convened meeting… The 
victims did not merit the fate that befell them since they were not against the 
ideals of MOSOP but against the way Saro-Wiwa has been handling the affairs 
of the body (The News, 6 June 1994: 8). 
In any case, the arrested were later arraigned before a ‗special‘ military tribunal, which 
sentenced Saro-Wiwa and eight others to death by hanging.  The ‗specialness‘ of the 
tribunal was underscored by that fact that ―it was not to be bound by any rules of 
evidence or law whatsoever; and there could be no appeal against its decision, but the 
military must confirm any sentence passed by it‖ (Ekine, 1997: 266).50  Eventually, the 
execution51 was carried out on 10 November 1995, despite all entreaties both from 
within and outside the country (Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007: 98).  During his fathom 
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 As reported by the press, ―many of the intended witnesses for the prosecution declined and asserted by 
affidavit that they had been promised money to give false accounts of what happened, but were disturbed 
by their respective conscience to withdraw. The accused themselves put up the defences of alibi. But all 
such defences were for a law court, not for the special military tribunal, in which the panel included some 
military officers of the rank of major‖ (Ekine, 2007: 266). 
51
 Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other accused were hanged at Port Harcourt prison only fifteen miles from 
Ogoniland. As he was led to the gallows, Saro-Wiwa exclaimed; ―Lord receive my soul and let the 
struggle for justice in Ogoniland continue and bear fruit‖ (quoted in Ekine, 1997: 266). 
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trial by the Abacha junta, Ken Saro-Wiwa noted that, ‗the Nigerian military dictatorship 
survives on the practice of violence and the control of the means of violence‘ (Saro-
Wiwa, quoted in Adejumobi, 2003: 2). 
The Nigerian playwright, Wole Soyinka (1996: 152), opines that the immediate 
execution of Saro-Wiwa was to remove the pivotal figure of opposition around which a 
united Delta front could emerge.  The ‗trial‘ was thus a charade, in his eloquent words: 
Ken Saro-Wiwa‘s fate had long been sealed.  The decision to execute him and 
his eight companions was reached before the special tribunal was ordered to 
reconvene and pronounce a verdict that had been decided outside the charade 
of judicial proceeding.  The meeting of the Provisional Ruling Council to consider 
the verdict was a macabre pretence, a prolongation of the cynicism that marked 
the trial proceedings from the outset (Soyinka, 1996: 152). 
It is instructive to note that the chicanery and subsequent hanging of Saro-Wiwa was 
not so much a sign of disrespect for international opinion but ―a sign to Nigerians 
themselves that there was no escape from the state‘s totalitarian apparatus and that 
nobody in the whole world could save them‖ (Na‘Allah, 1998: 75). Such a model of 
governmentability runs athwart the ―ludic‖ and ―convivial‖ model Mbembe (1992: 22) 
proposes for the African post-colony.  The travails of Saro-Wiwa and the Niger Delta 
people bear witness to the Nigerian government‘s long-standing perception of agitators 
for the rights of oil producing ethnic minorities as ―misguided elements,‖ ―mischief 
makers‖ and ―selfish miscreants‖ (Suberu, 1996: 46).  In short, Saro-Wiwa‘s death 
represents the ultimate collapse of the elusive distinction between the Nigerian state 
and civil society, and the demise of effective citizenship.  Ojakorotu and Uzodike (2007: 
97) argue that the death of Saro-Wiwa ―sounded the death knell of the Ogoni struggle...  
This was not only due to state repression but also to leadership bickering.‖  
Clearly, the state‘s reprisals against Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP run athwart the broad 
sympathy which the Ogoni movement continues to enjoy both within the Nigerian civil 
society and internationally.  For instance, in October 1994, Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP 
were named, along with two other organizations in India and Trinidad, as joint-winners 
of the 1994 Right Livelihood Award52, often termed the alternative Nobel Prize (Suberu, 
1996: 46).  The following month, in November 1994, the popular London-based human 
rights organization, Amnesty International, declared Ken Saro-Wiwa a ―prisoner of 
conscience.‖ Saro-Wiwa, Amnesty International declared, ―is an internationally 
renowned writer, detained without charge or trial since May 1994, chained hand and 
foot for long periods incommunicado, and without medical care‖ (Vanguard, 11 
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This award, which is worth $250 000, was established by a German-Swede in 1980 to honour and 
support those offering practical and exemplary answers to urgent social problems. 
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November 1994: 1). The Ogonis also received the special attention of Amnesty 
International which revealed that at least 50 people in Ogoniland had been killed and 
about 600 detained for months without charge or trial under inhumane conditions 
(Vanguard, 11 November 1992: 2).   
Despite the fact that the Obasanjo-led government, which ruled from 1999 until 2007, 
was viewed as a transition to civilian rule, the level of violence in the region continued to 
spiral. Examples of this escalation include: intensification of the military option to control 
the oil fields and pipelines through the specially created Nigerian Military Task Force for 
the Niger Delta with specific orders to ‗shoot-to-kill‘ protesting indigenes.  In this way, 
Obasanjo demonstrated his propensity to use brute force to compel silence and 
acquiescence.  
Table 9 
Militarization of the Niger Delta, 1990-2006 
Date Place Operating force Action 
October 
1990 
Umuechem Security Protection 
Unit 
 Killed 80 unarmed 
demonstrators 
 Destroyed 495 houses  
1993 Umuechem   Razed houses and destroyed 
properties 
1999 Odi Army and mobile 
police 
 Razed the entire community as 
every house and property 




Uwheru Operation Restore 
Hope 
 killed 20 persons 
 Burnt down 11 houses 
July 2004 Egbema Operation Restore 
Hope Joint Security 
Task Force 
 Used gun-boats, military 
helicopters and bombs to 
destroy 13 communities 
 Razed a total of 500 buildings 
 200 persons, mostly women 
and children, are feared dead 
and are still missing 




 killed sixteen youths for 
agitating for a better deal from 
multinational oil corporations 
October 
2005 
Odioma Joint Security Task 
Force 
 killed 77 persons, including 
youths 
Source: Ikelegbe, 2003, p.219. 
 
Cases of violent behaviours under the Obasanjo-led regime include: (1) the invasion of 
Odi Town on the direct orders of Obasanjo in retaliation for the murder of 12 policemen 
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by youths in the town in 1999.53 Over 2000 people were killed, thousands displaced and 
properties razed; (2) brutal rapes of women and young girls by Nigerian Army personnel 
in Choba; (3) gunning down of unarmed youths who protested against unemployment in 
Bonny Island; (4) ravaging of communities in Ke-Dere in Rivers State for protesting 
unwanted and forceful return of Shell Oil to Ogoniland; (5) killings of women and 
children, burning and looting of property in Oleh town in Isokoland; and (6) the 
massacre on 17 October 2000 of 15 youth protesters in Tebidaba in Bayelsa State (Ijaw 
National Alliance of the Americas [INAA], 2000). This is what Ake refers to as the 
―militarisation of commerce‖ and ―privatization of the state‖ (quoted in Rowel et al.  
2005: 15).  Edmond Keller (1983: 274) has noted that a reliance on intimidatory 
techniques not only presents the ―image of a state which is low in legitimacy and 
desperately struggling to survive,‖ but also ―in the long run can do more to threaten 
state coherence than to aid it.‖  
Thus far, this chapter has highlighted and critically discussed the root causes of ethnic 
minority conflicts and rising violence in the Niger Delta.  The next chapter seeks to 
undertake an analysis of the proximate or catalytic causes of the ethnic minority 
conflicts in the Niger Delta.   At the close of this chapter, the reader should be well 
acquainted with two important perspectives that are fuelling the conflict in the Niger 
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 This military expedition has been described as the ―largest deployment of troops since the Biafran war‖ 


















Proximate Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict 
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
This chapter will probe the proximate or catalytic causes of the Niger Delta conflict from 
two salient perspectives: (1) environmental (2) social-security.  The environmental 
perspective exposes the vitiation of the flora and fauna of the Niger Delta environment 
as well as the decimation of the economic wellbeing of the people and the violation of 
their human rights.   In particular, the chapter spotlights the irresponsible practices of 
the world‘s largest oil company (Shell) in the Niger Delta; it shows how such negligent 
practices have unleashed havoc on agricultural land and impoverished a whole region.  
The social-security perspective, on the other hand, argues that while arms proliferation 
is not directly the cause of conflict in the volatile Niger Delta, their stockpiles fuel wars 
and sustains violence.  The section argues that the higher the insecurity in a region, the 
higher the recourse to internal arms race.   The collapse of the social contract between 
the state and its citizenry has a hand in this perpetuation and is, therefore, illuminating.   
4.2 The Environmental Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict 
In terms of natural resources, the Niger Delta is easily one of the most blessed regions 
in the world.   Besides its huge oil and gas reserves, ―there are extensive forests, [a 
surfeit of] wildlife, and fertile agricultural land where rice, sugarcane, plantain, beans, 
palm oil, yam, cassava, and timber are cultivated‖ (Okonta and Douglas, 2001: 121).  
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The Niger Delta is also known for its fish resources.   It has more freshwater fish 
species than any other coastal system in West Africa (Okonta and Douglas, 2001: 121).  
As a matter of fact, ―three-quarters of the fish caught in the sub-region are bred in the 
mangroves of the Delta, which have been described as the third largest and the most 
discrete in the world‖ (Okonta and Douglas, 2001: 121).  Mangrove trees, which grow 
tall and healthy on the creeks and near riverbanks, provide protective barriers for the 
country‘s coast and are also a source of medicine, fruit, and raw material for such 
cottage industries as weaving, wood carving, and rope making.  The biodiversity of the 
Delta is enormous.  The World Bank (1993) has drawn attention to its importance as 
home to a potpourri of threatened coastal and estuarine fauna and flora, and to the 
need for preservation of the biodiversity of the area because of its rich biological 
resources.   
Appreciably, the people of the Niger Delta have always had a spiritual and symbolic 
connection to their land and resources.   As the following quote corroborates:  
To the Ogoni, the land on which they lived and the rivers which surrounded them 
were very important.  They not only provided sustenance in abundance, they 
were also a spiritual inheritance.  The land is a god and is worshipped as such.  
The fruit of the land, particularly yams, are honoured in festivals and, indeed, the 
Annual Festival of the Ogoni is held at the yam harvest.  The planting season is 
not a mere period of agricultural activity: it is a spiritual, religious and social 
occasion.  ‗Tradition‘ in Ogoni means in the local tongue (doonu kuneke) the 
honouring of the land (earth, soil, water)...  To the Ogoni, rivers and streams do 
not only provide water for life – for bathing, drinking, etc.; they do not only 
provide fish for food, they are also scared and are bound up intricately with the 
life of the community, of the entire Ogoni nation (Saro-Wiwa, 1992: 12-13).   
In political parlance, this foundation account of an ―original affluent society‖ (Sahlins, 
1972: 1-39) serves as a charter for Ogoni ownership of the land, ―a resource framed as 
a cultural and spiritual heritage which was later spoiled by oil and stolen by the state‖ 
(Apter, 1998: 124).  According to the correspondences established in this vision, the 
devastation of land and water is tantamount to the destruction of tradition itself, one 
which sustained a harmonious balance between a natural ecology, economy and 
community.  Only in this light can we begin to appreciate the agony of the Ogonis, and 
other Niger Delta communities, upon seeing the curse of oil in their ‗sacred‘ land. 
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4.2.1 The Curse of Oil: Pollution and Human Rights in the Niger Delta 
If you want to go fishing, you have to paddle for about four hours through several 
rivers before you can get to where you can catch fish and the spill is lesser… 
some of the fishes we catch, when you open the stomach, it smells of crude oil.54 
By the 1960‘s the rivers had been dredged to allow pontoons or even ships to 
enter our backyard.  Shell BP had started to pollute the rivers, streams and 
farmlands with oil and flaring gas.  Forests had been cleared by poachers and 
others to feed the African Timber and Plywood Company in Sapele.  Streams 
and marshes dried up.  Rubber trees were planted in a frenzy to make money 
and were soon tapped to death (Ojaide, 1994: 15). 
Oil was first drilled in the Niger Delta at Oloibiri (Bayelsa state) in 1956.  Since then, 
―over 1,481 oil wells [have sprouted like mushrooms] producing from about 159 oil 
fields.  There are more than 7,000 kilometres of pipelines and flow lines and 275 flow 
stations operated by more than 13 oil companies‖ (UNDP, 2006: 156).   The quotes 
above aptly describe the impact of oil exploration and extraction on the resource-rich 
environment of the Niger Delta people.  The impact of oil exploration in the Niger Delta 
has been devastating for the Niger Delta people, their land, and their very survival and 
posterity.   For one thing, ―oil exploration has over the last five decades impacted 
disastrously on the socio-physical environment of the Niger-Delta oil-bearing 
communities, massively threatening the subsistent peasant economy and the 
environment and hence the entire livelihood and basic survival of the people‖ (Eteng, 
1997: 4). 
The nexus between pollution and human rights have is a time-honoured one.  It was 
unequivocally noted, in a 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
that ―man‘s environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being 
and to the enjoyment of basic human rights—even the right to life itself [sic]‖ (quoted in 
Amnesty International, 2009: 13).  One of the salient factors in the violations of human 
rights is an unhealthy environment.   In a report published by Amnesty International 
(2009: 13), it was explicitly stated that ―the most common examples include pollution of 
water, soil and air, resulting in violations variously of rights to an adequate standard of 
living, to adequate food, to water, to adequate housing, to health and to life.‖  Perhaps, 
this was why Judge Weeramantry of the International Court of Justice once noted that: 
The protection of the environment is... a vital part of contemporary human rights 
doctrine, for it is a sine qua non human rights such as the right to health and the 
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 Interview with local fisherman reported in Center for Environment, Human Rights and Development‘s 
(CEHRD), Report on the state of human rights abuses and violence in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, 
2008.  Available at www.cehrd.org.  Retrieved on 2 May 2011. 
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right to life itself.  It is scarcely necessary to elaborate this, as damage to the 
environment can impair all the human rights spoken of in the Universal 
Declaration and other human rights instrument‖ (quoted in Amnesty 
International, 2009: 12).    
Crucially, the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights [ACHPR], to which Nigeria 
is a party, equally states in Article 24 that all peoples have a right to a ―general 
satisfactory environment favourable to their development‖ (ACHPR, 2001, quoted in 
Amnesty International, 2009: 13).  Further, Article 24 of the African Charter ―requires the 
State to take reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources‖ (ACHPR, 2001, quoted in Amnesty 
International, 2009: 13).   
Poignantly, the human rights implications of oil pollution in the Niger Delta are ―serious, 
under-reported and have received little attention from the Nigerian government or the oil 
multinationals‖ (Amnesty International, 2009: 9).   Years of oil activities in the Niger 
Delta have precipitated an all-pervasive pollution caused by oil spills and gas flaring.   In 
one extensive study conducted in 2006, it was noted that the Niger Delta is ―one of the 
world‘s most severely petroleum-impacted ecosystems‖ (Amnesty International, 2009: 
13).  The study further stated that, ―The damage from oil operations is chronic and 
cumulative, and has acted synergistically with other sources of environmental stress to 
result in a severely impaired coastal ecosystem and compromised the livelihoods and 
health of the region‘s impoverished residents‖ (Amnesty International, 2009: 13).   The 
above has created a sense of environmental insecurity in the region.   Here, we use the 
term environmental insecurity to mean the ―non-military threats that emanate from the 
social contradictions embedded in the environment‖ (Obi, 2003: 167; see, also, 
Omotola, 2006).   Accentuating the level of environmental insecurity in the region is the 
high rate of gas flaring in the region.  A 1995 World Bank Study Defining an 
Environmental Development Strategy, shows that ―76 per cent of all the natural gas 
from petroleum production in Nigeria is flared vis-à-vis 0.6 per cent in USA, 4.3 per cent 
in the UK and 21 per cent in Libya‖ (Na‘Allah, 1998: 68) (see Box 1).  Further, ―at 
temperatures of 1300 to 1400 centigrade the multitude of flares in the Niger Delta area 
heats up everything, causing unimaginable emissions of poisonous gases.  The flares 
release 35 million tons of carbon dioxide a year and 12 million tons of methane‖ 
(Na‘Allah, 1998: 68).  Omotola (2006: 25) has noted  that ―some of the gaseous 
pollutants released into the atmosphere such as carbon monoxide, chlorine, nitrogen 
oxides, sulphur oxides, acid aerosol, beryllium etc, are known for causing headaches, 
heart problems, irritation, oedema, dizziness, and gene or neuron problems, depending 
on the pollutants‖ (see, also, Kaladumo, 1996: 29).   Following a tour of Shell‘s 
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installations in Nigeria, an appalled Clive Wicks, the head of WWF-UK‘s international 
program, declared:  ―Travelling in the area is like flying over Dante‘s inferno. Wherever 
you look you see these goddamned flares‖ (Independent, 10 December 1995). 
Apart from gas flaring, oil spills has also been a recurrent problem in the Niger Delta, 
with harmful consequences for environmental security in the region.  The United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in its Niger Delta Human Development 
Report (2006), has revealed, shockingly, that ―a total of 1,100,000 barrels oil was spilled 
in the Niger Delta between 1979 and 2005‖ (UNDP, 2006: 184, quoted in Omotola, 
2009).   The breakdown is shown in Table 10 (see, also, Box two).  However, the 
figures provided may not sufficiently capture the extent of the oil spillage, bearing in 
mind that the reporting of oil spills in the Niger Delta has been completely dysfunctional 
for decades (Amnesty International, 2009: 15).  In particular, Rivers and Delta States 
suffer about 300 major oil spills a year which discharge about 2,300 cubic metres of oil 
(Na‘Allah, 1998: 68).  The most disastrous of such oil spills was that which occurred at 
Dere (Bornu Oil Refinery) in 1972.  The damage of the spill was so extensive that, 
according to Ken Saro-Wiwa (1992), over 20,000 people lost their means of livelihood.  
Acid rain fell on the area for months following this and both children and adults coughed 
blood.  To make matters worse, ―a High Court presided over by a British-born judge 
awarded damages against Shell [to the paltry sum of] £168,468, thus pre-empting the 
imposition of fines of tens of millions of dollars agreed upon by a special governmental 
committee set up to investigate the matter‖ (Saro-Wiwa, 1992: 44, quoted in Na‘Allah, 
1998: 68). 
Table 10 
Summary of Some Oil Spills in the Niger Delta, 1979-2005. 




1979 Delta 570,000 
Funiwa No.  5 well 
blow out 
1980 Rivers 400,000 
Oyekama spillage 1980 Rivers 10,000 
System 2c Warri-
Kaduna Pipeline 
rupture at Abudu 
1982 Edo  18,000 
Sohika oil spills 1983 Rivers 10,000 
Idoho oil spills 1983 Akwa-Ibom 40,000 
Jones creek oil 
spills 
1998 Delta 10,000 
Etiama oil spills 2000 Bayelsa 11,000 
Ughelli oil spills 2005 Delta 10,000 
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                                                                           TOTAL 1,100,00 
Source: UNDP, Niger Delta Human Development Report, Abuja, Nigeria, 2006, p.184.   
Grievously, incessant oil spillages unleashed severe strains on the Niger Delta 
environment, thus negatively affecting the main sources of livelihood of the Niger 
Deltans, that is fishing and farming.   In this regard, Omotola (2006: 10) argues that ―oil 
spills have inflicted unimaginable levels of damage on farmlands and rivers such that 
they can no longer sustain oil nutrients and aquatic resources‖ (Omotola, 2006: 10). The 
latter, says Omotola (2006: 10), is ―partly [responsible for] the high rate of 
unemployment that characterizes the Niger Delta since the people are predominantly 
farmers and fishermen.‖ Among the major crops grown in the Niger Delta are yam, 
cassava, cocoa, and pumpkins.  The proximity of oil pipelines, among other oil 
infrastructures, to farmlands.   Even if there were no oil spills, ―the existence of such 
infrastructure within a relatively densely populated rural setting can cause difficulties for 
farmers‖ (Amnesty International, 2009: 39).   The UNDP report on the Niger Delta notes 
that livelihood of over 60 per cent of Niger Deltans derives from the natural environment 
(UNDP, 2006: 74).   For many in the oil-rich region, ―the environmental resource base, 
which they use for agriculture, fishing and the collection of forest products, is their 
principal or sole source of food‖ (Amnesty International, 2009: 39).   Environmental 
damage, therefore, belies human rights in the region. 
What about the damage to fisheries? Tens of thousands of families in the Niger Delta 
rely on fishing – in inland rivers as well as offshore – for both income and food.  
Damage to fisheries remains one of the major impacts of the oil industry.  The UN Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has noted that ―[f]or brackish-water resources, the 
state of the resources is deplorable.  Fishing pressure is very high, arising from the lack 
of alternative employment for estuarine communities.  Oil pollution further complicates 
the scenario, with the devastation of aquatic life in the area‖ (quoted in Amnesty 
International, 2009: 27).  In fact, pollution results in the death and dearth of fishes; ―it 
kills their food sources and fish larvae, and damages the ability of fish to reproduce, 
causing both immediate damage and long-term, cumulative harm to fish stocks.‖55  It is 
the case that ―when oil and wastes are discharged into an enclosed body of water, fish 
are directly exposed to pollutants and can die‖ (Amnesty International, 2009: 27). 
A résumé of the major human rights issues raised in the 2009 Amnesty International 
report on the Niger Delta include:  
1. Violations of the right to an adequate standard of living, including the right to 
food—as a consequence of the impact of oil-related pollution and environmental 
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damage on agriculture and fisheries, which are the main sources of food for 
many people in the Niger Delta. 
2. Violations of the right to gain a living through work—also as a consequence of 
widespread damage to agriculture and fisheries, because there are also the main 
sources of livelihood for many people in the Niger Delta   
3. Violations of the right to health—which arise from failure to secure the underlying 
determinants of health, including a healthy environment, and failure to enforce 
laws to protect the environment and prevent pollution. 
4. The absence of any adequate monitoring of the human impacts of oil-related 
pollution—despite the fact that the oil industry in the Niger Delta is operating in a 
relatively densely populated area characterized by high levels of poverty and 
vulnerability. 
5. Failure to provide affected communities with adequate information or ensure 
consultation on the impacts of oil operation on their human rights 
6. Failure to ensure access to effective remedy for people whose human rights 
have been violated (Amnesty International, 2009: 10). 
Box 1 















Gas flaring is a process whereby the associated gas from oil 
production is burned so as to dispose of it.  The second largest gas flaring 
operation in the world, after Russia, occur in the Niger Delta; they are a 
significant source of greenhouse gas and particular matter emissions, 
exposing communities to a number of harmful pollutants including sulfur 
dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and carcinogenic substances.  A thorough study 
of the region has not yet been carried out, however, it is widely accepted 
that these pollutants are linked to a series of significant health problems 
(ERA, 2005).  The exact percentage of associated gas that is flared is 
disputed.  According to the NNPC, Nigeria flares 40% of its annual natural 
gas production (EIA, 2007).  The World Bank estimates that the figure is 
closer to 75% (World Bank, 2005).  Shell and other energy companies 
operating in the region attribute the extent of flaring in the Niger Delta to the 
lack of local and regional market for gas, as well as to the lack of adequate 
gas infrastructure.   
Gas export is identified as the main solution to the problem and has 
become a central part of Shell‘s efforts to decrease its flaring operation 
(Shell, 2006).  In 1996, the Nigerian government agreed to end gas flaring 
in the Niger Delta by 2008.  However, the penalties imposed for flaring 
have been too modest to achieve this goal (ICG, 2006b).  In its most recent 
annual report, Shell Nigeria has set a deadline.  By this time the company 
states that it will have either found ways to gather associated gas, or it will 
shut in production from the fields were associated gas cannot be gathered 
(Shell, 2006).  Chevron Nigeria is also working toward eliminating gas 
flaring from its operation but does not set itself a firm deadline.  All new 
Chevron developments in the Niger Delta, however, are being designed as 
―zero flare‖ projects (Chevron Nigeria, 2007).  The World Bank/UNDP 2004 
Strategic Gas Plan for Nigeria identified the gas sector as an area of huge 
growth potential for the country and underlined the importance of bringing 
an end to flaring as the first step in tapping this potential (ESMAP, 2004).   
Source: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEV/Resources/3177394-
1168615404141/33282011172597654983/Niger_Delta_May2008.pdf.    
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In the statement published as a lead up to the 1992 Ogoni Bill of Rights, Leton (1992: 6-
7) successfully confronts the world with the effects of environmental ruin.  He states: 
Lands, streams and creeks are totally and continually polluted; the atmosphere is 
forever charged with hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide; many 
villages experience the infernal quaking of the wrath of gas flares which have 
been burning 24 hours a day for 33 years; acid rain, oil spillages and blow-outs 
are common.  The results of such unchecked environmental pollution and 
degradation are that: (i) the Ogoni can no longer farm successfully.  Once the 
food basket of the eastern Niger Delta, the Ogoni now buy food (when they can 
afford it) (ii) Fish, once a common source of protein, is now rare.  Owing to the 
constant and continual pollution of our streams and creeks, fish can only be 
caught in deeper and offshore waters for which the Ogoni are not equipped (iii) 
All wildlife is dead (iv) The ecology is changing fast.  The mangrove tree, the 
aerial roots of which (sic) normally provide a natural and welcome habitat for 
many a sea food—crabs, periwinkles, mud skippers, cockles, mussels, shrimps 
and all—is now being gradually replaced by unknown and otherwise useless 
palms.  (v) The health hazards generated by an atmosphere charged with 
hydrocarbon vapour, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide are innumerable 
(Leton, prelude to the Ogoni Bill of Rights, 1990). 
Box 2. 








4.2.2 Shell in the Niger Delta: A Symbol of Death? 
I repeat that we all stand before history.  I and my colleagues are not the only 
ones on trial.  Shell is on trial here, and it is as well that it is represented by 
counsel said to be holding a watching brief.  The company has, indeed, ducked 
this particular trial, but its day will surely come and the lessons learned here may 
prove useful to it, for there is no doubt in my mind that the ecological war the 
company has waged in the delta will be called to question sooner than later and 
Between 1976 and 2001, a total of 6,817 oil spills have been recorded 
in the Niger Delta with only 70% of the oil spills being recovered (UNDP, 
2006).  This has had a huge impact on marine life with negative 
consequences for local livelihoods dependent on fishing and for human health 
consuming contaminated seafood (EIA, 2003).  Decades of inadequate or 
non-existent environmental regulation have allowed oil companies to operate 
their facilities without incorporating the costs of environmental damage into 
their decision-making.  Spills can occur for a number of different reasons.  
Shell measures the number of oil spills annually at its facilities along specific 
criteria: whether the spills were the result of corrosion, operational failure 
(machinery or human error), or sabotage.  In recent years there appears to 
have been an increase in the number of oil spills caused by deliberate 
attempts to damage oil facilities.  According to Shell, 69% of the 241 total oil 
spills incidents recorded in 2006 occurred as a result of sabotage.   
Source:  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEV/Resources/3177394-




the crimes of that war be duly punished.  The crime of the company‘s dirty wars 
against the Ogoni people will also be punished  
Complete Statement by Ken Saro-Wiwa to Ogoni Civil Disturbances Tribunal, 
September 21, 1995. 
Shell multinational oil company has been described as a major polluter of the 
environment on the one hand, and a busy propagator and purveyor of technical fixes for 
its transgressions on the other (Enzensberger, 1996).  It is therefore not always easy to 
penetrate the elaborate ―environmental friendly‖ façade erected by the company‘s green 
lobbyists and spin doctors to the ogre that is polluting and despoiling the world‘s fragile 
ecosystems (Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 63).  In the course of exploring for oil in the 
Niger Delta for over the past fifty years, Shell, contrary to what the propaganda that the 
company‘s public relations agencies have been feeding the international community, 
has not only radically altered the ecological equipoise of the Niger Delta, but through 
negligence has orchestrated a vicious ecological war—―one whose victims are a 
hapless people and the land on which they have lived and thrived for centuries‖ (Okonta 
and Douglas, 2003: 64).   
Apter (1998: 127) has argued that ―What Shell brought to Ogoniland was not profit but 
pollution, contaminating the mangrove swamps and farmland with seepage and spills 
while fouling the air with black smoke and lethal gases from flare-offs that burned day 
and night.‖ Growing discontent erupted in July 1970, when a blow-out in one of Shell‘s 
oil fields wreaked havoc on the surrounding villages.  An entire village ecosystem was 
destroyed, prompting petitions to the military governor and protests against Shell-BP‘s 
‗I-do-not-care‘ attitude.  One such letter from an Ogoni school teacher likens the horrors 
of the blow-out to the violence of the Biafran War: 
We in Dere today are facing a situation which can only be compared with our 
experiences during the civil war...  an ocean of crude oil has emerged, moving 
swiftly like a great river in flood, successfully swallowing up anything that comes 
on its way.  These include cassava farms, yams, palms, streams, animals, etc.  
for miles on end.  There is no pipeborne water and yet the stream, the only 
source of drinking water, is coated with oil.  You cannot collect a bucket of rain 
water for the roofs, trees and grass are all covered with oil.  Anything spread 
outside in the neighbourhood is soaked with oil as the wind carries the oil miles 
away from the scene of the incident...  Thrice during the Civil war the flow station 
was bombed setting the whole place on fire...  Now a worse fire is blazing not 
quite a quarter of a mile from the village...  men and women forced by hunger 
‗steal‘ occasionally into the ‗ocean‘ [of oil], some have  to dive deep in oil to 
uproot already rotten yams and cassava.  I am not a scientist to analyze what 
effects the breathing of dangerous gases the crude oil contains would have on 
the people, but suffice it to say that the air is polluted and smells only of crude 
oil.  We are thus faced with a situation where we have no food to eat, no water to 
drink, no homes to live and worst of it all, no air to breathe.  We now live in what 
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Hobbes may describe as a STATE OF NATURE—a state where peace or 
security does not exist ‗...and the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short‘ (Reprinted in Saro-Wiwa, 1992: 58-59). 
A disheartening account of the ecological war waged by Shell in the Delta is told by 
Kings, Chiefs and Community leaders of the Niger Delta during the report submitted to 
the World Conference of Indigenous Peoples on Environment and Development at the 
Rio Earth Summit in June 1992: 
Apart from air pollution from the oil industry‘s emissions and flares day and night, 
producing poisonous gases that are silently and systematically wiping out 
vulnerable airborne biota and otherwise endangering the life of plants, game, 
and man himself, we have widespread water pollution and soil and land pollution 
that respectively result in the death of most aquatic eggs and juvenile stages of 
life of finfish and shellfish and sensible animals (like oysters) on the one hand, 
whilst, on the other hand, agricultural lands contaminated with oil spills become 
dangerous for farming, even where they continue to produce any significant 
yields (quoted in Idoniboye-Obu, 1992: 59). 
It is instructive to note that long before Shell‘s activities in the Niger Delta made 
international headlines, officials of the Inspectorate Division of the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company had raised an alarm over what the oil exploration activities of Shell 
and the other foreign oil companies were doing to the delta environment.  According to 
one NNPC report: 
We witnessed the slow poisoning of the waters of this country and the 
destruction of vegetation and agricultural land by oil spills which occur during 
petroleum operations.  But since the inception of the oil industry in Nigeria more 
than twenty-five years ago, there has been no concerned and effective effort on 
the part of the government, let alone the oil operators, to control the 
environmental problems associated with the industry (quoted in Okonta and 
Douglas, 2003: 64). 
Seventeen years after this report was made little has changed.  If anything, the spate of 
environmental pollution in the region has continued unabated.  In fact, the oil exploration 
and exploitation of Shell has intensified, pushing up its production target to one million 
barrels of crude oil a day.56  In the process of extracting the oil, adequate consideration 
is not given to the over seven million people who live in the area, and the impact of the 
company‘s operations on their environment and their way of life.  In fact, since Shell set 
up its first oil rig in Oloibiri in 1958, not a single satisfactory Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) has been conducted and made public in the Niger Delta before 
operations commence, to determine what potential harmful effects such activities are 
likely to have on the area and how to circumvent or at best minimize them (Okonta and 
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 See, http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/seminars/papers/y673_spring_2003_pegg.pdf.   
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Douglas, 2003: 65).57  All available evidence seems to lend evidence to the fact that 
Shell‘s destruction of the Niger Delta is informed by a cavalier attitude to the welfare of 
the local people (Greenpeace Nederland, November 10, 1996).  Why else would the 
same company go to great lengths to conduct rigorous and extensive EIAs for its 
operations in Europe and North America and refuse to replicate the same in the Niger 
Delta?  
Consider with me, for a moment, the following report on seventeen different EIAs that 
Shell conducted for a pipeline project in Scotland before a single hole was dug:  
A painstakingly detailed Environmental Impact Assessment covered every meter 
of the route, and each hedge, wall, and fence was catalogued and ultimately 
replaced or rebuilt exactly as it had been before Shell arrived.  Elaborate 
measures were taken to avoid lasting disfiguration, and the route was diverted in 
several places to accommodate environmental concerns (Shell International, 
1992: 5, quoted in Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 66).   
Clearly, what is good for the people of Scotland is not considered good for the 
communities of the Niger Delta, from whose land Shell has extracted billions of dollars‘ 
worth of oil since 1958.  This is a prime example of double-standards in Shell‘s 
operations. 
4.2.3 The Net Effect of Shell’s Activities in the Niger Delta 
The consequence of Shell‘s environment-destroying operations in the Niger Delta is ―an 
ecosystem so mangled, raped, and denuded that the area has been labelled the most 
endangered delta in the world‖ (Idoniboye-Obu, 1992: 16).  The damage is total and 
extensive: ―high pressure pipelines that crisscross farmlands and even house 
backyards, well blowouts, and discharge of waste and flares that light up the skies 24 
hours a day and poison the atmosphere with lethal gasses‖ (Okonta and Douglas, 2001: 
66).  David Moffat, an environmental consultant with the World Bank, estimated that 
since it began operations in the Niger Delta, Shell has destroyed a huge portion of the 
mangrove forests in Rivers and Delta states alone, in the process also exposing this 
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―Shell vigorously denies this, claiming that it has been conducting EIAs for its operations in the Niger 
Delta since 1982—but the juggernaut has not been able to corroborate its denial.  The two EIAs that the 
company claimed were commissioned for a major pipeline project in the Delta turned out to have been 
conducted well after the project had commenced‖ (Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 66).  According to the 
Environmental Resources Management report, ―Both documents [the Shell-commissioned EIAs] refer to 
Shell‘s Oil Spill Contingency Plan as a major mitigative measure, but there is no clear indication that an 
effective contingency plan, customised to account for specific local environmental sensitivities, in fact 
exists.‖ The report further added that ―there is little evidence that SPDC have been involved in the EIA 
process, that they acknowledged the potential impacts of their pipeline operations, and that they have 
taken ownership of the mitigation measures necessary to minimize potential impacts‖ (The Body Shop 
and Environmental Resources Management, March 31 1994, quoted in Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 66).   
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otherwise discrete ecosystem to further degradation by hunters and loggers (Moffat and 
Linden, 1995: 531).   
According to World Bank estimates, ―oil companies in Rivers and Delta states spill 
about 9 000 cubic feet of oil in three hundred major accidents annually.  On its part, 
Shell says it spilled an average of 7, 350 barrels of oil a year between 1989 and 1994, 
and that a total of 221 spills occurred in the course of its operations during the period‖ 
(Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 66).  However, as Greenpeace (1996: 24) has noted, these 
figures excludes the large number of supposedly ―minor‖ spills that takes place every 
day (but) which Shell usually did not take into account when making its estimation.  
Quite aside, the light nature of Nigeria‘s crude, coupled with its ability to evaporate 
quickly, makes it intractable to assess the precise volume and spread of spills when 
they occur.  The World Bank therefore argues that actual annual figures of oil spills in 
the Niger Delta are actually about ten times the officially released estimates (Moffat and 
Linden, 1995: 592; Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 66).   
Now, the oil spills occur because the bulk of Shell‘s pipelines through which the oil leaks 
are rusty, obsolete, and poorly maintained.  The truth of the matter is that some Shell 
pipelines and sundry installations in the Niger Delta have not been replaced since they 
were emplaced in the 1960s (Moffat and Linden, 1995: 592).  The result has been an 
increase in the rate and volume of oil spills as Shell accelerates production activities, 
subjecting old and decrepit pipelines to pressure they are no longer able to handle.  
They crack and buckle, spewing oil into the surroundings.  The testimonies of Van 
Dessel, Shell Nigeria‘s former head of environmental studies, best sums up this 
ecological apocalypse: ―Wherever I went, I could see… that Shell‘s installations were 
not working cleanly.  They didn‘t satisfy their own standards, and they didn‘t satisfy 
international standards.  Every Shell terrain I saw was polluted, every terminal I saw 
was contaminated‖ (quoted in Okonta and Douglas, 2003: 67).  Van Dessel was so 
outraged at Shell‘s official indifference to this shocking scenario that he submitted his 
resignation letter in December 1994, two years after he took up his post.   
It is instructive to note that oil pollution clean-ups in the Niger Delta is frequently both 
slow and inadequate.  By way of illustration, ―at Ogbodo, where a massive oil spill 
occurred in 2001, clean-up of the site was delayed for months, and even then was 
inadequate‖ (Amnesty International, 2009: 20).  Similarly, ―the oil spill at Bodo was not 
stopped for more than two months.  Eight months after the spill, no proper clean-up had 
been completed....  Fisheries have been devastated and the long-term impacts are 
probably incalculable‖ (Amnesty International, 2009: 20).  Quite aside, the slowness or 
imperviousness on the part of the Nigerian government to ―contain, cleanup and 
remediate oil spills‖ can heighten the danger of fires breaking out and causing damage 
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to life and property (Amnesty International, 2009: 20).  Perhaps, the worst incident (on 
record) of fire outbreak is the Jesse explosion and fire of 1998 which claimed roughly 
1,000 lives (Amnesty International, 2009: 20). 
Unenviably, Nigeria notoriously leads the world (including all OPEC countries) in flaring 
gas brought up with oil in the drilling and extraction process.  As previously noted, ―the 
World Bank estimates, 87 per cent of all associated gas is flared into the Niger Delta 
atmosphere by oil companies operating in Nigeria, vis-à-vis 21 per cent in Libya and 0.6 
per cent in the United States‖ (Greenpeace Nederland, 1994: 26).  Shell officials 
claimed that the company flared an average 40 billion square feet of gas every year 
between 1991 and 1994, and according to these figures, the World Bank has estimated 
that 80 billion cubic feet of gas is flared in the Niger Delta yearly (Greenpeace 
Nederland, 1992: 27, quoted in Okonta and Douglas, 2003).  According to Geoffrey 
Lean, the leading British environmental journalist, Shell‘s operation in Nigeria makes the 
company one of the biggest contributors to global warming.  The company‘s gas flaring 
installations are like its pipelines—old, poorly constructed, and in some-cases ill-
maintained—and as a result they emit ―far more pollution than Britain‘s twenty million 
homes combined‖ (Lean, 1995).58  Strikingly, the percentage of gas flared in the 
Netherlands, where Royal Dutch Shell has its international headquarters, is zero 
(Greenpeace Nederland, 1992: 27).   
In response to entreaties from concerned Nigerian scientists and conservationists, the 
World Wide Fund of Nature (WWF) have lobbied Shell for eight years to clean up its 
operations in Nigeria and ensure that the amount of gas flared in the course of its 
operations is substantially reduced.  However, Shell consistently rebuffed these pleas.  
Faced with this obduracy, the WWF went public in December 1995, denouncing Shell‘s 
operations in the Niger Delta.  Quite aside, the process by which crude oil is found and 
put to commercial use undergoes several stages, each of them a lethal blow to the 
Niger Delta environment (Amnesty International, 2009).  The following Ogoni song, 
composed in 1970, sums up the Niger Delta community‘s experience with Shell: 
The flames of Shell are flames of hell  
We bask below their light  
Nought for us serve the blight  
Of cursed neglect and cursed Shell (quoted in Saro-Wiwa, 
1995: 79) 
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According to Geoffrey Lean, quoting figures supplied by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
―Annually the flares emit 34 million tons of carbon dioxide, the main cause of global warming, while the oil 
fields went about 12 million tons of methane, which has even more potent effect,‖ (Lean, 1995). 
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Having examined the environmental proximate causes of the Niger Delta crises, our 
attention now shifts to the social-security proximate causes of the crises.  In addition to 
exploring the phenomenon of small arms proliferation, and the associated human 
security threat, the next section discusses the responses of the oil bearing communities 
to the failure of state and corporate responses to address the state of uneasy stasis in 
their oil-rich region.   
4.3 The Social-Security Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict 
Remember your seventy-year-old grandmother who still farms before she eats; 
remember also your poverty stricken people; remember too your petroleum 
which is being pumped out daily from your veins, and then fight for your freedom. 
 Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro59 
One of the major security problems plaguing Africa, since the end of the Cold War in the 
1990s, is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) (Onuoha, 2011: 51; 
Agbiboa, 2011b).60 This development has intensified intra-state conflicts that have 
scarred Africa since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s.  In Nigeria, ―trade in SALW 
has fuelled ethnic clashes in the Niger Delta,‖ especially between the Ijaws and their 
adjoining neighbours, the Itsekiri and Urhobos, as events in Warri have corroborated in 
recent times (Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007: 85; see, also, Agbiboa, 2011b).  This 
situation adds a further complication to general insecurity in the Niger Delta, as the state 
struggles on grimly to resolve the impasse in the volatile region.  This section delves 
into the currency of SALW proliferation in Nigeria and how the armed rebellion in the 
Niger Delta has been intensified through the use of arms that are primarily smuggled 
from countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Gabon and Cameroon (Agbiboa, 2011b: 16; 
Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007).   
The proliferation of arms and the intensity of the violent conflicts in Nigeria‘s oil-rich 
Niger Delta can be traced to two seismic events: the aftermaths of the end of the Cold 
War and the effects of globalization (Agbiboa, 2011b).   Following the end of the hyper-
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 ―Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro in an address to his 59-man ragtag army before the first revolt against the oil 
multinationals and the Nigerian government in 1966‖(Tebekaemi,1982: 117).     
60
 The section adopts the definition of SALWs provided by the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) Convention.  ―‗Small arms‘ refers to arms used by one person, and which include 
firearms and other destructive arms or devices such as exploding bombs, incendiary bombs or gas 
bombs, grenades, rocket launchers, missiles, missile systems or landmines; revolvers and pistols with 
automatic loading; rifles and carbines; machine guns; assault rifles and light machine guns.  ‗Light 
weapons‘ are portable arms designed to be used by several persons working together in a team, and 
which include heavy machine guns, portable grenade launchers, mobile or mounted portable anti-craft 
cannons; portable anti-tank cannons, non-recoil guns; portable anti-tank missile launchers or rocket 
launchers; portable anti-aircraft missile launchers; and mortars with a calibre of less than 100 millimetres‖ 
(ECOWAS, quoted in Onuoha, 2011: 51). 
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militarization of the Cold War years, the fall of the Soviet Union and its snowballing 
effects on the states of the former Eastern bloc, state structures became dysfunctional 
which, invariably, forced the former East European countries to reform their security 
sectors and downsize their military profiles (Agbiboa, 2011b).  These compelling 
realities provided a significant social context for weapon proliferation61 to the Third 
World countries of which Nigeria is no exception.  According to estimates, ―more than 
639 million of SALW were proliferating in the world in 2003 out of which 60 per cent of 
this arsenal was in the possession of the civilian population‖ (Small Arms Survey, 2003: 
13), while a further estimate of, between seven and eight million, new weapons are 
added to the world stockpile every year (Badmus, 2010: 324).  Bah (2004: 33) has 
noted that ―of the approximately 500 million illicit weapons in circulation worldwide, it is 
estimated that 100 million of these are in SSA with eight to ten million concentration in 
the West African sub-region alone.‖ The number of small arms in circulation in Nigeria is 
placed at roughly one million to three million (Ebo, 2006: 1; Obasi, 2002: 69).  According 
to one 2001 estimate, 80 per cent of the weapons in civilian possession had been 
obtained illegally (Obasi, 2002: 69), due to strict laws on civilian possession of arms.  In 
turn, the illegality makes it a Herculean task to track flows and possession.   
Crucially, weapons enter into the country across land borders and via sea ports.  These 
weapons then make their way into the hands of ―armed groups, national dealers, 
political and community leaders, and individuals‖ (Agbiboa, 2011b: 22).  Craft 
production in particular provides a domestic source of SALW.  The key to understanding 
the trade in SALW is Demand: ―as long as insecurity persists, and economic and 
political opportunities for benefits exist through the deployment of force,‖ demand for 
SALW will continue unabated (Weiss, 2003).  Due to the lengthy and porous nature of 
Nigerian borders, ―smuggling and cross-border trade [in SALW] are difficult to detect 
and monitor‖ (Agboton-Johnson et al.  2004: 21).  Beyond this, the task of customs 
officials, the police, and the navy is further compounded by the lack of sufficient staff 
combined with the dearth of vehicles and resources (Agbiboa, 2011b).  While many are 
certain that SALW are alarmingly making their inroads into the country, as supported by 
the circulation of weapons made abroad, the exact entrance routes of these weapons 
remain largely terra incognita.   
Some countries have been implicated as sources for the transferral of SALW.  These 
include the neighbouring countries of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (Ginger and 
Ismail, 2005: 6; Ikelegbe, 2005a: 228; Agbiboa, 2011b), as well as Gabon and Guinea-
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 These weapons were given for free to many African states, especially conflict prone societies.   
Notably, ―since 1995, the United States alone has given away nearly 3 million rifles, pistols, machine 
guns, and grenade launchers‖ (Awake, March 22 2001: 6). 
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Bissau (Ikelegbe, 2005a: 228; Ojudu, 2007).  Other reported sources include Cote 
d‘Ivoire, Liberia, South Africa, Turkey, and Ukraine, as well as Bulgaria, Kosovo, and 
Serbia (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 34).62 According to Agboton-Johnston, et al. (2004: 
21), ―there are three notorious arms smuggling frontiers in Nigeria, namely the south-
west (Idi-Iroko in Ogun state and Seme in Lagos state), the south (the port city of Warri 
in Delta state), and the north-east at the border with Niger and Cameroon (Adamawa, 
Borno, and Yobe states).‖ Warri is usually referred to as the hub of the arms trade in the 
Niger Delta (Ojudu, 2007; Peel, 2005: 2);  ―its location in the delta, as well as the 
demand for small arms in that area of the country, make this a logical place for the 
reception of shipments‖ (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 34; Agbiboa, 2011b).  A number of 
other towns are notorious for the availability of SALW, including ―Asaba, Benin City, 
Warri, Aba, Onitsha, Enugu, Owerri, Awka, and Port Harcourt‖ (Small Arms Survey, 
2007: 1).   
Onuoha (2011: 51) contends that ―the high rate of illegal procurement and use of small 
arms in Nigeria is indexed by the intermittent seizure of SALW‘s by security and border 
control officers, the frequency of deployment of these arms in conflict and crime scenes, 
and the level of human causality and material damage recorded in the aftermath of its 
use in the country.‖ At Dabar Masara, Borno State, a woman named Lucy Danagana 
was intercepted in November 2010 while trying to trying to smuggle 10 AK-47 rifles from 
Chad Republic into Nigeria.  She made her way into Nigeria from Chad through Kofia in 
Cameroon with the help of a boat (Olugbode, 2010: 9).  Around the same period, the 
police in Ibadan, Oyo State, intercepted a large cache of arms and ammunition from a 
suspected bank robbery squad.  Onuoha (2011: 51) notes that ―the seized arms and 
ammunitions included 47 rifles, 103 AK-47 rifle magazines, one assault rifle magazine, 
2,540 AK-47 rounds of ammunition, 727 general purpose machine gun (GPMG) rounds 
of ammunition, three chain bullets, explosive materials, two GPMGs and one chisel (a 
tool with a characteristically shaped cutting edge)‖ (see, also, Bamidele, 2010: 6).  In 
October 2010, a high-profile interdict was recorded when ―a combined team of security 
agents impounded 13 containers loaded with various sizes of grenades, rocket 
launchers, explosives, assault rifles, heavy machine guns and ammunition at Apapa 
Wharf in Lagos, Nigeria‖ (Onuoha, 2011: 51). 
This aside, a good picture of the level of SALW‘s circulating in Nigeria can be gleaned 
from the quantity of arms surrendered during the disarmament and demobilisation (DD) 
phase of the Amnesty programme for the Niger Delta militants in 2009.  Onuoha (2011: 
52) contends that ―the Amnesty initiative saw over 15,000 militants surrender arms at 
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the expiration of the DD phase of the Amnesty.  Weapons recovered during the 
disarmament process included 2,760 assorted guns, 287,445 ammunitions of different 
calibre, 18 gun-boats, 763 dynamite sticks, 1,090 dynamite caps, 3,155 magazines and 
several other military accessories, such as dynamite cables, bulletproof jackets and 
jack-knives‖ (see, also, Agbiboa, 2011b).  The popular belief was that only a modicum 
of arms were given up by militants during the DD phase, as most of them doubted the 
authenticity of the state‘s commitment to the amnesty initiative. 
The most prominent sources of illegal SALW in Nigeria, especially the Niger Delta, 
include ―purchases from international and national arms dealers, sales and rentals by 
serving and retired security personnel63, sales by returning peacekeepers, sales of 
recycled weapons from decommissioning exercise, oil-for-arms exchanges in the Delta 
region, and purchases of locally produced craft weapons‖ (Small Arms Survey, 2007: 
16).  Besides, ―[unlawful] weapons are also obtained through thefts from dealers, 
armouries, and residences; seizures from security officials during robberies; and in 
clashes with other armed groups‖ (Small Arms Survey, 2007: 16).  Weapons entering 
the South, especially in the Niger Delta area, appear to come through more direct 
channels, such as ―cash payments or bartering oil for arms between armed groups and 
offshore ships‖ (Agbiboa, 2011b: 18).   
Against this backdrop, it is not overstated to argue that the proliferation of SALW in the 
Niger Delta is partly to blame for the spiralling of violence in the region.  According to 
Ojakorotu and Uzodike (2007: 88), the situation ―informed the inauguration of the 
national committee on the proliferation and illicit trafficking in SALW in the year 2000 
amid escalation in the volatile region‖ (Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007: 88).  Quite aside, it 
is rather paradoxical that developed nations—who are known for belabouring the need 
for peace in Africa—usually serve as conduit for the importation of SALW to war-torn 
regions in Africa.  The on-going supply of arms to Libyan rebels by France and the 
United States is a corroborating example to this contention.  Table 11 below vividly 
illustrates the ample resources expended by states of West Africa on small arms with 
net effect of state militarization.  Consequently, ―like a chain reaction, this action of the 
states underlines militants‘ proclivity to smuggle small arms from neighbouring states of 
West Africa in exchange for oil to prosecute their cause‖ (Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007: 
88). 
Table 11 
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 In addition to providing access to small arms, ―serving and retired service personnel have also provided 
training to militants.  The armed groups in the Niger Delta have shown superior strategies and tactics 
using better training and organization.  The use of military trainers would explain how militants in the 








Main Exporting Countries 
(value in USD, years) 
Comments on Types of SALW Traded 
Benin France: USD 10,900 in 
1999-2001 
Revolvers and pistols, sporting rifles, and 
shotguns from France. 
Burkina 
Faso 
Italy: USD 865,315 in 
1999-2002 
Czech Republic: USD 
155,384 in 1999-2001 
France: USD 75,982 in 
1999-2002 
Italy reported exports of mainly cartridges, 




Czech Republic: USD 
27,595 in 2001 
Reported imports of revolvers and pistols 
Cote 
d‘Ivoire 
Spain: USD 76,391 in 
2001 
Italy: USD 60,550 in 
1999-2001 
US: USD 48,889 in 1999-
2001 
Czech Republic: USD 
38,051 in 2001-2002 
France: USD 27,886 in 
1999-2001 
Spain and the Czech Republic reported 
exports of only cartridges. 
Revolvers/pistols and shotguns reported 
from Italy. 
Military weapons and cartridges reported 
from the US. 





UK: USD 449,145 in 1999 
Czech Republic: USD 
120,961 in 1999-2002 
Russia: USD 31,134 in 
1999 
Poland: USD 28,107 in 
2000 
UK reported exports of parts and 
accessories of military weapons, 
cartridges. 
Reported imports of cartridges from the 
Czech Republic, Russia and Poland 
Ghana UK: USD 2,156,203 in 
1999-2001 
Cyprus: USD 2,093,385 
in 1999-2001 
Germany: USD 131,099 
in 1999-2001 
France: USD 52,909 in 
1999 
 
Spain‘s and France‘s reported exports 
consist of cartridges and the UK‘s of 
mainly cartridges 
US reported exports mainly of Shotguns, 
cartridges and military weapons 
Cyprus and Germany report exporting 
mainly shotguns. 
Guinea France: USD 3,342,698 in 
1999-2001 
Spain: USD 1,563,183 in 
1999-2001 
UK: USD 325,601 in 1999 
Portugal: USD 231,845 in 
France exported cartridges, sporting rifles, 
military weapons, shotguns, and parts 
cum accessories. 
Only cartridges exported from Spain and 
the UK. 




Czech Republic: USD 15, 
391 in 1999 
shotguns. 
Only shotguns from Germany. 





Portugal: USD 332,054 in 
1999-2001 
Spain: USD 168,912 in 
2000-2001 
France: USD 104,620 in 
1999-2002 
Portugal reported exports of cartridges, 
shotguns, revolvers/pistols, and sporting 
rifles. 
Spain and France reported exports of 
cartridges. 
Liberia Under UN embargo, no imports  therefore authorized 
Mali France: USD 72,327 in 
1999-2002 
France reported exports of mainly parts 
and accessories and  
Niger France: USD 92,134 in 
1999-2002 
Italy: USD 60,643 in 
1999-2001 
Reported imports of revolvers, shotguns, 
parts and accessories, and cartridges 
from France; 
France reported exporting sporting rifles, 
cartridges, and shotguns.  Reported 
imports of shotguns from Italy; Italy 
reported exporting revolvers. 
Nigeria US: USD 246,007 in 
1999-2002 
UK: USD 90,953 in 1999-
2002 
Italy: USD 49,074 in 2001 
Germany: USD 13,062 in 
1999 
US reported exporting mainly cartridges. 
Germany reported exporting 
revolvers/pistols 
UK reported exporting shotguns, 
cartridges and parts. 
Italy reported exporting revolvers and 
shotguns. 
 
Senegal France: USD 2,246,810 in 
1999-2002 
US: USD 959,420 in 
1999-2002 
Spain: USD 426,508 in 
2000-2002 
Italy: USD 232,992 in 
1999-2002 
Germany: USD 116,770 
in 1999-2002 
Czech Republic: USD 
81,996 in 2001-2002 
Only cartridges from Spain. 
Mainly revolvers and cartridges from 
Germany. 
Diversified imports from France, US and 
Italy. 
Cartridges, revolvers/pistols and shotguns 






US: USD 29,542 in 2001 
Spain: USD 13,398 in 
2001 
UK: USD 10,139 in 2000 
US reported exports of parts and 
accessories. 





Togo Spain: USD 41,212 in 
2000 
Spain reported exporting cartridges 
Source: Cross et al.  2004, as reproduced in Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2008, p.88. 
4.3.1 Supply and Demand 
Our basic postulate in this section is that a major reason why small arms are ubiquitous 
is due to a vibrant demand for them.  People and armies seem to provide a flourishing 
market for licit and illicit supplies of SALW in both developed and Third World countries.  
Taya Weiss (2003: 5) has noted that ―where there is a lack of human security, real or 
perceived, there is inevitably a surplus of guns in the hands of people who feel safer 
armed with the ability to protect themselves.‖  Various attempts have been made to 
stem the tide of small arms and light weapons proliferation from this relatively novel 
perspective.  In one UNDP publication Development Held Hostage: Assessing the 
Effects of Small Arms on Human Development, Peter Batchelor and Robert Muggah 
(2002: 9) notes the following:  
Narrow supply-side approaches that focus on the weapons and on ex-
combatants are only part of the solution.  Nor can the broad range of socio-
economic impacts of small arms be dealt with in a framework that focuses 
exclusively on weapons reduction.  Because small arms play a key role in 
undermining development gains in conflict-affected, post-conflict, and stable 
societies alike, they should be of concern to the development community rather 
than the exclusive preserve of the security and disarmament community. 
Further, Batchelor and Muggah (2002: 9) consider the urgent need for a ―preventive 
framework,‖ stating that ―the development community has demonstrated the capacity to 
design and implement comprehensive, transparent, participatory and locally-appropriate 
responses to small arms issue.‖ A careful study of many local approaches to violence 
fuelled by firearms shows that they are mostly based on ―demand-and-conflict-
prevention‖ while national and global responses tends to be ―emergency-triggered‖ 
(Weiss, 2003).  This needs to change.  Seen from a demand vantage point, weapons 
cease to be the overriding focus of intervention.  In lieu of this, the spotlight is turned to 
gun-users and seeks to influence those who purchase these SALWs in the market, in 
addition to regulating suppliers and enforcing apposite laws.  Weiss (2003) aptly notes 
that ―by bringing demand-reduction measures to the fore, the problem of small arms 
proliferation can be debated in new fora.  This brings gun-fuelled, conflict-related 
problems out of traditional defence and foreign affairs areas and brings them under the 
lens of traditionally ‗humanitarian‘ policies.‖ What is more, ―the burden of crime and 
violence prevention is lifted off the back of policing and brought to broader, more 
powerful levels of government control‖ (Weiss, 2003). 
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According to the United Nations Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small 
Arms (UNRPGESA) (1997: 12), state-level failure to provide security is offered as the 
raison d’être of demand-based proliferation: ―When the State loses control over its 
security functions and fails to maintain the security of its citizens, the subsequent growth 
of armed violence, banditry and organised crime increased the demand for weapons by 
citizens seeking to protect themselves and their property.‖ Culturally speaking, the 
report maintains that ―possession of military-style weapons is a status symbol, a source 
of personal security, a means of subsistence, a sign of manliness and, in some cases, a 
symbol of ethnic and cultural identity‖ (UNRPGESA, 1997: 16).  This culture of weapons 
ownership and possession bolsters demand mostly ―when a State cannot guarantee 
security to its citizens or control the illicit activities in which these weapons are utilised‖ 
(UNRPGESA, 1997: 16).   
Despite the persuasive argument for the role of demand as a driver of arms 
proliferation, the report‘s recommendations to rein in the corrosive effect of small arms 
proliferation tilted toward supply-side measures (Weiss, 2003).  These include 
―increased guidelines for arms transfers, adapting national laws and regulation, 
imposing licensing requirements, marking and safeguarding weapons, and restricting 
manufacture‖ (UNRPGESA, 1997: 21-23).  By failing to underscore the centrality of 
demand factors in its recommendation clause, Weiss (2003) contends that ―the Experts‘ 
Report set an example for the supply-side focus that has characterized every instrument 
since.‖  In 2000, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) met in Bamako, Mali to 
develop an African Common Position on SALWs, in anticipation of the 2001 United 
Nations Conference.  The Bamako Declaration—informed by the 1998 ECOWAS 
Moratorium and the 2000 Nairobi Declaration—revisited demand reduction strategies as 
a possible policy option.  While unequivocally reaffirming the values of ―sovereignty, 
non-interference, and the right to individual and collective self-defence,‖ the signatories 
asserted that ―the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small 
arms and light weapons… sustains conflicts … promotes a culture of violence … has 
adverse effects on security and development … and is both one of supply and demand‖ 
(quoted in Weiss, 2003).  The declaration makes some improvement (but barely 
enough) in suggesting that the conundrum should be approached not only from 
supplier‘s point of view, but also through  
the promotion of measures aimed at restoring peace, security and confidence 
among and between Member States, the promotion of structures and processes 
to strengthen democracy, the observance of human rights, and economic 
recovery and growth, the promotion of conflict prevention measures, and the 
promotion of solutions that include both… supply and demand aspects (quoted 
in Weiss, 2003). 
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It is useful to note that availability has a snow-ball effect on demand.  Besides, Small 
arms are extremely difficult to get rid of because they are sturdy, durable, and reusable: 
―once present in a country they tend to stay there, either fuelling crime or flowing over 
national boundaries to serve the needs of neighbouring conflicts‖ (Weiss, 2003).64 
According to Weiss (2003), ―[i]n restive regions with bleak economic forecasts, former 
combatants have little hope of finding a job in civilian life.  The option of keeping a gun 
and seeking mercenary work becomes [more beguiling] than turning over their only 
chance at earning a livelihood.‖ Added to this, ―poverty, unequal access to resources, 
large youth populations with no access to education or jobs, and other socio-political 
factors contribute to instability, [but] it is the presence of guns that enables conflict to 
escalate into the type of violence that is beyond state control or mediation‖ (Weiss, 
2003).  As I argued elsewhere, ―small arms proliferation precludes development and 
frustrates conflict resolution efforts, creates a fertile ground for war economies to 
flourish and become entrenched, and contributes to a growing number of refugees and 
internally displaced persons‖ (Agbiboa, 2011b: 12).65  
Appreciably, arms reduction continues to present a major challenge to various national, 
regional, and international efforts to prioritise it.  The prelude to the report on the 
conference Shrinking Small Arms: A Seminar on Lessening the Demand for Weapons 
has this to say on the matter:  
The issue of the demand for weapons must be addressed, but as diplomats 
often note, this opens a whole new area of issues in conflict resolution, 
community development, justice reform, youth programming, postwar peace 
building and attitude change that is far beyond the experience of the ministries of 
defence and foreign affairs which normally deal with weapons control… Much 
[NGO-based] demand-side activity is not focused intentionally on weapons 
control, but is conducted to end wars, control violence, increase development or 
empower marginalized populations (Conference Report, 1999: 8). 
Adverting out attention to Nigeria, especially the Niger Delta, the next section argues 
that it is the failure of the Nigerian state (especially under military rule) to meet the 
fundamental needs of the people – especially human security – that occasioned the 
collapse of the social contract, which eventually put the state and society at 
loggerheads.  To properly understand this collapse and the emergence of what is 
generally dubbed the Hobbesian Niger Delta, it behoves us to search for its etiology 
within the context of both the endogenous and exogenous factors.  This is because, as 
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―One of the purposes of demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programmes is to 
confiscate and take small arms out of circulation following a conflict period, but arms caches are rarely 
effectively destroyed in the wake of fragile peace agreement‖ (Weiss, 2003). 
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Badmus (2010: 327) argues, ―the international socio-political and economic contexts 
have overbearing effects on the local conditions especially in Nigeria‘s oil basin.‖  
4.3.2 The ‘Hobbesian Niger Delta’ and the Collapse of the Social 
Contract 
During the Cold War, especially in the immediate post-independence years, African 
states enjoyed economic buoyancy and this enhanced their ability to provide adequate 
social services to the populace.  In addition, many African states received some 
financial assistance from the international financial institutions (IFIs), while the super 
powers where relentless in their pursuit of hegemonic interests and ideological 
supremacy, which saw the continent in a vantage position for financial and military aid 
from Moscow and Washington.  These sources of aid enabled African governments to 
maintain peace ―as a result of the state-driven expansionism in the socio-economic 
sector‖ (Badmus, 2010: 327).  It is useful to note that much of what took place in Africa 
during the early period after independence can be characterized by ―urban-biased‖ from 
the point of view of development.  The marketing boards extracted resources from rural 
areas and used them for urban development under the development strategy which was 
then popular.  Moreover, the kind of aid provided Africa during the Cold War had a 
devastating effect on the long term development of the country.  Often, they ignored 
African ruling elites that were oppressing their people if the rulers were allies of either 
the U.S.  or Soviet Union ideologically.66  
The economic prosperity of the late 1960s and early 1970s, started to show signs of 
depreciation by the late 1970s/early 1980s owing to a plethora of negative socio-
economic factors.  Eventually, Africa‘s economic downturn ballooned into a full-blown 
economic crisis; thanks to the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 that made oil price rise and 
fluctuate (Badmus, 2010: 327).  As a result of this economic crisis, the capabilities of 
many African governments to guarantee citizens‘ welfare were greatly emasculated and 
their legitimacies eroded.  In response to the dire situation, African states had little 
choice but resort to ―borrowing from the Bretton Wood Institutions with the acceptance 
of the neo-liberal, anti-developmental Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) for the 
stabilization and recovery of their economies‖ (Badmus, 2010: 327).  One notable point 
about SAP policies is the fact that they are anti-state in that they call for ―neo-liberal 
market reform based on the belief that the state was blocking economic growth and 
development by spending too much on welfare benefits in health, education and other 
                                                          
66
 I thank the reviewer of one of my articles titled ―Armed Groups, Arms Proliferation and Conflict in Third 
World Countries: The Niger Delta Perspective‖ (submitted to the Journal of Third World Studies) for 
bringing this information to my awareness. 
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subsidies‖ (Badmus, 2010: 328; see, also, Vasudevan, 1999: 11-28).  The 
implementation of SAP became counterproductive as it further weakened the state‘s 
legitimacy by adding a further complication to the pre-SAP social crisis.  Added to this, 
the gap between the rich and the poor widened sharply, thereby reinforcing uneven 
development, which, in the words of Badmus (2010: 328), ―matches up to clear regional 
and ethnic divisions in a manner amplifying political tensions.‖  
Quite aside, rural poverty had a snow-ball effect on the teeming populations of urban 
poor caused by rural to urban drift of people in search of greener pastures.  To make 
matters worse, the resultant social instability created a fertile ground for the recruitment 
of marginalised and irked people into ethnic militia groups (Badmus, 2006: 270-291)—a 
reality which further deepened the general sense of insecurity in the region.  The loss of 
control of the economies by the African government and the state‘s inability to salvage 
its sapping population, apparently and interminably fractured the basis of national unity, 
put the state and the society at dagger-drawn opposition to each other, and above all, 
compelled the masses to look for alternative structures (constructed around ethnicity 
and religion), to re-strategize their options, and saw these new structures as workable 
mechanisms for coping with the worsening economic crisis, of which privatization of 
security (that is, acquisition of SALW for their own protection and as instruments of 
negotiation) is imperative (Jega, 2000).  Against this backdrop, African states (Nigeria 
inclusive) ―lost their power, legitimacy, and national cohesion since they failed to fulfil 
their own promises of the social contract‖ (Badmus, 2010: 328).   
According to the social contract theory of arms: 
citizens transfer the possession of weapons to a constituted authority (i.e. the 
sovereign and the state) with the agreement that the state will provide and 
guarantee people‘s security (in all its connotations) while the ownership of such 
weapons is in the hands of the people which gives them (i.e. citizens) the 
opportunity to withdraw and reclaim self-defence when states fail to honour their 
own obligations of the contract (Badmus, 2010: 328).   
In this context, ownership67 of arms is exercised as ―the General will‖ and not as ―the 
Will of All,‖ (Badmus, 2010: 329) which appertains to the combination of sectional will 
that makes up the society.  If violence and arms proliferation in the Niger Delta are the 
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 Ibeanu expatiates further on the similarities and differences between ‗ownership‘ and ‗possession‘ with 
respect to social contract theory of arms.  According to Ibeanu (2005), ―ownership and possession are 
related but distinct.  The former refers to the right in the last analysis to decide the ends to which society‘s 
instruments of violence are to be put legitimately.  Possession on the other hand, refers to the capacity to 
actually put those instruments of violence to use.  It is possession that government exercises through its 
coercive apparatuses.  However, it is the citizens that are the owners of society‘s instrument of violence, 
who confer possession on governments.  Once citizens confer possession on government, it is sustained 
in so far as government incarnates.‖ 
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result of the breakdown/collapse of the social contract (and of arms in particular), then it 
follows that the task that awaits is to 
reconcile differences in the possession of these instruments of violence between 
the state and the populace until the social contract is reconstituted or resumes 
proper functioning.  In so far as the legitimacy of the state at the local, state, and 
federal levels remain contested by a vast majority of people in the Niger Delta, 
they will continue to contest the right of the state and its agencies to monopolize 
society‘s instruments of violence (Ibeanu, 2005: 53).   
Needless to say, ―small arms are lethal, but easy to use: A single rapid-fire assault rifle 
can fire hundreds of rounds a minute‖ (Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007: 91).  Added to 
this, small arms are easily transported and concealed.  But why does a poor continent 
have such a magnitude of stockpiled small arms? Perhaps, what explains this 
ambiguous situation between economic underdevelopment (poverty) on the one hand 
and proliferation of SALW and armed conflicts on the other is the ―strongest expression 
of the injustice in the paradox of wealth that characterizes situations of conflicts in 
Africa—the fact that those who produce wealth are the poorest and those who are 
wealthy take the wealth by force‖ (Ibeanu, 2005: 37).  Hence the main reason for people 
to arm themselves is not only predicated on their poor socio-economic conditions but 
also on their relative deprivation and exclusion from issues that directly affects them 
(Agbiboa, 2011b). In such a situation, SALW serves two functions: ―they abet in 
sustaining injustices and also offer hopes for redressing injustices‖ (Badmus, 2010: 
325), thereby confirming Naylor‘s avowal that the demand for SALW is a ―surrogate for 
demand for social injustice, and the firearm is the capital good intended to bring that 
objective‖ (quoted in Dominick and Olonisakin, 2001: 16).  Nowhere is this more 
conspicuous and poignant than in Nigeria‘s delta. 
4.3.3 Oiling the Guns and Gunning for Oil 
Nigeria is among the developing countries where the proliferation of SALW is 
manifested in crisis proportions and ―its society has become fully militarized and 
enmeshed in the culture of the gun‖ (Badmus, 2010: 325).  This has been the tragic 
story of the Niger Deltans.  Unhappy with the exploitative and heavy-handed nature of 
the Nigerian state, different oil-producing ethnic minority groups have united under 
various social banners to contest exploitation and as a result, ―oiling their guns as well 
as gunning for oil in the region‖ (Badmus, 2010: 325, emphasis added), and fighting for 
a fair share in the natural resources found on ‗their‘ land.  The foregoing has led some 
scholars to describe the Niger Delta as a region that is both ―ungoverned and 
ungovernable,‖ (Badmus, 2010: 325; Agbiboa, 2011b) owing to the fact that the 
Nigerian government lacks the required gravitas and savoir faire to stem the rising tide 
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of conflict that has plagued the region in recent decades (Chatham House, 2006; 
Lubeck, Watts, and Lipschutz, 2007: 1; Watts, 2007).  According to the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the growing unrest in the Niger Delta is one that 
―could tip towards outright warfare‖ (UNDP, 2006: 18).   
Beyond this, ―the increasing sophistication of organized piracy, oil-bunkering and 
hostage-taking in the oil producing Niger Delta region, [as well as] the region‘s peculiar 
swampy geography and extensive access to international waterways  combine to make 
the region an important distributional point for SALW proliferation in Nigeria‖ (Ogundiya, 
2011: 64).  The use of small arms by elements in the security services to seize power 
has spawned a ―militarized national psyche and culture of violence‖ (Small Arms 
Survey, 2001: 3).  Adding a further complication to the issue of SALW proliferation in the 
Niger Delta is the fact that it becomes intractable to draw a distinction between lawful 
and unlawful trade in arms because ―weapons once officially sold to state statutory 
security forces are often stolen by military personnel only to re-appear on the black 
market as illegal weapons, thereby prolonging the intensity of conflict in the region‖ 
(Badmus, 2010: 326).  In particular, the crisis in the Niger Delta has been aggravated by 
the militant approach of the Nigerian government to armed group activity while failing to 
seriously address any of the legitimate concerns of the irked population. 
The grievances of those living in the Niger Delta are well founded.  The population 
bears the brunt of environmental despoliation resulting from the irresponsible operations 
of oil companies.  As we have previously stated, oil spills and gas flaring have dealt a 
fatal blow to fishing, farming, and the air quality in the region.  In return, the population 
has received only a modicum of support from the Nigerian government, which benefits 
from the high revenues earned from the sale of crude oil.  Grievously, the Niger Delta 
population have no control over the oil in their land,68 and no claim to the associated 
perks that flows from its sale.  Indeed, rather than serve as a tool for ―social 
engineering,‖ law has been used as an ―instrument of expropriation and denial‖ in the 
region (Agbiboa, 2011b: 12). According to Amnesty International (2009: 9), ―The 
[Nigerian] Federal Government allocates permits, licenses and leases to survey, 
prospect for and extract oil to the oil companies, who are then automatically granted 
access to the land covered by their permit, lease or license.‖ In particular, the provisions 
of the 1979 and 1999 constitutions and other legislations such as the Territorial Waters 
Act (1967), the Petroleum Act (1969), the Exclusive Economic Zone Act (1978) and the 
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Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Clause 44 states: ―…the entire property in and 
control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or  
upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of 
the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.‖ 
The Petroleum Act of 1969, Clause 1 states: ―the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under 
or upon any lands to which this section applies shall be vested in the State.‖ 
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Land Use Act (1978) served to firmly entrench the nationalisation policy which vested 
ownership and control of all land and the resources therein in the Federal Government.  
This contravenes the common law doctrine of quic quid plantatur solo cedit (―what is 
attached to the land accrues to the land and belongs to the owner‖).   
Though the percentage of oil-related revenue has gone up (in the Niger Delta) from less 
than 2 per cent (under military rule) to 13 per cent, the bulk of this funding ends up lining 
the pockets of many state officials, with little visible signs of growth and development in 
the area (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 18).  Albeit ―the incidence of poverty has declined 
since 1996 in the delta‖ (UNDP, 2006: 58), the lack of roads, health care and 
educational facilities, as well as the high level of unemployment in the region underline 
the insouciance and insensitivity of the Nigerian state and oil multinationals.  Irked by 
the redundancy in the region and bent on drawing the world‘s attention to their odious 
condition, the Niger Delta (since the 1990s) has witnessed the emergence of a plethora 
of armed groups.69 According to one June 2004 anti-cult law in Rivers state, armed 
groups in the state number close to 100 (Best and Von Kemedi, 2005: 21-22).70 
The Niger Delta has since become a hot spot for the proliferation of SALW, which the 
militias have used to unleash terror in the country on various occasions (Omotola, 2006: 
13).  For example, armed groups have hatched various nefarious plans, including the 
use of violent tactics in the form of ―kidnappings, battles with security forces, clashes 
with one another, and car bombs, which is a more recent tactic‖ (Hazen and Horner, 
2007: 19).  Increasingly, such groups are demonstrating sophisticated tactics and 
weaponry, raising concerns apropos of future violence (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 19; 
Fisher-Thompson, 2007).  As previously stated, the Nigerian state has often had a flair 
for repressive measures as a means of interrogating the activities of ethnic militias in 
the oil-rich region.  This includes the emplacement of draconian decrees such as the 
one promulgated by the Abacha regime prohibiting the Ogoni‘s demand for the right to 
self-determination as articulated in the Ogoni Bill of Rights.  The decree criminalized 
any disruptions of crude oil production activities as acts of treason attracting capital 
punishment (Ovwasa, 1999: 94-95; Omotola, 2006: 19).  Noticeably, the militarization of 
the delta area has not helped matters.  Instead, it has ―solidified the resolve of the 
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Some of these agitate for change in the political situation and in the distribution of resources.  In other 
words, it is a claim for resource control and financial revenue to be ceded to the oil-bearing states where 
decisions about distribution can be made, thereby taking this decision-making power out of the hands of 
the federal government. 
70
 The most prominent groups currently active in the Niger Delta is the Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta (MEND)—some of the nefarious activities of MEND will be considered in chapter five of 
this study.  Other groups include the Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta (COMA), the Joint 
Revolutionary Council (JRC), the Niger Delta People‘s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and a number of cult 
groups, such as the Outlaws and Icelander (see Hazer and Horner, 2007: 19).   
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armed groups, encouraged recruitment, and heightened public support for some of 
these groups‖ (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 19).   
4.3.4 Janus Unbound: Armed Resistance in the Niger Delta 
By definition, violence refers to ―the intentional use of physical force or power, 
threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, 
that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological 
harm, maldevelopment or deprivation‖ (Hazen and Horner, 2007: 13).  Specifically, the 
concern in this section is with armed violence, which, for the purposes of this study, is 
defined as the carrying out of a violent act with ―any material thing designed or used or 
usable as an instrument for inflicting bodily harm‖ (Taback and Coupland, 2005: 20).   
Since the early 1990s, resistance movements have sprouted like mushrooms in the 
Niger Delta region.  Notable among these are ―the Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP), the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), the Ijaw National Congress 
(INC), the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), the 
Ijaw Nationality Rights Protection Organization (INRPO) and the Ogoni Patriotic Union 
(OPU)‖ (Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007: 95).  These movements have emerged to 
challenge the excesses of the state-oil-multinational alliance.  The recourse to armed 
violence by these groups is essentially due to their insufferable condition and the use of 
violence by the Nigerian state against them (Obi, 2001: 6).  Obi (1999: 433) contends 
that these groups have attempted, with some level of success, to draw the attention of 
the national and international community to paradox of prosperity in their region, as well 
as their various political and economic demands (Obi, 1999: 433).  The Ogoni and Ijaws 
are two major ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta.  Subsequently, an analysis of the 
nexus between the Nigerian state and these two ethnic minority groups will furnish a 
useful illustration of state violence and armed local resistance by ethnic militia. 
4.3.4.1 The Ogoni Resistance 
MOSOP and Ogoniland must survive and flourish for the sake of us all.  For 
better or worse, MOSOP and Ogoniland are the conscience of this country.  
They have risen above our slave culture of silence.  They have found courage to 
be free and they have evolved a political consciousness which denies power to 
rogues, hypocrites, fools, and bullies.  For better for worse, Ogoniland carries 
our hopes.  Battered and bleeding, it struggles on to realise our promise and to 
restore our dignity.  If it falters, we die (Claude Ake, quoted in Okonta and 
Douglas, 2003: 16). 
Obi (2001: 9) has rightly noted that ―The tag of oil minorities evolved after the civil war, 
and gained prominence by the late 1980s as a modality of identifying those minorities 
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which, despite their connections to oil – the very lifeblood of Nigeria – have found 
themselves marginalised at the national level in terms of class, state and power.‖  
Nigeria‘s ‗oil minorities‘ are the ethnic minority groups, among them the Ogoni, who 
inhabit the Niger Delta, the principal oil-producing region of the country (Okonta, 2008: 
118).  Up until 1990, minority demands all across Nigeria were largely purveyed through 
delegations, petitions and meetings with state and federal authorities (Na‘Allah, 1998: 
69).  A significant change in the approach was to take place in the case of the Ogoni 
with the formation of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 
1990 with Dr. Garrick Leton as President and Ken Saro-Wiwa as spokesperson.  This 
was the organization put together by Ken Saro-Wiwa and others of his ilk to mobilize 
their people in the struggle for better treatment by the oil companies and the Nigerian 
government (Na‘Allah, 1998: 69; Ojakorotu, 2000: 81).  In the words of Saro-Wiwa: 
[The] Ogoni has offered Nigeria an estimated $30 billion and received nothing in 
return, except a blighted countryside; an atmosphere full of carbon dioxide, 
carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon… a land of polluted streams and creeks of 
rivers without fish, and land which is, in every sense of the term, an ecological 
disaster (quoted in CDHR, 1994: 8, quoted in Na‘Allah, 1998: 69). 
Indeed, ―[t]he Ogoni struggle typically exemplifies the nature and dynamics of the crisis 
as well as local resistance in the Niger Delta region‖ (Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007: 95).  
The formation of MOSOP could be said to have spelt a salient shift in Ogoni identity-
formation when they were radically transformed, in the words of Osaghae (1995: 329), 
from an ―ethnic group-in-itself‖ to an ―ethnic group-for-itself.‖ In an important sense, the 
leaders of MOSOP had triggered the processes that Franz Fanon (1993) identifies in 
On National Culture as critical for the formation of coherent national and cultural 
identities: ―There is no fight for culture which can develop apart from popular struggle.‖  
The first step in prosecuting a common struggle for MOSOP was the drawing up of the 
―Ogoni Bill of Rights‖ (OBR) in the later part of 1990.  This was presented to the 
government of Ibrahim Babangida, the UN sub-committee on the Prevention of 
Discrimination against Minorities, the African Human Rights Commission, Greenpeace 
and Rain Forest Action Group among others (Na‘Allah, 1998: 70).  As can be gleaned 
from the OBR (see Appendix 1), the Ogoni people‘s demands were four-pronged: 
a) the demand for a right to control their political affairs 
b) the control and use of a fair share of economic resources derived from Ogoniland 
c) the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation 
d) Adequate and direct representation in all Nigerian national institutions (MOSOP, 




To the above objectives the elders interpolated the following reassurance lines: 
a) We are Nigerians, proud to be Nigerians and would wish to remain Nigerians; 
b) We hold no malice to any group or groups in this country and especially the 
many ethnic groups that comprise Rivers State; 
c) We have no affiliation with any organization inside or outside Nigeria; and 
d) We speak as loyal and law abiding citizens of Nigeria and are here to fight for our 
rights, not by force of arm but through dialogue and persuasion (MOSOP, 1992). 
In December 1992, MOSOP requested the all the oil multinationals in Ogoniland 
(including Shell and Chevron) and the Nigerian state to pay back ―royalties and 
compensation within 30 days or quit Ogoniland‖ (Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007: 96; see, 
also, MOSOP, 1992).  At the end of the ultimatum, roughly 300,000 people marched out 
in peaceful protest on 4 January 1993 to express their dissatisfaction with the status 
quo.  Now, there are two ways in which this record protest by the Ogonis marked a 
watershed in their resistance campaign: ―First, it transformed the Ogoni question into a 
national issue.  Second, it attracted the sympathy and attention of the international 
community to the plight of the Ogoni people‖ (Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007: 96).  This 
peaceful demonstration led to the arrest and detention (by the state security forces) of 
many MOSOP leaders.  It is useful to note that ―between January and December 1993, 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and other prominent Ogoni leaders were arrested and detained several 
times‖ (Human Rights Watch, 1995).  Meanwhile, the Nigerian state tried to emasculate 
the Ogoni resistance through different various stratagems.  For example, the Nigerian 
government ―‗encouraged‘ violent conflict between the Ogoni and their neighbours, 
which resulted in ethnic and communal clashes‖ (Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007: 96-97).   
On 21 May 1994, violence erupted in Giokoo village during one of Saro-Wiwa‘s 
campaign visit to the village.  Reportedly, some chiefs (allegedly being sponsored by 
the Nigerian state) were surreptitiously holding a meeting.  During the ensuing 
pandemonium, the four chiefs were brutally murdered71 (Na-Allah, 1998: 41; Ojakorotu 
and Uzodike, 2007: 97).  This horrific incidence led to the arrest of Saro-Wiwa and eight 
other MOSOP members on the count of incitement to murder.  Subsequently, a special 
military tribunal in Nigeria sentenced Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues to death by hanging 
(Ojakorotu and Uzodike, 2007: 97).  The execution was carried out on 10 November 
1995 despite all entreaties – both local and global – to the contrary.  This development 
put a solid dent on the challenge posed against the state-oil alliance by MOSOP and 
sounded the death knell of the Ogoni struggle.  The organization was further 
emasculated by fractional squabbles.   
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A gripping description of the killing of these four chiefs is presented by Desmond Lera Orage, a son to 
Chief Samuel Orage who was one of the murdered chiefs.  The piece is titled ―The Ogoni Question and 
the Role of the International Community in Nigeria‖ in Na‘Allah (1998: 41-48). 
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It is instructive to note that the totalitarian state apparatus in Nigeria has always shown 
an unenviable appetite for violence.  The chicanery and subsequent hanging of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa was not so much a sign of disrespect for international opinion but ―a sign to 
Nigerians themselves that there was no escape from the state‘s totalitarian apparatus 
and that nobody in the whole world could save them‖ (Na‘Allah, 1998: 75).  Thus, the 
totalitarian regime was interested in showing their unquestioned power of life and death 
over its citizens.  Such a model of governmentability runs athwart the ―ludic‖ and 
―convivial‖ model Mbembe (1992) proposes for the African post-colony.  In the words of 
Ken Saro-Wiwa: ―To be at the mercy of buffoons is the ultimate insult.  To find the 
instruments of state power reducing you to dust is the injury‖ (quoted in Na‘Allah, 1998: 
75).  The general factors that accounted for the fall of the Ogoni resistance can be 
summarised, as Bob (2002: 395) suggests, in terms of the shrinking of domestic and 
international opportunities which had engendered the formation of social movements.  
These factors are outlined below: 
1. The differences (between the radical and conservative wings) within the MOSOP 
leadership over the issues of organisational structure and strategies. 
2. The activities of the conservative elite who bargained for and accepted political 
offices offered by the Federal Government as these frustrated MOSOP in its 
attempt to forge a cohesive front against the MNOCs and the government. 
3. The withdrawal of the conservative elements within the MOSOP‘s echelons vis-á-
vis the boycott of the Presidential elections of June 12, 1993. 
4. The failure of the international community to sustain its support for MOSOP in the 
aftermath of the internal crisis. 
5. Increased repression of the civil rights movement in general by the Abacha 
regime (Bob, 2002: 395). 
 
Following the implosion of the Ogoni movement, it fell to the Ijaws to carry out militant 
struggle against the state and oil companies in the Niger Delta.  The eventual transition 
from military rule to civilian administration in 1999, couple with the interest of 
international community gave impetus to the Ijaw resistance. 
4.3.4.2 The Ijaw Resistance and the Use of Deadly Weapons 
The emergence of Ijaw struggles came on the heels of the decline of the Ogoni 
resistance following the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and direct state repression of the 
Ogoni.  The Ijaw-state-oil companies face-off centered on years of injustice and socio-
economic neglect of the oil-bearing Ijaw nation (Agbiboa, 2011b).  In August 1997, over 
10,000 youth of Ijaw origin protested at Aleibiri village in Bayelsa state demanding an 
immediate end to Shell activities in the oil Delta.  In particular, the Ijaw people vowed to 
liberate themselves from the bondage of exploitation.  Appreciably, the Ijaw struggle 
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was perched atop the lessons from the MOSOP experience and upon its attempt to put 
an end to the divisions among the Ijaw in the Niger Delta.  Besides, the Ijaw leadership 
―built its support from the grassroots and depended on the energy, vision and anger of 
the youth in the Niger Delta.  It drew upon local symbols and metaphors at the 
community level to build pan-Ijaw neo-nationalism‖ (Obi, 2002: 16).  Unlike the Ogoni, 
the Ijaws, under the aegis of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), were more militant in their 
approach to the demand for resource control.  The group employed a series of 
measures to express the grievances of the Ijaws in forms of hostage-taking and violent 
confrontation with the military forces. 
The confrontations were further aggravated (especially in Bayelsa state) due to negative 
consequences of oil exploration for the Niger Delta environment.  In this regard, Shell, 
among other oil companies, was the common enemy.  Badmus (2010: 342) contends 
that ―between 1998 and 1999, the Ijaw youth became more restive and most of these 
agitations occurred in Bayelsa State and culminated in the first Egbesu72war‖ (see, also, 
Ibeanu, 2005: 45).  In the vanguard of these protests were the myriads clans of the 
Ijaws, a diverse and fiercely independent people who have made their living from fishing 
and trading from time immemorial.  Their home region in the Delta is ―a vast steamy 
maze of countless creeks and rivers feeding into what is reputedly the world‘s biggest 
remaining area of mangrove‖ (Maier, 2000: 112).  As the source of nearly half of the 
$280 billion Nigeria has earned from petroleum exports in the past three decades, it 
also stands as a monument to the failure of the modern African nation-state to care for 
its people (Agbiboa, 2011b). 
One can trace the root of the Ijaw confrontation to extra-legal detention of Ijaw youth 
leader for distributing ‗seditious‘ documents against the then Military Governor of 
Bayelsa State.  By way of a reaction, the militant Egbesu Boys liberated their detained 
leader from the Government House in Yenegoa having disarmed the soldiers on sentry.  
According to Ibeanu (2005: 46):  
The success of the first Egbesu war obviously enhanced the profile of the youths 
and cult, and encouraged more people, many of whom were unemployed, to join 
the protests.  In a matter of weeks, the invincibility of the Egbesu had spread 
throughout Bayelsa State and beyond, and the success of the Egbesu youth in 
the ‗first war‘ fed into wider demands by the Ijaw for more petroleum revenues. 
Now, the death of General Sani Abacha in office in 1998 and the rise of General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-1998) impacted directly on the Ijaw wars.  Shortly after 
General Abubakar assumed power, he embarked on reconciliatory agendas to resolve 
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the internal political deadlocks that marked General Abacha‘s dictatorship.  In this 
context, says Badmus (2010: 348), ―the already militarized and reduced political space 
opened up and people‘s fundamental human rights were guaranteed.‖ In view of this 
development, the Ijaw youth furnished a more vigorous and assertive pursuit of their 
demands.   
During the Ijaw Youth Convention in Kaiama town on 11 December 1998, a document, 
popularly known as the Kaiama Declaration, was addressed to the military government 
in which they requested for increased local control of oil revenues and better 
environmental practices.  In the Kaiama Declaration, a deadline (of 31st December 
1998) was given to the Nigerian government and oil companies to meet their various 
demands; otherwise the oil companies should close their operations and leave the Ijaw 
land and the entire Niger Delta region.73 Shortly after the declaration, the Ijaw youth 
spearheaded a peaceful demonstration in Yenegoa to express their demands and also 
―during this demonstration they passed across their grievances to the Federal 
Government through the Bayelsa state government‖ (Badmus, 2010: 349).  But the 
relatively peaceful demonstration ended in utter tragedy when Nigerian soldiers stormed 
the protest grounds killing scores of youths and leaving many badly injured (Ukeje, 
2001).  The Ijaw youth and the entire Ijaw nation interpreted this assault as an open 
declaration of war by the Nigerian government on ethnic Ijaw.  So conceived, the Ijaws 
became more restive with consequential military build-up and arms proliferation which 
made the security situation to decline rapidly (Badmus, 2010: 343).  The second 
Egbesu war was on the cards and eventually started when the state security forces 
clashed with Ijaw youth who were taking part in a cultural festival in Yenegoa.  The 
clash left many dead and had huge cost on the Ijaw nation, especially in Yenegoa and 
Kaiama (Ibeanu, 2005: 47).   
The dawn of the Nigerian Fourth Republic in May 1999—especially under Obasanjo‘s 
presidency (May 1999-May 2007)—seems to have lacked the required gravitas and 
savoir faire to check the spectre of conflict in the Niger Delta.  This is supported by the 
military invasion of Odi town in Kolokuma-Opokuma Local Government Area of Bayelsa 
state in November 1999 (Badmus, 2010: 343).  Perhaps, this is why Ibeanu (2005: 47) 
noted that the Odi incident ―confirms the fears of human rights community that it will 
take some time before the vestiges of the rule of the militariat in Nigeria are eliminated.‖ 
The proximate cause of the Odi massacre was the abduction and subsequent killings of 
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seven policemen (by some Odi youth) that were on intelligence mission in Odi,74 the 
second largest town in Bayelsa state.  The Obasanjo regime saw the killings of the 
policemen as Egbesu challenge to the Nigerian state.  By way of a response, Obasanjo 
gave a two weeks ultimatum to then Bayelsa state Governor, Chief DSP 
Alamieyeseigha, to produce the culprits, the failure of which saw ―the Federal 
Government ordered the Odi punitive military expedition (known as Operation HAKURI 
II) in which over 2000 people lost their lives, thousands displaced and properties 
destroyed‖ (Environmental Rights Action, 2002: 7).  In his reaction to this particular 
incident, the IYC President, Felix Tuodolo declared:  
It is clear to us that the whole operation was designed to instil fear on the Ijaw 
and stop the mass of our suffering people from continuing our peaceful struggle 
to end the degradation of our lands and creeks by transnational oil companies 
and the Nigerian state.  We insist that oil companies should not continue to 
operate in our communities under the cover of soldiers of occupation (IYC Press 
Release, 1999, quoted in Ojakorotu, 2008).   
The spates of hostage taking and oil bunkering75 in the Niger Delta are clear indications 
that all is not well with Niger Delta, nay the Nigerian state.  In 2011, the Ijaw resistance 
is spearheaded by such militant groups as the Niger Delta People‘s Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF) led by Mujahedeen Asari Dokubo‘s, the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) led by 
Tom Ateke, and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).‖ In 
particular, NDPVF and MEND (created in 2005) have proved deadly with increasing 
pipeline vandalism, kidnappings and taking over oil facilities in the volatile Niger Delta.  
Both movements purport that their activities are geared at a redistribution of oil wealth 
and increased local control of their natural resources (Agbiboa, 2011b).  According to 
Badmus (2010: 343), ―these groups are notorious for kidnappings of oil workers 
(especially expatriates) for ransom with negative effects on the Nigerian state since the 
deteriorating security has forced some oil services firms to leave the country.‖ (see 
Table 12 for select militant groups operating in the Niger Delta).76 According to one 
United Nations (UN) Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs report, in January 
2007 alone, ―at least 50 foreigners were taken hostage, two of who were killed.  That 
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 The seven policemen were in Odi to uncover the plan of Ijaw youth to attack ethnic Yoruba in Lagos as 
a reprisal for the O‘Odua People‘s Congress‘ (OPC)-a pan Yoruba ethnic militant organisation-attacks on 
Ijaw residents of Ajegunle Area of Lagos a month earlier.   
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 Omotola (2006: 22) argues that ―the phenomenon of oil bunkering has also assumed the dimensions of 
a scourge.  This has become so endemic that about 10 percent of Nigeria‘s oil production is now said to 
be going into illegal bunkering controlled by local politicians who hire armed militias to look after their 
interests [and other shenanigans].‖   
76
 It should be stated here that the existence and activities of these movements are sine qua non for 
understanding the intensity of armed conflicts and arms proliferation in the region with their negative 
consequences on the Nigerian post-colony.  But the scope of this study is limited to the Ogoni and Ijaw 
struggles within the contexts of MOSOP and INC. 
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compares to a total of around 70 foreigners snatched in the whole of 2006‖ (quoted in 
Obi, 2009: 104-105).  In a serious bid to undermine the Ogoni and Ijaw quest for full 
citizenship in a more inclusive Nigerian ‗project,‘ corrupt custodians of the post-colony 
tend to compromise the very basis of their tentative hold on power.  Thus, as Okonta 
(2008: 116) says,  
they foreclose the possibility of creating a state that is embedded in society and 
derives its raison d’être from the people, instead siring a pathological construct 
masquerading as a nation that is unable to project power and ambition beyond 
its shores, while exposing the Nigerian state and society to more determined, 
focused, and predatory international forces 
Table 12 
Select Militant Groups Operating in the Niger Delta 
Group Description Activities 
Egbesu Boys of Africa  Militant arm of the 
Ijaw youth Council 
 Seeks justice and 
equity for the oil-
bearing Ijaw 
communities in the 
Niger Delta 
 Not a cohesive 
militant movement; 
members are active in 
other groups 




attacks on oil 
installations. 
Niger Delta Peoples 
Volunteer Force (NDPVF) 
 Led by Mujahedeed 
Asari Dokubo 
 Founded in 2003 
 Members mainly Ijaw 
 Demands more 
control over resources 
for the Niger Delta 
states 
 Modelled on Isaac 
Boro‘s Niger Delta 
Volunteer Force 
(1966) 
Declared all out wars 
vs.  Nigerian 
government in 2004 
and was subsequently 
outlawed; violent 
confrontations with 
NDV mid-2003 to late 
2004; kidnappings and 
attacks.   
 
 
Niger Delta Vigilante 
(NDV) 
 Led by Ateke Tom 
 Members mainly Ijaw 
Violent confrontation 
with NDPVF mid-2003 




Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger 
 Emerged December 
2005 
Many of the recent 
hostage tasking and 
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Delta (MEND)  Close links to NDPVF 
 Demands: 100 % 
control of oil wealth; 
release of Dokubo; 
release of 
Alameiyeseigha 




attacks on oil facilities; 
armed clashes with 
security forces 
between 2005 and 
January 2006. 
Source: Ikelegbe 2000, p.219. 
Irrespective of the differences in their background, leadership style, organisational 
profile, action plans and area of operations, social movements in the Niger Delta, 
according to Ikelegbe (2001: 457), have adopted such broad modalities as: 
 Advocacy and agitation (intended to raise public awareness on the plight of the 
people of the Niger Delta through ―press statements, interviews, conference 
communiqués, advertorials, commentaries and publicized meetings‖). 
 Dialogue (which has found expression in the call for meetings and consultation 
with a view to reconciling the communities and the oil multinationals). 
 Monitoring (of MNOC and government activities in the Niger Delta especially in 
volatile communities where there is no love lost between the key players). 
 Popular action (against MNOC and the state). 
 Litigation (resort to the legal process to compel MNOCs for instance, to clean up 
oil spills and to pay compensation to affected communities). 
 Armed confrontation (in extreme cases where all the other methods appear to 
have failed (Ikelegbe, 2001: 457-460) 
Ikelegbe (2001: 460) further notes that there is some sense of understanding, support 
and congruence between the groupings and their modus operandi.  As a matter of fact, 
―the methods used by the various groups have tended to be dictated by the 
expediencies of regime type, disposition, and international support‖ (Ikelegbe, 2001: 
460).  Thus far, our discussion in this chapter has revolved around the proximate or 
catalytic causes of the Niger Delta conflict.  The next chapter moves further afield to 
explore the international ramifications of the Niger Delta conflict; it also assesses the 
extent to which the internationalisation of the plight of the Niger Deltans (especially by 
MOSOP and MEND) has affected policy shifts and attitudinal change on the part of key 





The Internationalisation of an Internal Resistance 
5.1 Introductory Remarks 
The inclusion of the Ogoni resistance into the global rights agenda, its success in 
waging one of the most sophisticated environmental rights struggles in the 1990s 
was predicated not merely on the co-optation of the global rights discourse on 
the universalisation of human rights and freedom, but also a solid project of local 
popular empowerment under a conscious leadership.  The social force of the 
Ogoni, empowered the case through, and in the global rights discourses, and 
won the attention and support of significant sections of global civil society to the 
cause of local resistance (Obi, 1998a). 
This section unpacks the crisis in the Niger Delta with special focus on its international 
dimension by which is meant the involvement of international non-governmental 
organisations in the politics of local governance in Nigeria.  It takes as its point of 
departure the seismic events in the 1990s (especially the emergence of organised 
pressure groups and their protestations against human rights abuses) that underscored 
the international community‘s engagement with an issue that could have been regarded 
as Nigeria‘s domestic affair.77 In tackling its thematic concern, this section probes the 
extent to which the internationalisation of the crisis engendered both attitudinal and 
policy shifts on the part of key actors.  At the onset, it is useful to bear in mind that very 
few scholars have actually explored the international ramifications of the Niger Delta 
conflict.   Hence this section helps to advance a growing field of knowledge and to 
facilitate a more nuanced understanding of the Niger Delta conflict.  
5.2 The Ambivalence of the International Community 
The rethinking of development-related policies in the West was underscored by two 
salient factors: the end of the Cold-War era and the failures of structural adjustment 
programmes (SAP) to meet their intended results.  The problem was that ―structural 
adjustment programmes had not empowered the rural majority in Africa—ostensibly the 
target beneficiaries of the project‖ (Okonta, 2008a: 120).  Instead, it had allowed 
autocratic leaders in Africa (the likes of Ghana‘s Jerry Rawlings, Uganda‘s Yoweri 
Museveni, and Ethiopia‘s Meles Zenawi) to profit inordinately from the contentious 
thesis of neo-liberalism which argued that structural adjustment policies can only 
operate under ―a courageous, ruthless, and perhaps undemocratic government‖ 
(Clapham, 1996: 193, quoted in Okonta, 2008a: 122).  Following the end of the Cold 
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War in the 1990s, the linkage between economic development and ‗good governance‘ 
began to crystallize among Western governments and disillusioned aid donors.  No 
wonder the World Bank and the Western governments began to ‗urge‘ African leaders 
to adopt the principle of ‗good governance‘ in all their practices (Okonta, 2008a: 120; 
Ake, 2000: 128).  
However, Nigeria‘s leaders frowned at the new political conditionality of ‗good 
governance‘ as espoused by the West.  Why?  Because, as Okonta (2008a: 121) 
argues,  
if ‗good governance‘ had been translated into democratisation in practical terms, 
the concept would have had to create, in the Niger Delta and elsewhere in the 
country, an emancipatory project that would have been forced to engage 
seriously the demands of such groups as MOSOP for self-determination and a 
fair share of Nigeria‘s oil receipts, as contained in the movement‘s bill of rights. 
The Nigerian elite, yoked to a state whose politics still revolved around 
competition for spoils, could not afford to open up the political space to potential 
challenges such as MOSOP. It was, therefore, in the ruling elite‘s interest to 
suppress MOSOP, and the threat to the elite‘s sources of self-reproduction that 
the movement represented. 
It is useful to underscore the opportunistic tendency for Western agencies and 
governments to foist a preferred system of government, such as electoral democracy, 
on post-colonial African leaders.  Usually, such a ‗suggested‘ system of government 
becomes a criterion for foreign aid and trade between both African and Western 
countries.  On this note, Ake (2000: 129) has argued that these Western countries 
support electoral democracy of limited depth ―which tends to see political pluralism and 
free and fair elections rather too ubiquitously.‖  Elsewhere, Ake (2000) insists that 
‗established democracies‘ are not able to offer the developing countries clear and 
meaningful standards of democratisation to relate to.  This is because they themselves 
have  
no clear and meaningful standard of democracy, a condition arising from the 
growing alienation of the practice of democracy from the Western ideology of 
democracy and the concerted effort by powerful interests to deradicalize 
democracy by offering a profusion of definitions which trivialize it (Ake, 2000). 
This aside, the duplicitous and quasi-democratic stance of the Western government and 
international agencies, ―when confronted with the option of choosing between their 
strategic interests and whipping into line a regime that has been implicated in the gross 
violation of the human rights of its own citizens‖ (Soyinka, 2006: 496), is crystallized in 
the words of Okonta (2008a: 121): 
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The ambiguous stance of Western governments and international agencies to 
‗deeper‘ democracy – as represented by groups like MOSOP – which called on 
General Ibrahim Babangida (Nigeria‘s military ruler between 1985 and 1993) and 
his successor General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) to hold free and fair elections in 
Nigeria, while declining to sanction them when they came down heavily on 
grassroots democratic movements like MOSOP, is a function of the core need of 
these Western countries to continue to maintain an expedient institutional 
framework to protect their own parochial interests in politically volatile countries 
such as Nigeria. 
Okonta (2008a: 123) further argues that  
in condoning the excesses of General Abacha‘s corrupt military dictatorship in a 
Nigeria that was clearly unable to deliver social order and development to its 
people, these industrialized countries and the oil companies that service them 
collaborated to retard the emergence of a Nigerian state at ease with itself and 
enjoying the support and confidence of its citizenry. 
Now, the institutional framework best suited to securing and exploiting the oil fields of 
the deemed to be a regime of political authoritarianism, epitomized in Nigeria by the 
military junta.  Nnameka Achebe, an erstwhile director of Shell Nigeria noted candidly, if 
insensitively, in an interview with the Irish Times (February 2, 1996) two months after 
Saro-Wiwa was executed: ―For a commercial company trying to make investments, you 
need a stable government.  Dictatorships can give you that.‖  This line of reasoning 
seems to resonate with the sole objective of colonial rule, which can be gleaned from its 
―laws, routines, and command relationship with civil society‖ (Okonta, 2008: 122; Ake, 
2000: 114).  In the same way that the colonialists, acting in tandem with collaborating 
local elites, worked to exploit the resources of peasant producers and to forcefully 
silence every dissenting voice, ―so too did Shell and Western countries rely on General 
Abacha‘s military regime and—to a lesser extent— comprador elements and local 
notables in Ogoni and elsewhere in the country to [violently] contain MOSOP‖ (Okonta, 
2008a: 122; Boele et al.  2001: 74-86).   
The question of Nigerian featured prominently in the agenda of the Commonwealth 
meeting held in Auckland, New Zealand, in 1995.  The strenuous efforts of Ken Wiwa—
Saro-Wiwa‘s eldest son—were frustrated in Auckland when he attempted to urge the 
heads of states to take an unequivocal stance on the dreadful fate he told them was 
about to befall his father.  Despite his appeal, ―the official Commonwealth position, 
supported by former South African President Nelson Mandela, was that ‗constructive 
engagement‘ and ‗quiet diplomacy‘ were the best way to engage the Abacha regime‖ 
(Wiwa, 2000: 11, quoted in Okonta, 2008a: 124).  In what with hindsight could only be 
considered to have been ―an act of unprecedented political recklessness, and a 
diplomatic faux pas‖ (Uhomoibhi, 2008: 239), the Abacha regime executed (on 10 
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November 1995) nine human rights activists from the Ogoni area, in the Niger Delta 
region of the country, including the author and human right activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa.  
This incident generated various reactions from the international community.78  
Uhomoibhi (2008: 239) notes that ―the sheer bravado of committing an execution on the 
eve of the Commonwealth summit infuriated its leaders,‖ some of whom, most 
prominently South Africa‘s Nelson Mandela, had pleaded with the government for a stay 
of execution.  According to Ekineh (1997: 269), ―no incident in Nigeria has shocked the 
outside world so horribly as the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni 
leaders by the Nigerian military junta on the 10th of November, 1995.‖  Further, Ekineh 
(1997: 268) argues that  
[m]any of the commonwealth leaders at their Auckland, New Zealand conference 
were horrified by the sentence of the tribunal.  Even at that stage, Mr. Robert 
Mugabe of Zimbabwe demanded stiff measures against the Nigerian military 
government.  In South Africa, Archbishop Tutu, in a powerful speech, urged the 
Commonwealth to expel Nigeria until democracy was restored. But as some of 
the leaders hesitated, Her Majesty, the Queen, in an unusual manner, implored 
the Commonwealth to be seen to have some moral values. 
The first international body to respond to the execution was the Commonwealth of 
Nations. In the midst of the fury and rage caused by the incident, the Commonwealth 
was not prepared to listen to any justification, proffered by the Abacha government, that 
the activists had been tried and convicted by a court of law and had been duly punished 
for the crime of murder.  In an emergency meeting convened in November 1995, at the 
Commonwealth retreat in Millbrook, New Zealand, Nigeria was suspended by the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM).79  Uhomoibhi (2008: 240) 
notes that a committee—the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG)—was 
also set-up to monitor Nigeria‘s implementation of the Harare principles and to work 
towards the country‘s eventual return to the Commonwealth organisation. Further, 
CHOGM agreed that ―... if no demonstrable progress was made towards the fulfilment of 
these conditions (democratisation and respect for human rights/release of political 
prisoners) within a time frame (of two years), Nigeria would be expelled from the 
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 The British Prime Minister, Mr. John Major, called the hanging ―Judicial Murder‖ (quoted in Ekineh, 
1997: 270). 
79
 The organisation‘s reaction was informed by the Harare Declaration of 20 October 1991 (Ojakorotu, 
2008). By way of a brief background,  at the Commonwealth Head of Government Meeting held in 
Harare, Zimbabwe in 1991, Commonwealth leaders had adopted a set of principles in a declaration in 
which they pledged to respect and uphold the values of democracy, ‗good governance‘, and human 
rights. They also pledged to promote the observance of these principles in their respective countries as 
the basis for sustained economic and social development; and as ―a catalyst for new forms of friendship 
and cooperation with all [nations], in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations‖ (quoted in Uhomoibhi, 
2008: 238-239).   
139 
 
association‖ (Uhomoibhi, 2008: 240).80 At the meeting of CMAG, held in 23 April 1996, 
the organisation recommended measures to force the Nigerian government to change 
their heavy-handed ways.  These recommendations include:  
Visa restrictions on and denial of educational facilities to members of the 
Nigerian regime and their families, withdrawal of military attachés and cessation 
of military training, an embargo on the export of arms, a visa-based ban on 
sporting contacts, and the downgrading of diplomatic and cultural links (Human 
Rights Watch, 1999). 
It was also recommended that a ban on air links and additional economic 
measures, including freezing the financial assets and bank accounts in foreign 
countries of members of the regime and their families, should be considered in 
consultation with the E.U., U.S. and other members of the international 
community (Human Rights Watch, 1999; Uhomoibhi, 2008: 240). 
However, the above recommendations by CMAG fell largely on deaf ears. During the 
four years of Nigeria‘s suspension from the Commonwealth, two dialogues were held in 
London and Abuja between CMAG and the Nigerian government.  The chair of CMAG, 
Stanley Mudenge, Zimbabwe‘s Foreign Minister at the time, visited Nigeria once to 
monitor developments in the country.  However, ―neither the dialogues nor the threats of 
sanctions against Nigeria approved by CMAG in 1996... had any positive effect on 
Nigeria-Commonwealth relations during this period‖ (Uhomoibhi, 2008: 240).81  Quite 
aside, following sustained international furore over the extra-judicial executions, ―the EU 
tightened its arms embargo on the Nigerian regime, froze aid and extended visa 
restrictions to all Nigerian government officials‖ (Okonta, 2008a: 124).  Former South 
African President Mandela backed calls for a regional summit to discuss punitive 
measures against the Nigerian junta, and to sanction Shell for not doing enough ―to 
show its outrage about what was happening in Nigeria‖ (quoted in Mathews, 1995).  But 
the EU refused to back calls for suspension of Shell‘s planned investment of £2.4 billion 
in the LNG project.  Brussels also rejected the suggestion, by Germany and Sweden, 
that an oil embargo be imposed on Nigeria, arguing that member countries of the EU 
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 See, Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group retreat, Millbrook, New Zealand, November 1995. 
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 Improvements in relations only occurred after the sudden death of General Sani Abacha in June 1998 
and the assumption of office by General Abdusalaam Abubakar. The latter paved the way for a 
rapprochement  between Nigeria and the Commonwealth, through his successful conduct of a transition 
process that ushered in democratic rule in Nigeria in May 1999.  In the words of Emeka Anyaoku, the 
Nigerian Commonwealth secretary-general: ―The memorable day, 29th May, marked Nigeria‘s full 
resumption of Commonwealth membership, to the enthusiastic acclaim of all its members.  It closes an 
unhappy chapter when the Commonwealth was forced to act againt the Abacha regime for its serious 
violations of Commonwealth fundamental principles‖ (see, ―Nigeria regains full membership in the 
Commonwealth,‖ Commonwealth News Release, 1999, issued by the Information and Public Affairs 
Division, Commonwealth Secretariat, Malborough House, London, 1 June, 1999. See also Emeka 
Anyaoku, 2004, ―The Nigerian Crisis,‖ in The Inside Story of the Modern Commonwealth (London, Nairobi 
and Ibadan: Evans Brothers, pp.161-182). 
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imported only 30 per cent of Nigeria‘s oil and that the Europeans would need to discuss 
tougher measures with their partners, including the United States (Mathews, 1995).  
However, what the U.S. and the European community did do, by way of a response to 
the brutal execution, was to withdraw their ambassadors from Nigeria in a show of 
anger (Ekineh, 1997: 270).  The action gladdened many Human Rights Activists around 
the world, albeit the withdrawal was only pro tem. 
By the time the Commonwealth reconvened in September 1997, the industrialised 
countries, led by Britain, had toned down their harsh rhetoric against the Abacha 
regime, and were back to doing business with General Abacha.  U.S.  president Bill 
Clinton followed suit six months later when, during his tour of Africa in March 1998, he 
announced in Johannesburg (South Africa) that his government would not object if 
General Abacha ran for president as a ‗civilian‘ (Clinton‘s aides later corrected this 
gaffe).  But ―the Abacha junta had neither improved its human rights record nor moved 
Nigeria any closer to democracy:  the two benchmarks that the Commonwealth heads 
of government had agreed would be used [as a yardstick] to determine the country‘s 
fate in September 1997‖ (Okonta, 2008a: 124-125).  Indeed, a profitable trade still 
existed between Western governments and the Abacha regime, while lip service was 
paid to the concerns raised by MOSOP and the increasing number of international 
environmental and anti-globalisation groups.  By September 1997, Abacha was still 
firmly in power and was supported by a close group of collaborating elites at local, state 
and national levels.   
The U.N. also responded to the execution of the Ogoni ‗9‘.  Its General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 50/199 on the precarious situation of human rights records in 
Nigeria on 22 December 1995.  The gross violation of human rights by the Nigerian 
junta was strongly condemned by the international body and it recommended members 
of the body to impose individual sanctions on Nigeria (Ojakorotu, 2008: 218).  The 
United Nations Secretary General sent a fact-finding mission to Nigeria in April 1996 for 
an on-the-spot investigation and it recommended, inter alia, that the Nigerian 
government establish ―a panel of eminent jurists to consider financial compensation for 
the relatives of those hanged, and that a committee chaired by a retired judge and 
including representatives of the Ogoni and other minority communities make 
recommendation in connection with the economic and social conditions in those 
communities‖ (Ojakorotu, 2008a: 218).   
Beyond the fact-finding mission, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights appointed a 
Special Rapporteur Commission—headed by Indian Attorney General Soli Jehangir 
Sorabjee—to assess the situation of human rights in Nigeria.  However, the Nigerian 
government strictly opposed the commission‘s activities in Nigeria but they were able to 
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submit their reports based on the facts that they gathered outside Nigeria, that ―the 
Nigerian legal system does not currently provide effective protection of human rights,‖ 
and that ―the rule of law does not prevail in Nigeria,‖ as well as detailing a range of 
specific abuses (Ojakorotu, 2008: 218).  Further, the reports confirmed that 
(a) the Government has failed to address the plight of the Ogoni people and to 
protect their human rights; 
(b) the recommendation of the Secretary-General‘s fact-finding mission concerning 
the appointment of a committee for introducing improvement in the 
socioeconomic conditions of minority communities has been ignored (Ojakorotu, 
2008: 218). 
The reports concluded its findings by insisting that environmental contamination led by 
Shell has not received the required attention and that the Nigerian government has not 
paid sufficient attention to the development and environmental issues in the volatile 
region.  In no different fashion, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in May 1998 ―note[d] with alarm the extent of the devastation that oil 
exploration has done the environment and quality of life in the areas such as Ogoniland 
where oil has been discovered and extracted without due regard to the health and well-
being of the people and their environment‖ (quoted in Human Rights Watch, 1999).  
Further, the reports asserted that ―the rights of minority and ethnic communities—
including the Ogoni people—should be respected and full redress should be provided 
for the violations of the rights set forth in the Covenant that they have suffered‖ (Human 
Rights Watch, 1999).   
Importantly, many Human Rights and pro-democracy organisations also condemned the 
execution and demonstrated against the brutality by the Nigerian military.  Notable 
among these organisations were ―Anita Boddick‘s Body Shop organisation, Amnesty 
International, The Greenpeace Movement and World Council of Churches (WCC) and 
Writer‘s organisations‖ (Ekineh, 1997: 271).  In January 1997, as a follow-up, the WCC 
published a report of the situation up-to-date in Ogoni, and it accused the military in 
Nigeria of ―widespread oppression in oil-rich Ogoniland.‖ It also accused Shell ―of 
causing environmental devastation in the region‖ (Ekineh, 1997: 271).  Further, the 
report stated that  
a quiet state of siege, even today (January 1997) on Ogoniland... intimidation, 
rape, arrests, torture, shooting and looting by soldiers continue to occur... it is no 
wonder why Shell has been the target of international sanction.  Its 
environmental record in Ogoniland and other minority oil producing areas is 
distasteful (quoted in Ekineh, 1997: 271).  
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In spite of the international outrage over the extra-judicial killings, ―the military junta did 
nothing to remedy the situation. Instead, they tried to mollify foreign governments and 
businesses with sweeteners of some sort‖ (Ekineh, 1997: 271).  In its insensitivity to the 
Ogoni quest for citizenship and its rewards, and scheming with self-serving Western 
governments to sustain the political marginalisation of a constituent part of Nigeria, the 
Abacha regime had placed the legitimacy of the state, and indeed its sustainability, in 
question.  Indeed, by reproducing the heavy-handed regime of political authoritarianism 
and material scarcity that colonial rulers had foisted on the ‗natives,‘ ―Nigeria‘s 
governing elite created a congenial atmosphere for Shell and other multinational oil 
companies in the Niger Delta, which were thus freed from the checks and constraints to 
which an active and empowered citizenry could have subjected them‖ (Okonta, 2008a: 
125).   
It is important to note that the struggle of the ethnic minority groups in the 1990s 
witnessed a severe blow hard-on-the-heel of the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, as this event 
scaled down the impact of international support for local resistance.  Saro-Wiwa had 
personified the struggle and now he was no more.  Most importantly, the division that 
his death caused bedazzled the international community and reduced its support for the 
struggle of MOSOP and other ethnic groups in the region.  Besides, since the Nigerian 
state was undemocratic until mid 1999, the INGOs were forced to hold dialogue with the 
military.  Unfortunately, a highly structured and commandist behemoth, practically 
unaccountable to the people, always prevaricated on the human rights issues which 
were prevalent in the Niger Delta.   
5.3 The Globalisation of Local Resistance 
Conceptually, ‗globalisation‘ has been described as ―a multicentric, multiscalar, 
multitemporal, multiform, and multicausal process‖ (Jessop, 2002: 97).  The above 
description captures globalization‘s polymorphous character—it means too many things 
in too many contexts.   Perhaps, the term is best captured dialectically in the context of 
―growing trans-global enmeshment and interdependence among actions, organizations 
and institutions within different functional systems and the lifeworld that lies beyond 
them‖ (Jessop, 2002: 97).   According to José Antonio Alonso (2001: 86), ―globalisation 
represents a new era in the world system, one that is characterised by the dislocation of 
national economies and nation-states, and their re-composition on the basis of global 
relations, in accordance with what the market demands.‖  James Beckford (2003) has 
noted some of the basic contours of globalisation:   
1. The growing frequency, volume and interrelatedness of cultures, commodities, 
information, and peoples across both time and space 
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2. The increasing capacity of information technologies to reduce and compress time 
and space (giving rise to notions such as the global village) 
3. The diffusion of routine practices and protocols for processing global flows of 
information, money, commodities and people. 
4. The emergence of institutions and social movements to promote, regulate, 
oversee or reject globalisation. 
5. The emergence of new types of global consciousness or ideologies of globalism 
that gives some expression to this social interconnectedness such as 
cosmopolitanism (Beckford, 2003: 19). 
Globalisation has evident implications for local politics.  Obi (2009a: 469) argues that ―in 
its drive to totalise the hegemony of global capital over society, globalisation integrates 
or subordinates other viable social systems, and drains democracy of politics, reducing 
it to the managerial enterprise for running the ‗new‘ market society.‖ Subsequently, 
resistance politics becomes the hiding place for those who are excluded by capitalist 
social relations, and who seek to oppose the homogenizing agenda of globalisation.  
Depending on the specifities of each moment, the balance of social forces, and the 
organisational capacity of local social movements, these movements seek forcefully to 
reduce the inequities embedded in the imperatives of global accumulation.  Crucially, 
the globalisation of local resistance derives from the various transnational networks 
used by local movements to gain access to the global stage in order to ―voice their 
grievances, gain attention, and win international support for their struggles against the 
excesses of global-national actors embedded in their locale‖ (Obi, 2009b: 475).   
The local struggle to gain access to the international arena is rests largely on the 
shoulders of transnational social movements.  According to Boli et al. (2001: 393), 
transnational social movements are the ―Heroic Redeemers‖ of oppressed local 
communities.  These transnational social movements are ―impelled by considerations of 
equality, justice, liberty, autonomy, self-actualization, empowerment, cultural 
authenticity, and many other watchwords anchored in the global moral order‖ (Boli et al. 
2001: 393).  In short, according to Peter Willetts (1996), transnational social movements 
constitute the ―conscience of the world.‖ Appreciably, the Niger Delta struggle was 
fundamentally framed by the social movements of the Niger Delta ―in global discourses 
of social justice and human/environmental rights: self-determination and resource (oil) 
control‖ (Obi, 2009b: 475).  The popular belief was that self-determination will provide 
them with the space and access to power that would enable them to reassert control 
over the highly prized oil resources of their communities, as well as force the oil 
multinationals to recognize and respect their rights.  The human rights struggles in the 
Niger Delta revolved largely around exposing wanton rights violations by the state and 
the oil multinationals and on appeals to the international community for support in 
securing redress.  Many of these struggles took the form of ―popular protests, the 
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making of demands or declarations, or the presentation of bills of rights to the Nigerian 
government and the oil multinationals.‖ Prime examples of these include the Ogoni Bill 
of Rights (1990), Addendum to the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1991), the Aklaka Declarations 
of the Egi People, the Ogba Charter, the Isoko Youth Charter, the Oron Bill of Rights, 
the Warri Accord, and the Kaiama Declaration (1998) of the Ijaw ethnic minority group. 
In 2000, the Niger Delta Congress – a coalition of oil minorities‘ movements – sent the 
Niger Delta Bill of Rights to the U.N.  Organisations like the Niger Delta Women for 
Justice (NDWJ) and the Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria 
(ERA/FoEN) have campaigned vigorously over the years against human rights 
violations by the Nigerian military and repeated oil spills by oil multinationals in the Niger 
Delta from the 1990s to the present.  In the 1990s, challenges to transnational 
corporations on their socio-environmental record accelerated in pace with economic 
globalisation.  As Boele et al. (2001: 122-123) notes: 
Indigenous people, local communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
ethical investors, consumers and the general public started to question the 
behaviours of corporations and the economic paradigm they represented. Social 
movements, equally globalised and often using new global communication tools, 
identified these issues and repatriated them to the home countries of 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs). 
The Ogoni resistance, in particular, was emblematic of how a transnational 
corporation‘s unwillingness to recognize the emergence of powerful new forces in civil 
society on a global scale, and to adjust its corporate strategy to manage stakeholder 
interest, ultimately led to tragedy, eroded its image and social capital, and threatened its 
long-term profitability.  Given the strategic importance of the Niger Delta, it was to be 
expected that the Ogoni resistance would capture the attention of industrialized 
countries whose leaders, in collaboration with Shell, would seek out local allies to 
mediate in the crisis and ensure that their interests were protected, and where possible, 
further enhanced (Okonta, 2008).  The high level of articulation of the Ogoni situation in 
various position papers, speeches and interviews by MOSOP leaders, as well as the 
internationalisation of the Ogoni plight, turned MOSOP into the poster child of the 
struggle against the marginalisation, deprivation and dispossession of the oil-producing 
communities in the Niger Delta. 
5.4 How MOSOP Engaged the International Community 
It is important to recap that globalisation of capital has played a key role in the conflict 
between Shell and the Ogoni people of the Niger Delta.  Shell is positioned at the hub of 
the ―global structure of material accumulation which simultaneously concentrates wealth 
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and energy in certain locales‖ (Saurin, 1996: 42).  The phenomenon of globalism had 
effectively excluded and marginalised the Ogoni community.  Given this context, it is not 
surprising that local resistance occurred, because ―it is clear that the very existence of 
the Ogoni came under serious threat.  Their environment has been destroyed; their 
health endangered; they lost many of their sources of livelihood; they lack basic 
infrastructure; and they are subjected to brutal repression from both the multinationals 
and the government‖ (Isike et al.  2007: 32-33).  To make matters worse, the Ogoni 
were deprived of their treasured land since it has been incorporated into globalised 
capitalist endeavours (Giddens, 1999: 18).  This appears to reinforce the view that 
capitalist relations—with its individualism and materialism features—serves to exclude 
people who previously had communal attachments to factors of production like land, as 
was the case in pre-colonial Nigeria.  Mabogunje (1999: 13-14) argues that ―a price-
setting and self-regulating market for land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship 
provides the most important integrative mechanism for a capitalist economy and for a 
capitalist society,‖ which he opines was used to incorporate Nigeria into the 
internationalist capitalist economy to achieve the ―ultimate purpose of the colonisation of 
Nigeria.‖ 
The setting up of the MOSOP became the frontier for the struggle not only in Ogoniland 
but also throughout the Niger Delta.  Interestingly, its activities provided a reference 
point for many other similar demands across the country.  According to Isike et al. 
(2007: 33), ―The Ogoni struggle exemplifies the nature and objectives of the crisis and 
local resistance in the Niger Delta region.  It is an ethnic struggle championed by 
MOSOP to protect the political, cultural, and socio-economic interests of the Ogoni 
ethnic group, and this pattern has begun to resonate throughout the region.‖ Further, 
Isike et al. (2007: 33) contends that ―the insensitivity of the oil companies and the 
Nigerian state to the plight of the Ogoni, the urge for local autonomy or limited self-
determination within the Nigerian federation, and the global support for environmental 
issues, human rights and democracy all combine to underscore the formation of 
MOSOP and its activism in the 1990s‖ (Isike et al.  2007: 33; Miller, 1995: 1-13).  
Claude Welch (1995: 635) lucidly captured the frustration of the Ogoni when he writes:  
The Ogoni live atop some of the richest real estate in Africa...  few Ogoni benefit 
from jobs, developments or amenities in the oil industry.  Instead, they suffer 
environmental degradation that has polluted streams and fresh water sources, 
poisoned land through spills and blowouts and created an atmosphere fouled by 
decades of flaring natural gas. 
The transnational nature of the Niger Delta conflict is partly a result of world publicity 
and efforts of renowned environmentalist and writer, Ken Saro-Wiwa.  He drew the 
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attention of the world community to the plight of the Niger Delta; this paved the way for 
the region‘s entrance into the human rights debate and policy agenda of a large 
movement of NGOs and INGOs.  It must be noted that modern information technology 
had a pivotal role to play in the internationalisation of the Niger Delta conflict.  Quite 
aside, the involvement of INGOs was a sequel to the globalisation of the international 
system hard-on-the-heels of the collapse of the former Soviet Union.  The intervention 
of these bodies has helped to exert some pressure on the oil companies and the 
Nigerian state.  Isike et al. (2007: 37) argues that ―by extending the Niger Delta human 
rights issues beyond Nigeria‘s borders to international organisations, international 
conferences, and the domestic politics of many influential countries, the alliances 
between INGOs and the NGOs, CBOs and social movements have greatly facilitated 
the globalisation of the struggle.‖ 
Under the dynamic leadership of Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP became the earliest minority 
resistance groups in the Niger Delta to tap successfully into ―the dynamics of 
transnational support networks‖ (Bob, 2001: 312; Obi, 2009: 475).  In its influential 1990 
Ogoni Bill of Rights, MOSOP appealed to the international community to: 
a. Prevail on the American Government to stop buying Nigerian oil.  It is stolen 
property.   
b. Prevail on Shell and Chevron to stop flaring gas in Ogoni.   
c. Prevail on the Federal Government of Nigeria to honour the rights of the Ogoni 
people to self-determination and AUTONOMY.   
d. Prevail on the Federal Government of Nigeria to pay all royalties and mining 
rents collected on oil mined from Ogoni since 1958.   
e. Prevail on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to stop giving 
loans to the Federal Government of Nigeria; all loans which depend for their 
repayment on the exploitation of Ogoni oil resources.   
f. Send urgent medical and other aid to the Ogoni people.   
g. Prevail on the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and the 
Commonwealth of Nations to either get the Federal Government of Nigeria to 
obey the rules and mores of these organisations, face sanctions or be expelled 
from them.   
h. Prevail on European and American Governments to stop giving aid and credit to 
the Federal Government of Nigeria as aid and credit only go to encourage the 
further dehumanization of the Ogoni people.   
i. Prevail on European and American Governments to grant political refugee 
status to all Ogoni people seeking protection from the political persecution and 
genocide at the hands of the Federal Government of Nigeria.   
j. Prevail on Shell and Chevron to pay compensation to the Ogoni People for 
ruining the Ogoni environment and the health of Ogoni men, women and 
children (OBR, 1990: 8, see appendix 1). 
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The strategies used by the MOSOP to globalize local resistance have been extensively 
explored and documented (Bob, 2001; Carr et al. 2001).  Lobbying was a key strategy 
deployed by MOSOP to conduct its struggles.  In this regard, the movement‘s activities 
entailed petitioning international organisations and foreign governments over the 
decimation of the Niger Delta ecosystem by multinational companies through their oil 
activities as well as the infraction on human rights by security forces.  Crucially, lobbying 
extended beyond the personal level to the organisational level.  Ken Saro-Wiwa‘s 
attendance at international conferences focusing on environmental rights issues 
afforded him the opportunity to meet and interact with rights activists as well as the 
international media in an attempt to sway international public opinion in favour of the 
beleaguered people of the Niger Delta.  The import of such lobby was to influence the 
international community to exert pressure on the MNOCs to change their harsh policies 
and attitudes towards the crisis in the Niger Delta and the plight of people.   
Saro-Wiwa‘s efforts in this regard were underscored by certain factors as attested to in 
his personal reminiscences.  According to Saro-Wiwa:  
Three events… encouraged [me] to… place the issue before the world: the end 
of the Cold War, the increasing attention being paid to the global environment, 
and the insistence of the European Community that minority rights be respected, 
albeit in the successor states to the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia.  What 
remain[ed] to be seen [was] whether Europe and America [would] apply in 
Nigeria the same standards which they have applied in Eastern Europe (Saro-
Wiwa, 1992). 
The global minority and human rights movements gave a welcomed fillip to the Ogoni 
cause by facilitating access to the global NGOs, transnational institutions, and media 
platforms and exposed their struggles to worldwide acknowledgement, including awards 
from prominent human rights bodies.  On the other hand, they provided the medium for 
exposing the rights violations perpetrated by the oil multinationals and thereby called 
into question the reputation of the latter in Europe and North America (Fleshman, 2000: 
181).  Organisations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International promoted the 
MOSOP cause and are still very much involved in publishing reports about the poor 
state of human rights and inept governance in the Niger Delta region.  In this way, these 
organisations have contributed towards the re-setting of the international agenda by 
forcing their concerns into the mix of issues and by insisting that ―the international 
community has a collective and humanitarian responsibility to ensure that rights-abusing 
governments and multinational companies must be called into account for their 
behaviour towards fellow global citizens‖ (Isike et al.  2007: 37).  In a study of 
transnational linkages in global support networks, Bob (2001: 317) attributes the 
148 
 
success of MOSOP to ―direct lobbying of transnational NGO‘s,‖ and ―networking by the 
movement‘s leaders at international conferences.‖ 
It is instructive to note that MOSOP‘s initial framing of its conflict around ethnic minority 
rights ―left most of MOSOP‘s initial contacts unmoved‖ until it strategically ―reframed its 
grievances to highlight environmental problems caused by a Shell subsidiary,‖ and 
demonstrated its capacity for mass mobilization and grassroots legitimacy (Okonta, 
2008b).  These latter actions attracted the likes of Greenpeace, Sierra Club, and 
Friends of the Earth to rally around the Ogoni cause (Bob, 2001: 319).  Some credit for 
the transnationalisation of the MOSOP struggle is attributed to the feisty Ogoni writer 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, who played a pivotal role in the strategy for ―issue framing,‖ 
―networking,‖ using the global media to promote the Ogoni cause and using his 
resources and international contacts to maximum advantage (Bob, 2001: 319-321).  
Saro-Wiwa exposed the plight of the Ogoni to the United Nations Minorities Council, 
―calling for the recognition of the Ogoni people as one of the world‘s endangered 
minorities‖ (Soyinka, 1996: 4).  MOSOP also used the Internet, TV documentaries, 
publications, and public lectures to advance its cause.   
Importantly, the activities of such trans-boundary allies, which centered on the global 
rights discourses, left a major dent on the image of oil multinationals in their home 
countries.  Their activities included demonstrations, sit-ins, and consumer boycotts of 
Shell products, especially after the outrage caused by the hanging of nine Ogoni 
environmental rights activists in November 1995.  In the same manner, the picketing of 
Shell offices and stations worldwide as well as a steady stream of complaints in the 
form of emails, faxes, and letters from all parts of the world placed Shell on the 
defensive, even if on some occasions it admitted its shortcomings.  The same pressure 
from consumers and campaigners exerted pressure on Shell to admit that its 
environmental policies were a sham (Carr et al.  2001: 151-161).  Among the INGOs 
that threw their weight behind the Ogoni cause included: Gaia Foundation, Body Shop, 
Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Amnesty International, Pen 
International, and the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO).  
MOSOP and other local movements in the Niger Delta established branches in Europe, 
the USA, and Canada, from where they coordinated their global struggle (Obi, 2009: 
476).   
In particular, following a meeting with MOSOP delegates at a United Nations (UN) 
conference on indigenous peoples in Vienna, Australia, in July 1993, the Roddicks—
then owners of The Body Shop82—had developed a close networking relationship with 
                                                          
82
 The Body Shop is a cosmetic chain with shops in major European and American cities specialising in 
‗organic‘ and ‗environmentally friendly‘ beauty products.  The Body Shop had been campaigning to 
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Saro-Wiwa and the movement he championed.  The Body Shop was to establish the 
Ogoni Foundation in London in early 1995 in response to the human rights abuses in 
the Niger Delta.  Albeit with varying degrees of success, the transnationalisation of local 
resistance hurt corporate oil interests, forcing them to respond to allegations that they 
are not meeting international health, safety and environmental standards and they are 
guilty of collusion with Nigeria‘s dictatorial state to violate the rights of the Niger Delta oil 
minorities.  On a more critical note, the Ogoni struggle throws into bold relief the 
limitations of the ―one issue‖ campaign of some of these international social movements 
that take on the cause of the ―local people‖ (Okonta 2008b: 265).  In particular, Okonta 
(2008a: 125-126) notes: 
The Body Shop and Greenpeace – two leading international actors that took on 
Shell‘s dismal social and environmental performance in Ogoni – constructed and 
imposed a hegemonic ‗civil society‘ discourse on an otherwise complex political 
problem that could have been better served by a more nuanced, balanced and 
realistic approach, informed by the specificity and historicity of the case. 
Besides, as MOSOP and the Ogoni discovered after the tragic hanging of the ‗Ogoni 
nine,‘ support from transnational advocacy networks that lack the necessary 
wherewithal and occupy the lower end of hegemonic global power relations is not 
sufficient to grant the forces of local resistance decisive victory (Obi, 2009: 477).  In 
response to the protests and trenchant criticisms of MOSOP and other transnational 
advocacy groups, the oil multinationals framed their responses in the language of public 
relations and damage control (Obi, 2009b: 476).  In particular, officials of Shell Nigeria 
and its parent body, Royal Dutch/Shell, met in the offices of Shell International 
Petroleum Company (SIPC) in Waterloo, London on 15 and 16 February 1993—five 
weeks after the Ogoni had organised a successful National Day march to protest the 
company‘s continuing devastating policies on their land—to discuss the Ogoni agony.  
Okonta (2008a: 270) contends that Shell in response to the criticism sought to protect 
its reputation by promising an environment-friendly approach to its operation in the 
Niger Delta.  Shell‘s effort was also backed by a $16 million advertising campaign.   
While Shell took the trajectory of corporate image damage control measures, for its part, 
the Nigerian state combined greater state repression of the Ogoni with the use of 
foreign public relations (PR) consultants and lobbying firms to pass off MOSOP leaders 
to foreign governments and international organizations as self-serving agitators bent on 
destabilizing the country and disrupting the political economy.  As Okonta (2008a: 126) 
comments, ―the Nigerian junta hired nine American-based public relations and lobbying 
firms some of which had made their name laundering the image of dictatorships in such 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
highlight the travails of social groups that they described as ―indigenous peoples‖ in South America for 
several years.  The Roddicks were seeking to expand their campaign to Africa. 
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diverse countries as Burma and Iraq, to wage a disinformation campaign in the New 
York Times and the Washington Post.‖ Also, members of the Ogoni elite opposed to the 
Saro-Wiwa led faction of MOSOP were pressed into service to travel abroad to testify to 
the depredations of the Saro-Wiwa led group within MOSOP.  As Obi (2009b: 476) 
contends, ―just as MOSOP transnationalised its protest, the response by the Nigerian 
state also included the transnationalisation of the defence of its actions against the 
MOSOP-led resistance.‖ The Nigerian state also got some support from the MNOC‘s 
that had considerable influence with their home governments.   
During the February 1993 meeting in London, Shell officials were able to recognize that 
the company would still be under pressure no matter what it did to improve public 
relations, until ―the communities feel that their case is been heard and that real benefits 
start to flow from the 3 per cent Committee (the Oil Minerals Producing Areas 
Development Commission [OMPADEC])‖ (Okonta, 2008a: 127).  In their public 
presentation of the Ogoni issue, however, Shell was eager to depict MOSOP as a 
―terrorist‖ organisation that was waging a violent war against the Nigerian state, and to 
legitimize its own business interests in Ogoni (Shell Petroleum Development Company 
[SPDC], The Ogoni Issue, 1995).  The oil juggernaut also made efforts to explain away 
the issue of environmental crisis in the area and the extent of Shell‘s involvement 
therein (an estimated 40 per cent of Shell‘s oil spills occur in Nigeria, though it operates 
in over 100 countries) (Greenpeace International, 1994).  Efforts were further made to 
pit the Nigerian government against MOSOP by alleging that the organisation‘s leaders 
were pursuing a secessionist agenda.  Saro-Wiwa, some officials purported, was 
cynically using the corporation to internationalise a campaign that was fundamentally 
‗political‘ (Greenpeace International, 1994). 
The Body Shop campaign rested squarely on two planks: (1) widespread human rights 
collaboration of the Nigerian government; and (2) the horrific suffering endured by an 
‗indigenous‘ people in Africa at the hands of unscrupulous international oil interests 
(Okonta, 2008a: 127).  Framed in this hegemonic narrative, the Ogoni issue was of 
necessity the only story in the Niger Delta, since to focus on the travails of other local 
communities in the area, who had similar complaints against Shell and other Western oil 
companies, could call into question the validity of the ―indigenous‖ trope (Okonta, 
2008a: 127).  Unlike The Body Shop, the Green pace environmental group, in its Ogoni 
campaign, paid significant attention to the historicity of the Ogoni story, drawing 
attention to the coercive way in which the Ogoni had been co-opted into colonial Nigeria 
in the first decade of the twentieth century (van Gelder and Moerkamp, 1994: 40).  
Importantly, Greenpeace campaigners focused their energies on the environmental 
catastrophe in the Niger Delta and the irresponsibility of Shell in this regard. In a 
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November 1995 Greenpeace Netherlands report, attention was drawn to several modus 
operandi or codes of behaviour for multinational companies that it accused Shell of 
observing only in the breach (van Gelder and Moerkamp, 1994: 40).   
Significantly, the Body Shop and Greenpeace‘s campaigns increased the world publicity 
of the Ogoni struggle, forcing Shell to defend itself through full-page advertisements in 
major newspapers in Britain, the Netherlands and the United States.  But ultimately, 
despite The Body Shop‘s controversial claim on its website that, since the end of 
military rule in Nigeria in 1999, the company (in alliance with the Ogoni) had been able 
to achieve ―a sustainable local environment and appropriate development for the people 
of the Niger Delta,‖ these aspirations remain unrealised in the area (www.the-body-
shop.com/global).  Perhaps, ―it is unfair to expect too much of international groups like 
The Body Shop and Greenpeace, with limited financial and human resources, and with 
no army of their own capable of intervening in Nigeria to resolve the Ogoni crisis‖ 
(Okonta, 2008a: 128).  It is important to note, en passant, that some local groupings 
have joined the internationalisation campaign in the Niger Delta due largely to greed 
and their perceived need to position themselves for potential windfalls from activist 
activities. 
The attempts by Ken Saro-Wiwa to seek the support of the international community can 
be said to have yielded some dividends for the Ogoni people.  In 1992, the chair of the 
British Parliamentary Human Rights Group at the time, Lord Avebury, was in the 
vanguard of an attempt to get Shell to look into the complaints of the MOSOP leaders.  
Similarly, the Congressional Human Rights Caucus of the US House of Representatives 
had also petitioned the military leadership of General Abacha in May 1994, condemning 
its use of armed troops to quell dissenting voices among MOSOP (MOSOP, 1994: 13).  
The Influential Geneva-based World Council of Churches had thrown its weight 
financially behind MOSOP and sent an observer mission to Ogoniland.  So too had the 
UN Human Rights Commission.  In addition, International human rights organisations 
such as Human Rights Watch/Africa and Amnesty International played worth 
mentioning roles in internationalising the Ogoni struggle.  Amnesty International had 
adopted Saro-Wiwa as a ―Prisoner of Conscience‖ following his detention in the wake of 
Giokoo.  The MOSOP leader was also among the three recipients of the Right 
Livelihood Award—described in some countries as the ―alternative Nobel Prize‖—in 
1994 (Birnbaum, 1995).  The internationalisation of the crisis has also helped in 
persuading both the Nigerian government and oil multinationals to moderate (at least 
somewhat) their high-handed approach to the crisis.  Despite lingering problems, the 
general direction of the state and oil multinationals‘ approach has been based on a 
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human security perspective.  To some extent, this perspective has helped to reduce 
repression and exploitation in the Niger Delta. 
Although modest, the internationalisation of the Niger Delta crisis brought about some 
positive outcomes.  These include: (1) an increase in government‘s allocation of funds 
for community development in the Niger Delta, (2) the establishment of the OMPADEC 
in 1992, and (3) Shell‘s incorporation of human rights in its operating principles—these 
principles informed its commissioning of the Niger Delta Environmental Survey in 1995 
(Isike et al. 2007: 39).  Beyond this, there was also the recognition of the human rights 
component of the Niger Delta conflict by General Abubakar, Abacha‘s successor, in 
1998.  While President Obasanjo‘s administration can be criticised (rightfully so) for 
violating human rights in the Niger Delta (as the Odi massacre corroborates), since 
1999, the regime has also made some efforts to respond to the human security aspects 
of the crisis.  For example, one of the first Bills it sponsored was the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) Bill, which eventually established the body in 2000 
and set up various committees to diagnose and recommend solutions on root causes of 
the conflict (Isike et al. 2007: 39). Government has also implemented the constitutional 
provision of paying 13 per cent derivation funds to Niger Delta states for community 
development—albeit the Niger Deltans are still unhappy with the upward review. 
Compared to the pre-internationalisation period, one can argue that there have been 
some positive developments as a result of the internalisation campaign of MOSOP.  
Whatever the merits of these interventions, the reality in the Niger Delta remains highly 
unpalatable.  For the vast majority of the Niger Deltans, living conditions remain 
unbearable and the causal factors of these insupportable conditions remain 
substantively unchanged (Isike et al.  2007).  In the end, Okonta (2008: 133) argues that 
the international community failed MOSOP and the Ogoni on the two issues that 
mattered most: (1) prevailing on the Nigerian government to honour the rights of the 
Ogoni people to self-determination and autonomy; and (2) saving their leader‘s life 
when he sent out a desperate last SOS (Save Our Souls) plea to Commonwealth 
leaders in November 1995.  In 2011, the Ogoni people are still enmeshed in a complex 
cocktail of authoritarianism, poverty, and spiralling violence. 
The slowness or seeming imperviousness of successive Nigerian political and economic 
leaders to tackle the ―national question‖—seen by Osaghae (1995: 325) as 
dissatisfaction with the structure of power-sharing and resource allocation, and how the 
federation might be restructured ―in a manner acceptable to the constituent sections‖—
is driven by the rentier mentality of the Nigerian state.  Today, as ever before, the Ogoni 
demands for self-representation in key organs of policymaking in the Nigerian 
federation, and for a share of the oil receipts from their land, present the current 
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Goodluck Jonathan-led administration with a window of opportunity ―to reinvent the 
social basis of the state; to include marginalised social and interest groups in a new 
drive towards democracy and development; and to deploy the dynamism, creativity and 
material productivity of an engaged citizenry‖ (Okonta, 2008: 134).  As this paper 
argues in its concluding section, a consociational democratic arrangement, among other 
policy options, is a useful starting point for cleaning-up the inequities embedded in the 
Nigerian federal system. 
5.5 How MEND Engaged the International Community: The 
Militarization of Local Resistance? 
Following the eclipse of MOSOP and Nigeria‘s return to democratic governance in 
1999, it fell to MEND to develop a new strategy for engaging the international 
community with regards to the plight of the Niger Delta people.  MEND‘s strategy took a 
new form of the militarization of local resistance.  The emergence and operations of 
MEND has negatively affected the global access to the oil in the Niger Delta, 
necessitating the securitisation of oil commerce in the context of the ―global‖ energy 
interests of the world‘s powers, spearheaded by the U.S.  MEND‘s emergence as a 
social force in the Niger Delta may be placed between late 2005 and early 2006.  The 
organisation first made the headlines when it successfully attacked the EA oil field off 
the coast of the Niger Delta on 11 January 2006, and followed this with impressive 
attacks on Shell oil installations and contractors, and abducted some expatriate oil 
workers (Obi, 2008: 423).  The origins of MEND can be traced to the Ijaw ethnic 
minority group that is dispersed across the coastal states of the Niger Delta.  As Obi 
(2008: 424) comments, ―MEND is a decentralized broad pan-Delta alliance of Ijaw 
resistance groups in the Niger Delta whose [overriding aim] is to wrest control over the 
oil produced in the Niger Delta from the state-transnational oil alliance, which it has 
targeted for attack.‖  
MEND have carried out disturbing attacks on oil installations, openly exchanged bullets 
with the Nigerian military force, and kidnapped many foreign oil workers.  Unlike 
MOSOP, MEND‘s leaders are unknown, as it communicates with the outside world 
through the means of a dedicated email address, with all its press releases signed by 
an unknown Gbomo Jomo.  While MOSOP had taken to networking with transnational 
advocacy groups, the leadership of MEND have preferred to use the media to reach the 
international audience.  The attacks of MEND have featured prominently in global 
media, and in some cases, the group has given information prior to attacks, possibly to 
demonstrate the inability of Nigerian security forces to stop either its attacks or 
sabotage of oil installations.  MEND has drawn the eyes of the international community 
to the Ijaw plight through the taking hostage of foreign oil workers and the consequent 
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demand for ransom (Obi, 2009: 122). The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs documents that in January 2007 alone, ―at least 50 foreigners were taken 
hostage, two of whom were killed.  That compares to a total of around 70 foreigners 
snatched in the whole of 2006‖ (IRINnews, 2007). 
The use of emails, photographs, and hostage-taking by MEND is a stratagem geared at 
focusing ―the attention of Western governments and the world‘s media on the Niger 
Delta, exploiting the blaze of publicity generated by hostage-taking to press their 
grievances and demands‖ (Junger, 2007).  In particular, MEND has gained most 
attention globally by its threats to ―cripple the Nigerian oil exports‖ (IRIN, 2006). Among 
the other strategies used by MEND to internationalise its plight includes the creative use 
of the Internet to send information to its supporters abroad and ―effective dissemination 
of information and images of captives and well-armed fighters in real time‖ (Obi, 2009: 
478).  One theme that MEND often seeks to project is its capacity to hurt the economic 
interests of the state-global oil alliance and leave a solid dent on the transnational 
production of oil from the Niger Delta. 
In response to the criminal attacks of MEND, the Nigerian state-transnational oil alliance 
has often walked the path of militarisation and securitisation of the Niger Delta.  Three 
major considerations merit our attention.  The first point is that the Nigerian government 
have tended to perfunctorily dismiss MEND as an opportunistic criminal group.  The 
second point is that the post-9/11 global war on terror has tended to provide the 
background for the ―labelling‖ of MEND as a ―terrorist organisation with possible links to 
the other transnational terrorist groups targeting Western oil interests‖ (Obi, 2009).  The 
third point concerns the risks to U.S. interests against the background of the increased 
profiling of West Africa in global security equations as an alternative to the volatile 
Arabian and Persian Gulf (Ianaccone, 2007), as well as a site of increased global 
competition for hydrocarbons in the face of increasing demand and decreasing supply 
(Obi, 2009: 478).  The latter informs Obi‘s (2009: 478) contention that ―the transnational 
alliance has increasingly privileged the security dimension of the extraction of oil from 
the Niger Delta, with local resistance now seen as a threat that has to be removed.‖ It is 
in this context that the offer of military support to the Nigerian government (in 2008) to 
―restore law and order‖ in the Niger Delta by the British Prime Minister (BBC, 2008) 
becomes intelligible.  This was the raison d’être for the recently formed U.S. Africa 
Command (AFRICOM).  AFRICOM has as part of its mandate the curbing of threats to 
U.S. interests on the continent, as well as enhancing the capacity of African militaries to 
ensure security and order within their territories (Obi, 2009: 478). 
On countless occasions, MEND has been profiled by the Memorial Institute for 
Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) (2006) as ―an active terrorist group that uses violent 
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means to support the rights of the ethnic Ijaw people in the Niger Delta.‖ The report 
further notes that ―led by a notoriously shadowy and secretive elite cadre, MEND‘s 
ultimate goal is to expel foreign oil companies and Nigerians not indigenous to the Delta 
region from Ijawland.  In the short run, the group wishes to increase local control over 
the money made from the exploitation of the region‘s abundant natural resources‖ 
(MIPT, 2006).  In its superficial focus on labelling MEND as a terrorist group that 
constitutes an imminent threat to Western energy interests, MIPT missed the more 
salient point of probing the circumstances within which MEND emerged and the content 
of its message(s).  Okonta (2007: 7-11) provides a more nuanced view when he locates 
the emergence of MEND within ―the lethal cocktail of economic deprivation, military 
dictatorship and worsening environmental crisis‖ in the Niger Delta, and its tapping into 
―the fifty year Ijaw quest for social and environmental justice in the Niger Delta.‖ Beyond 
this, while MEND has kidnapped foreign oil workers as part of resistance movement, ―it 
has released all such hostages after a period, all unharmed, giving credence to the view 
that they are used to draw international attention to the injustice in the region, seen as 
an important aspect in globalising local resistance in the Niger Delta‖ (Obi, 2009: 123).  
MEND‘s spokesperson, Jomo Gbomo, once enumerated the objectives of MEND in an 
interview with Brian Ross: 
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is an amalgam 
of all arm bearing groups in the Niger Delta fighting for the control of oil revenue 
by indigenes of the Niger Delta who have had relatively no benefits from the 
exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian government and oil 
companies over the last fifty years (quoted in Obi, 2009: 123). 
From the above, one can conclude—with a good degree of accuracy—that MEND‘s 
anger is directed primarily at the Nigerian government and the oil multinationals, which, 
in tandem with the Oloibiri metaphor, are held culpable for decades of plunder and 
pollution of the oil-rich Niger Delta.  Having probed the internationalisation of local 
resistance in the Niger Delta, with especial focus on MOSOP and MEND, the 
concluding chapter goes in search of solutions to the current impasse in the Niger Delta; 
it suggest alternative strategies for the creative, ordered and amicable management of 





In Search of Solutions 
6.1 Introductory Remarks 
After over 50 years of independence, Nigeria stands helplessly at a political crossroads 
as it struggles to emplace legitimate and accommodative instruments of governance.  
The country‘s cultural cleavages are not just severe and enduring; they have become its 
major Achilles heel.  These cleavages are further exacerbated by the general sense 
among those who perceive themselves to be outside the corridors of power that their 
communities are poor and illiterate, lacking adequate social services, and without the 
accoutrements of development due to lack of adequate representation in government 
(Uzodike, et al.  2010: 175).  This is brought into stark relief when we recall the many 
ethnic minority groups in the Niger Delta whose oil resources have served as cash cows 
for Nigeria‘s foreign exchange earnings for more than three decades.  For such 
communities, ―majoritarian democracy has served both to legitimize and to facilitate 
their political marginalisation and the associated economic exploitation, poverty and 
development‖ (Uzodike, et al.  2010: 175).   
Spotlighting Africa, Ake (1996: 129) argues that the continent ―requires somewhat more 
than the crude variety of liberal democracy that is being foisted on it, and even more 
than the impoverished democracy that prevails in the industrialised countries.‖ Ake 
further avows that Africa needs a democracy that ―puts as much emphasis on collective 
rights as it does on individual rights‖—a form of democracy marked by ―incorporation 
and power sharing which ensures as much participation, inclusivity and representativity 
as possible‖ (Ake, 1996: 132, emphasis added).  Given the context of Nigeria‘s political 
processes and organisations as well as the severe structural segmentation of many of 
its ethnic groups, it seems plausible to work toward fashioning an instrument of 
governance that has the right ingredients for cushioning cultural cleavages while 
creating an enabling space within which political and economic development can 
blossom.   
Assuming the highly contestable, albeit popular, view that democracy is the most 
suitable system of governance, this section proposes to revisit and offer the idea of 
consociational democracy83 (or power-sharing) as a potentially effective long-term 
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The theoretical merit of consociationalism is reflected in the application of its tenets over the years in 
analyzing accommodation and power sharing in different countries.  It has been used in the study of 
Austria (Powell, 1970; Luther and Muller, 1992), Lebanon (Dekmejian, 1978), Switzerland (Steiner, 1990; 
Lehmbruch, 1993; Linder, 1994), Belgium (Zolberg, 1977), Malaysia (Von Vorys, 1975; Zakaria, 1989), 
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formula for mitigating Nigeria‘s ethnic minority problems and the associated challenges 
that it poses to the country‘s development, especially in the oil-rich Niger Delta.  The 
overriding position taken in this section is that the winner-takes-all format of 
majoritarianism is precisely why tensions have remained ubiquitous in Nigeria, despite 
the introduction of political liberalization and democratic politics.  The section concludes 
by adducing some other policy options that may help to alleviate the simmering conflict 
in the Niger Delta, and Nigeria as a whole. 
6.2 Consociational Democracy: A Viable Option? 
In Nigeria, national integration and development involves complex and difficult choices 
by leaders.  But because of the multiplicity of subcultures84 and the lack of resources, 
those choices are often deemed to reflect sectional biases, especially by those on the 
losing side of the policy decision.  Subsequently, policy outcomes may lead not only to a 
regime‘s loss of legitimacy in the perceptions of subordinated groups, but also may 
serve as primary causal basis of instability and repression.  This often manifests itself in 
us/them perceptions within subcultures.  The central aim of consociationalism is to 
mitigate the disadvantageous effects of majoritarian democracy on vulnerable ethnic 
minority groups (Suberu, 1996: 10).  For the Nigerian state, this would mean that no 
cultural group would be excluded from the political system.  The merits would be 
enormous.  In the apt words of Rupesinghe (1987: 538): 
Consociational democracy represents an alternative to what may be called a 
majority democracy where the individual citizen is the most important political 
unit, and political legitimacy is won on the basis of support for the majority of 
individual citizens.  The starting point for a consociated model is groups, for 
example ethnic or religious ones.  A consociated system of government means 
that political decisions are based on collaboration between representatives from 
these different groups. 
The basic assumption of consociational democracy is that societal unity is possible 
despite diversity and cultural segmentation.  Anchored on the works of proponents such 
as Arend Lijphart (1985) and Jurg Steiner (1974), the theory of consociational 
democracy pivots on a formula that seeks to brighten, rather than blighten, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Netherlands (Daalder, 1989; Lijphart, 1969, 1989), Colombia (Dix, 1980; Hartlyn, 1988), Canada 
(Cannon, 1982), the former Yugoslavia (Goldman, 1985; Vasovic, 1992), and a host of other countries. 
84
 Subcultures, as Robert Darl (1966: 371) has noted, ―are distinctive sets of attitudes, opinions, and 
values that persist for relatively long periods of time in the life of a country and give individuals in a 
particular sub-culture a sense of identity that distinguishes them from individual from other sub-cultures.‖ 
In the African environment, relative scarcities, social differences are amplified and demonized in 
absolutist fashion.  As Claude Ake (2000: 61) notes, ―the groups struggle on grimly, brutally, with little 
confidence in the possibility of resolving conflicts peacefully.  This in turn exacerbates the problem of 
political instability for which Africa is deservedly notorious.‖ 
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prospects for peaceful coexistence between people of different ethnic, linguistic, racial, 
regional, or religious subcultures within the boundaries or parameters of a state.  
Partisans of power-sharing assume that despite diversity and cultural cleavages, 
severely segmented societies can enjoy not only equal and extensive rights but also 
access to economic resources and power without having recourse to violence and other 
actions that dampen national development prospects (Lijphart, 1977).  Put simply, 
consociational democracy advocates a broadly based coalition government.   
Deduced from empirical evidence, consociational democracy seeks to explain how 
societies with varied subculture, like Nigeria, can establish peace and democracy.  
According to Lijphart (1977, 1990), consociational democracy is characterized by four 
basic elements:  
a. The participation of the representatives of all significant groups in the 
government of the country (also referred to as grand coalition) 
b. A high degree of autonomy for these groups 
c. Proportionality in resource allocation, political representation and bureaucratic 
appointments.  Minority veto on the most vital issues (quoted in Suberu, 1996: 
11; Uzodike, et al. 2010: 176). 
Lijphart (1990: 503) has explicitly stated that ―power-sharing is not complete unless all 
four (characteristics) are included, and it cannot work well—and certainly not 
optimally—if one or more are missing.‖  In other words:  
…proportionality is especially important as a guarantee for the fair representation 
of ethnic minorities.  But… minority veto – the fourth characteristic of power 
sharing – is the ultimate weapon that minorities need to protect their vital 
interests.  Even when a minority participates in a power-executive, it may well be 
outvoted or overruled by the majority.  This may not present a problem when 
only minor matters are being decided, but when a minority‘s vital interest are at 
stake, the veto provides essential protection.  The veto power clearly contains 
the danger that the entire power-sharing system can be undermined if one or 
more minorities overuse or abuse their veto power.  It works best when it is not 
used too often and only with regard to issues of fundamental importance 
(Lijphart, 1990: 495). 
Like any other constitutional arrangement, the consociational democracy framework will 
not work in situations were critical sections of the societal subcultures opt out of 
cooperative projects with rival groups (Uzodike et al. 2010: 176).  Indeed, as Lijphart 
(1969a: 212) has articulated, the most crucial characteristic of consociational 
democracy rests on the ―overarching cooperation at the elite level with the deliberate 
aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system.‖  Lijphart (1969a: 212) 
maintains that successful cooperation and harmonious living among subcultures rests 
on four quintessential pillars: 
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a. Ability of elites to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the 
subculture 
b. Ability of elites to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the 
elites of rival subcultures 
c. Elite commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its 
cohesion and stability 
d. The degree of elite understanding of the perils of political fragmentation. 
Both Lijphart (1969b) and Steiner (1974) submit that the more political decisions are 
reached by amicable agreement in severely segmented political systems, the higher the 
probability that there will be low hostility between subcultural groups.  Beyond this, 
Lijphart (1969b) acknowledges that there are particular environments which are most 
appropriate for consociational democracy: (1) a balance of power among groups; (2) the 
presence of cross-cutting cleavages; and (3) an overarching loyalty to the state. 
Subsequent developments of consociational theory, especially by John McGarry and 
Brendan O‘Leary (McGarry, 2006; Mc Garry and O‘Leary 2004a; 2004b; O‘Leary 2005a; 
2005b) have introduced an important modification.  O‘Leary contends that ―grand 
coalition‖ (in the sense of an executive encompassing leaders of all significant parties 
and communities) is not a necessary criterion; rather, he demonstrates that what 
matters for a democratic consociation ―is meaningful cross-community executive power 
sharing in which each significant segment is represented in the government with at least 
plurality levels of support within its segment‖ (O‘Leary, 2005a: 13).  For a more nuanced 
appreciation of the current state of consociational theory, it may be useful to examine 
John McGarry and Brendan O‘Leary‘s The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational 
Engagements published in 2004.  The arguments advanced in the stated work have 
also been rehearsed elsewhere (see McGarry and O‘Leary, 2006a; 2006b).  Crucially, 
these arguments are offered as a basis for a broad discussion among scholars on the 
merits of consociation (and other techniques of conflict settlement). 
According to McGarry and O‘Leary (2004b: 5), Northern Ireland and its 1998 Agreement 
―highlights six important weaknesses in traditional consociational theory.‖ These 
include: 
(1) The neglect of external actors. 
(2) The trans-state nature of some self-determination disputes and the necessary 
institutional arrangements to address them. 
(3) The increasing complexity of conflict settlements in which consociational 
arrangements form an important element but require complementary 
mechanisms to deal with ―the design of the police, demilitarization, the return of 
exiles to their homes, the management of prisoners, education reform, 
economic policy, and the promotion of language and other group rights‖ 
(McGarry and O‘Leary, 2004b: 13). 
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(4) Terminological and conceptual inaccuracies primarily associated with Lijphart‘s 
grand coalition requirement. 
(5) The merits of preferential proportional electoral systems. 
(6) The allocation of cabinet positions by means of sequential proportionality rules, 
for example, the d‘Hondt mechanism (see Wolff, 2009: 8). 
In dealing with these weaknesses, McGarry and O‘Leary‘s observations on external 
actors bring consociational theory in line with an established debate in international 
relations on the role of third parties in conflict resolution (see, for example, contributions 
in Otunnu and Doyle, 1998; Walter and Snyder, 1999; Thakur and Schnable, 2001; 
Carment and Schnable, 2003; Weller and Wolff, 2008; Wolff and van Houten, 2008).  
Importantly, their exploration of the provisions in the 1998 Agreement that transcend 
domestic institutions and address the specific ―Irish dimension‖ of the Northern Ireland 
conflict ―reflects a growing awareness among scholars and practitioners of conflict 
resolution that many ethnic conflicts have causes and consequences beyond the 
boundaries of the states in which they occur and that for settlements to be durable and 
stable, these dimensions need addressing as well‖ (Wolff, 2009: 8).85 This observation 
is clearly illustrated in the internationalisation of what may be properly described as 
local resistance in the Niger Delta region. 
Perhaps, the most significant development in consociational theory subsists in McGarry 
and O‘Leary‘s (2004b: 15) contention that the grand coalition requirement proffered by 
Lijphart is overstated, as ―what makes consociations feasible and work is joint consent 
across the significant communities, with the emphasis on jointness.‖ So conceived, they 
draw a distinction between ―unanimous consociations (grand coalitions), concurrent 
consociations (in which the executive has majority support in each significant segment) 
and weak consociations (where the executive may have only a plurality level of support 
amongst one or more segments)‖ (McGarry and O‘Leary‘s, 2004b: 15).  Wolff (2009: 10-
11), however, argues that the subsequent assertion that ―consociations become 
undemocratic when elites govern with factional or lower levels of support within their 
segments‖ (McGarry and O‘Leary, 2004b: 15) is not ―fully convincing either theoretically 
or empirically.‖ Theoretically, assuming that ―support‖ means electoral support, ―a 
                                                          
85
In the case of the 1998 Agreement for Northern Ireland, McGarry and O‘Leary highlights three 
dimensions: ―cross-border institutions which formalize cooperation between the Northern Ireland 
Executive and the Irish government (the so-called North-South Ministerial Council) and renew British-Irish 
inter-governmental cooperation (the British-Irish Inter-governmental Conference); the explicit recognition 
by the two governments of the rights to self-determination of the people in Northern Ireland and the 
Republic, i.e.  the possibility for them to bring about, in separate referenda, a united Ireland if that is the 
wish of respective majorities; and new institutions of regional cooperation, incorporating the UK and Irish 
governments, and the executive organs of the other two devolved regions in the UK and its three 
dependent island territories in the Channel and the Irish Sea‖ (quoted in Wolff, 2009: 8). 
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consociation is democratic or not if its executive emerges in free and fair election, not if 
it fulfils certain numerical tests‖ (Wolff, 2009: 11).  Further, Wolff (2009: 11) argues that 
implicitly, what seems to be at stake is less the democratic credentials of the 
arrangement, but its consociational nature, especially the criterion of jointness, 
as jointness, more generally, implies equality and cooperation across blocs and 
some genuine consent among the relevant mass publics for a democratic 
consociation and thus excludes just any coalition, as well as co-optation of 
unrepresentative minority ―leaders.‖ By extension, an arrangement in which 
elites govern with low levels of support from within their segments might also 
prove less stable compared to one in which an executive can rely on broader 
levels of support.   
Coming to Nigeria, the fairly recent experiences of violence in the country are arguably 
the outward manifestations of its lingering inability to emplace and consolidate effective 
accomodationist strategies (Uzodike et al.  2010: 177).  Though federalist in nature, 
Nigeria‘s federalism is highly regimented and centralised in a number of crucial areas 
such as ―generation and appropriation of government revenues, internal security, 
tertiary education, and the non-diffusion of political power‖ (Uzodike et al.  2010: 177).  
The by-product is that the Nigerian system largely enervates and asphyxiates initiative 
and effort at the state and local government levels where transformative regimes are 
most vital.  In a serious bid to steer clear of the excesses of the inherited colonial 
political structures, the architects of Nigeria‘s post-colonial federalism have sought to 
avoid entrenching the hegemony of ethnic majorities.  Meanwhile, they have engaged in 
a balancing act of sorts both between ethnic majorities and between the notional North 
and South of the country.  In effect, this has meant not only that the yearning of many 
groups seeking self-rule could not be easily met but also that few states outside of the 
majority-dominated ones are remotely close to being homogenous.  As a result, most 
significant minority groups in Nigeria are deeply discontented with a status quo that they 
believe continues to marginalise and under-represent them in national affairs.  For their 
part, many Nigerian leaders seem weary of encouraging a situation where citizens are 
less loyal to the constitution than to their ethnic groups.  Consequently, the majority of 
political leaders who favour centralised federalism view ethno-regionalism as a 
mischievous brew by a motley group of ambitious political and intellectual elites in 
search of personal gain (Uzodike et al.  2010: 177). 
However, the claim that an ethnically driven power-sharing arrangement is automatically 
parochial and in opposition to the desirable objective of developing a truly national 
society is, itself, fraught with difficulties.  Agreed, consociational democratic 
arrangement may have the net effect of bringing about further homogenisation of 
existing societal lines of segmentation.  Such homogenisation is quite strongly linked to 
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ineffective majoritarian models around the world where ethnic nationalisms have 
developed with political competition in marked contrast to the more fluid interactions that 
preceded post-colonial state structures.  A cursory glance at the recent experiences of 
African countries such as Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cote d‘Ivoire, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe is quite 
illuminating.  In Nigeria, for instance, ―the Edo, Hausa, Ibibio, Igbo, Ijaw, Kanuri, Nupe, 
Tiv or Yoruba were never more conscious of their ethnicity than they have become as a 
result of Nigeria‘s post-colonial history, which was driven by the excesses and failures 
of Nigeria‘s majoritarian leaders‖ (Uzodike, 2004: 308). 
In the absence of a political system that is well run with citizens that are truly at peace 
with each other, the homogenisation effect is bound to occur.  This can happen as much 
under a majoritarian system as it would under a consociational arrangement.  However, 
a salient caveat is that, unlike with the power-sharing model, ―it would happen in a 
majoritarian system with an attendant destruction of social capital in the form of social 
cohesion, political stability, human lives and property‖ (Uzodike et al.  2010: 178).  In 
essence, at the heart of the majoritarian democracy is the gamble that, as individuals 
and groups, people will transcend human predispositions and a long line of historical 
evidence to coexist peacefully, and in pursuit of common interests and objectives 
despite resource scarcities.  On the flip side, the power-sharing democratic framework 
not only accepts the objective condition of societal segmentation but also proffers useful 
and intellectually satisfying ways of defusing the conflict-ridden aspects of human social 
and political interactions.   
Subsequently, with individuals and sub-national groups coexisting peacefully, 
―cooperative behaviour, societal cohesion, and transformative developmental processes 
are more likely to occur and take root with a power-sharing arrangement‖ (Uzodike et al. 
2010: 178) vis-à-vis an ineffective majoritarian system.  In the long run, this will not only 
have a net positive effect of reducing inter-group tensions but also will serve to promote 
the desirable integrative attributes that can help foster a truly national society.  In this 
way, a consociational arrangement will significantly ameliorate Nigeria‘s structural and 
administrative problems.  It will not only effectively check the problem of under-
representation but also will create the proper space within which the problems 
associated with the unfair distribution of resources and democratic deficit can be better 
addressed. 
The assumptions and prescription of consociational engineering has, of course, not 
gone unchallenged.  A major criticism levelled against consociational democracy is that 
it focuses primarily on elite behaviour or elite consensus (Seaver, 2000: 247). The 
model deems cooperation between the elite as sufficient to emplace stable democracy 
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in societies with several subcultures.  The nub of the argument is that the emphasis on 
cooperative attitudes between elite ignores the centrality of the lower classes of society 
to sustaining political stability (Misir, 2003).  Quite aside, critics of consociationalism 
argue that ―the model is at best not sufficiently democratic and at worst not democratic 
at all‖ (Uzodike et al, 2010: 178).  This is because of the emphasis that the theory 
places on deference to the elite, combined with the ―secretive nature of elite decision 
making (which) seems to be at odds with normative democratic theory‖ (Seaver, 2000: 
247). Also, some scholars suggest that consociational arrangements are inappropriate 
for less-developed countries (LDCs) because: (1) their leaders are primarily concerned 
with maintaining unity; (2) these states face substantial problems of economic scarcity; 
and (3) there remain unaddressed and significant intra-ethnic conflicts.86 
Lijphart (2002: 41) has come to the defence of consociationalism, pointing to its 
democratic credentials such as the ―participation of representatives of all significant 
groups in political decision making.‖ Whatever the merits of the above criticisms, the 
crucial point remains that minorities are guaranteed representation under a 
consociational arrangement ―while majoritarian arrangements deprive minorities of a 
political voice‖ (Seaver, 2000: 253).  After all, ―the fundamental characteristic of 
democracy...  is the concession of the right of political expression of minorities‖ (Sartiori, 
1987: 320).  Similarly, Lord Acton affirms that ―the most certain test by which we judge 
whether a country is really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities‖ (quoted 
in Sartori, 1987: 320).  It is on the basis of the above premises that the power-sharing 
arrangement is considered necessary for addressing the excesses of under-
representation and marginalisation of minorities in Nigeria, especially in the volatile 
Niger Delta region. 
In order to protect minorities against the abuse of powers by majorities at the state level 
or the level of self-governing entities, consociationalism offers two remedies: ―(1) the 
replication of its core institutional prescriptions within the self-governing entity, and (2) 
the establishment and enforcement of strong human and minority rights regimes at both 
the state and substate levels‖ (Wolff, 2009: 13).  Added to this, both the rights of 
minorities and majorities are best protected in a consociational system ―if its key 
provisions are enshrined in the constitution and if the interpretation and upholding of the 
constitution is left to an independent and representative constitutional court whose 
decisions are binding on executive and legislature‖ (Wolff, 2009: 13; see, also, O‘Leary, 
2005: 55-58).  At the core of consociational prescriptions is, therefore, the emphasis on 
the protection of self-determined (rather than predetermined) identity groups through 
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 See ―Polyarchic Regimes: Consociational and Integrative Democracies,‖ http://www-
polisci.tamu.edu/upload_images/109/312Lecture3ConsociationalDemocracy.pdf.   
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―ensuring both their representation and effective participation in decision making 
especially in the legislative and executive‖ (Wolff, 2009: 13).  Underlying this contention 
is the assumption that representation and participation together will ensure that different 
identity groups recognize that their aims can be achieved, and interests protected, by 
political means and do not require recourse to violence (Wolff, 2009: 13-14).   
Given the requisite conditions, consociational devices in Nigeria will guarantee not only 
political participation but also the representation of minority communities in crucial 
decision making structures, thus ―fixing the democratic deficit‖ (Uzodike et al.  2010: 
179) and bolstering the country‘s federal system.  This would lead to greater political 
stability and consequent peace and prosperity.  Crucially, there is a powerful empirical 
motivation for the adoption of consociationalism to address the centrifugal tendencies 
inherent in the Nigerian state.  Dix (1980) spotlights the success of consociational 
democracy in Colombia—an experiment that could well provide model for its 
implementation in Nigeria.  Dix‘s empirical study demonstrates that ―Colombia (had) 
been a plural society that between 1958 and 1974 (and to a greater degree, beyond…) 
was successfully governed by intraelite agreement, (and) it has been a prime example 
of the operation of a consociational democracy‖ (Dix, 1980: 304-305, quoted in Uzodike 
et al.  2010: 179).   
Findings from Dix‘s study seem to suggest that a power-sharing arrangement in a 
country as divided as Nigeria would be less problematic vis-à-vis a majoritarian system.  
It is clear from the above that majoritarian system has no answer to the serious issues 
confronting ethnic minority communities in Nigeria nor has it been successful in 
resolving conflicts in the country.  Indeed, as Uzodike et al.  (2010:179) contend: ―A 
majoritarian system is likely to further deepen the marginalised status of Nigeria‘s 
minorities.‖  
6.3 Other Policy Options 
Beyond the advantages of implementing consociative mechanisms in the Nigerian 
political process, there is a need for a fundamental change in approach in terms of 
responses to the Niger Delta crisis by the Nigerian state and the oil multinationals.  This 
volte face (change in approach) is urgent because ―as the oil-rich region is, it constitutes 
a serious security risk not only to Nigeria, but to the entire international system‖ 
(Omotola, 2006: 24).  To this effect, seven policy options are considered imperative, as 
supported by Omotola (2006: 24-25): 
1. In order to address the various environmental and developmental concerns of the 
Niger Delta region, this study recommends an increase in the financial allocation 
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to the Niger Delta.  One way of realising this is through an upward review of the 
current 13 per cent derivation to at least 20 per cent.  However, adequate 
regulatory measures should be instituted to monitor the use of such resources 
given the prevalent culture of political and bureaucratic corruption for which the 
area is notorious. 
2. There is a need to regulate the concept and practice of corporate social 
responsibility through a legal framework and the oil multinationals should be 
enjoined to practice such in all their dealings along international minimum 
standards. 
3. All stakeholders should eschew the violent option in their responses to the Niger 
Delta situation.  As demonstrated so far in this study, such a pedagogy of 
violence only serves to exacerbate local resistance. Rather, nonkilling and 
democratic options such as ―popular consultation, persuasion, discussion, and 
consensus building‖ (Omotola, 2006: 24) should be encouraged and given pride 
of place.  This requires the mass media and civil society to do a great deal of 
social mobilisation at all levels. 
4. Youth empowerment schemes are crucial to curbing the high rate of youth 
involvement in ethnic militia groups in the Niger Delta.  Thus, this study 
recommends that issues such as youth forums, employment, education, capacity 
building, and related measures should be accorded the utmost priority by the 
Nigerian government. 
5. The prevalence of poverty and squalor in the Niger Delta has fanned the embers 
of conflict in the volatile region. There is a need to thoroughly engage this 
through poverty eradication programmes. Omotola (2006: 25) has recommended 
that the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) 
should be strengthened and employed in this regard. 
6. Since much of the allocation and compensation money paid currently ends up in 
the private accounts of the state managers, there is an urgent need for the 
governmental and oil companies to devise a transparent regulatory means to 
ensure that allocations and compensations to the oil-bearing communities 
actually get to the people.   
7. Beyond this, the over-reliance on the oil industry in Nigeria has resulted in a 
mono-focus that fails to realise the potential for other economic activities based 
on local assets.  Thus, there is a need for Nigeria to intensify its ongoing efforts 
to diversify the national economy.  According to Omotola (2006: 25), ―this is the 
only option, which in the long run can reduce the country‘s [excessive reliance] 
on oil, making it less sensitive to national income and development.‖  If this 
happens, associated tensions are bound to plummet.  Countries such as Qatar, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Russia, Norway, Egypt, and 
Oman have used petrodollars to transform their economies to economic power 
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